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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs • 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, MARGARET M. 
BECKER, J. LYNN DOUGAN, DIANA LADY 
DOUGAN, PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO., 
a Utah partnership, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BECKERS, DOUGANS AND PARK MEADOWS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is a consolidation of three appeals from the 
Third Judicial District Court: No. 89-0497, No. 89-0607 and No. 
89-0597. 
No. 89-0497: This is an appeal from two orders. The 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick entered an order on December 8, 1988, 
denying a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by First 
Interstate Bank of Utah ("FIBU")• (R. at 1098-1100). That Order 
has never been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court did 
not have and this Court does not have jurisdiction of FIBU's appeal 
from that Order. 
On May 5, 1989, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick entered 
summary judgment in favor of defendants/respondents, J. Lynn 
Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan (the "Dougans"), Frederick G. Becker, II 
Consolidated Cases 
Case No. 890497-CA 
Case No. 890597-CA 
Case No. 890607-CA 
and Margaret M. Becker (the "Beckers") and against the plaintiff/ 
appellant, FIBU. (R. at 1414-17). That judgment was certified as 
a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
No. 89-0607: The second consolidated matter on appeal is 
taken from the summary judgment in favor of defendant/respondent 
Park Meadows Investment Company ("PMD") and against the 
plaintiff/appellant FIBU. (R. at 1514-16). 
No. 89-0597: The third consolidated appeal is taken from 
the denial of FIBU's objections to Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements. (R. at 1511 and 1517-19). 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of these consoli-
dated appeals, except for the appeal from the Order denying FIBU's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2 and Article VIII, Section 3, Utah Constitution. The Utah 
Supreme Court poured over these consolidated appeals to the Utah 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is resolution of the PMD's appeal necessary? 
2. Was FIBU's notice to PMD defective? 
3. Was the acceleration of the Racquet Club Note 
improper as to the maker due to FIBU's failure to comply with the 
terms of the Note's acceleration clause? 
4. Are the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty one 
instrument which should be considered together and with reference 
to each other? 
5. Was FIBU required to give notice of default to the 
Dougans and Beckers prior to accelerating the amount due under the 
promissory note? 
6. Are Dougans and Beckers entitled to reimbursement of 
costs incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
7. Is the December 8, 1988 Order denying FIBUfs 
September 26, 1988 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment a final 
order? 
8. Is FIBU's appeal from the December 8, 1988 Order 
timely? 
9. Assuming arguendo the December 8, 1988 Order is sub-
ject to appeal, did FIBU prove it was entitled to summary judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE 
The determinative rules are: 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The determinative statutes are: 
Utah Code Ann. §§15-4-1 to -5 (1986). 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-12 (1989 Replacement). 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) and (b) (1980). 
(The determinative rules and statutes are set out verbatim in the 
Addendum at A2-6.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 15, 1986, FIBU commenced an action against 
PMD, a debtor under Chapter 11, Frederick G. Becker, II, Margaret 
M. Becker, Victor R. Ayers, Marion P. Ayers ("Ayers"), J. Lynn 
Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan and First Security Bank. (R. at 1-28). 
FIBU, as creditor of PMD's bankruptcy estate, was granted relief 
from the automatic stay to proceed. (R. at 2). FIBU sought relief 
on three causes of action: (1) judicial foreclosure of the trust 
deed; (2) putting FIBU in possession of the property or in the 
alternative appointing a receiver; and (3) claim against Beckers, 
Dougans and Ayers as guarantors. (R. at 1-24). 
On September 26, 1988, FIBU filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on its claims against Beckers, Ayers and Dougans. 
(R. at 723-25). More specifically, FIBU argued that Becker and 
Dougan remained liable on the Racquet Club Note because: (1) FIBU 
did not release any party obligated on the Racquet Club Note; (2) 
the language of paragraph 5 of the Work-Out Agreement was not a 
present release of any obligation of Enoch Smith; (3) the work-out 
agreement was superseded by the closing documents, none of which 
contained a release of the Racquet Club Note. FIBU additionally 
argued on its motion for partial summary judgment that regardless 
of whether Enoch Smith was released, Dougan and Becker were not 
discharged on the Racquet Club Note because the release of a prin-
cipal does not release a fully indemnified surety. Also, the bank 
argued that Becker's and Dougan's contention that the bank's 
impairment of the collateral securing the Racquet Club Note was 
without merit. Finally, the bank argued that the undisputed facts 
established that the Ayers were liable on the Racquet Club Note. 
(R. at 730-798). 
On November 28, 1988, the trial court denied FIBU's motion 
for partial summary judgment. A written order was entered on 
December 8, 1988. (R. at 1063, 1098-1100 and attached hereto in 
Addendum at Alll-114.) That order was never certified as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On February 6, 1989, Dougans and Beckers moved for summary 
judgment in their favor and against FIBU, no cause of action. 
(R. at 1121-23). More specifically, Dougans and Beckers argued: 
(1) the acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was improper due to 
FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the Note's acceleration 
clause; (2) the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instru-
ment and must be construed together and with reference to each 
other; and (3) FIBU was required to give notice of default to 
Dougans and Beckers prior to acceleration of the amount due under 
the Racquet Club Note. (R. at 1124-1202). 
In response, FIBU filed a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment on February 16, 1989. (R. at 1214-15). FIBU moved the 
court for partial summary judgment declaring that it had properly 
accelerated the promissory note from Park City Racquet Club in 
favor of FIBU and that Dougan and Becker were not released from the 
obligations by virtue of FIBU's conduct in relation to giving of 
notice of default under the Note. (Id.) 
On May 3, 1989, the trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Dougans and Beckers and against FIBU. (R. at 1414-17, 
and attached hereto in Addendum at A7-11). The trial court 
also denied FIBU's cross motion for partial summary judgment. 
(Id.) Furthermore, the trial court determined that there was no 
just reason for delay and directed the clerk to enter it as a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (ld_. ) 
Subsequent to the trial court's judgment in favor of 
Dougans and Beckers, they filed a Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements. (R. at 1421-23). FIBU objected to that memorandum. 
(R. at 1456-60). The trial court denied plaintiff's objections to 
Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements and 
awarded them $2,866.08. (R. at 1517-19). 
On May 22, 1989, PMD moved for summary judgment as to the 
claims brought against it by FIBU. (R. at 1446-47). PMD's motion 
was based upon a finding made by the trial court during the hearing 
on Dougans' and Beckers' motion that the notice required to be 
given by FIBU to PMD prior to FIBU exercising its option to accel-
erate was defective. (R. at 1450-52). PMD also moved the trial 
court to direct the clerk to enter the judgment as final in accor-
dance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of PMD and against 
FIBU and entered the judgment as final on July 6, 1989. (R. at 
1514-16 and attached hereto in Addendum at A12-15). 
This case is a consolidation of three appeals from the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. The first appeal was 
taken from the Order entered on December 1, 1988, denying FIBU's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Order, entered on May 
5, 1989. The second appeal was taken from the trial court's denial 
of plaintiff's objections to Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements. The third appeal was taken from the trial 
court's granting summary judgment in favor of PMD and against FIBU. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In December, 1978, Park City Racquet Club, Inc. ("PCRC") 
obtained an $800,000 loan ("Racquet Club Note") from Walker Bank, 
now known as First Interstate Bank of Utah ("FIBU"). The three-
page Note was signed by the president and secretary of PCRC, Becker 
and Victor R. Ayres, respectively. At the same time and in the 
same instrument the shareholders of PCRC, Frederick G. Becker, II, 
Margaret M. Becker, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan, Victor R. 
Ayers, and Marion P. Ayers, guaranteed payment of the Racquet Club 
Note. (R. at 1175-77 and attached hereto in Addendum at A16-19). 
The officers and directors of PCRC were: Frederick G. 
Becker, II, President and Director; J. Lynn Dougan, Vice President 
and Director; and Victor R. Ayers, Secretary and Director. The 
registered agent for PCRC was J. Lynn Dougan. The corporate 
address of PCRC, its officers, directors and registered agent at 
all times material herein was 2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84106. (Id. ) . 
On May 19, 1982, PCRC transferred undivided one-third 
interests in Racquet Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers and they, as 
part of that conveyance assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club 
Note. (R. at 1266-67). In or about August of 1982, Becker, Dougan 
and Ayers sold the Racquet Club to Park Meadows Development 
Company, later known as Park Meadows Investment Company ("PMD"), a 
partnership consisting of Enoch Smith, Enoch Richard Smith ("Dick 
Smith") and Victor R. Ayers. (Defendant Victor Ayersf Amended 
Answers to Request for Admissions, R. at 1179-80 and attached 
hereto in Addendum at A20-22). As part of the transaction, PMD and 
its partners assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club Note and 
agreed to indemnify Dougan and Becker from any liability arising 
from their guarantee of the Racquet Club Note. (I<3. See also, R. 
at 1182 and attached hereto in Addendum at A23-24). 
On September 2, 1982, Dougan sent a letter to FIBU inform-
ing it of those assumptions. (R. at 1522 and attached hereto in 
Addendum at A25-26). Furthermore, FIBU consented to the exchange 
of Dougan's and Becker's interests in the Racquet Club to PMD. (R. 
at 1522, Exhibit L thereto, and attached hereto in Addendum at 
A29-30). On November 11, 1982, Dougan wrote FIBU again informing 
it of the Indemnity Agreement between PMD, the Smiths, Vic Ayers, 
Becker and Dougan. (R. at 1522, Exhibit L thereto, and and 
attached hereto in Addendum at A27-28). 
In the spring of 1985, PMD was experiencing financial dif-
ficulties including an inability to pay on the Racquet Club Note. 
PMD and FIBU entered into discussions to reach an accommodation or 
work-out agreement. (R. at 1184-86 and attached hereto in Addendum 
at A31-35). In the work-out agreement FIBU released Enoch and 
Margaret Smith from all obligations owed FIBU except a $500,000 
loan owed by Enoch Smith Sons Company. In exchange the Smiths 
agreed to pledge an additional $4 million of personal unencumbered 
assets. The Dougans and Beckers were not consulted by FIBU with 
regard to the work-out agreement and were not aware of the 
delinquency or the actions of FIBU and PMD to work this out. As a 
result of the work-out agreement, the Racquet Club Note was to be 
brought current immediately from additional funds provided by the 
Smiths. (Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R. at 1188-91 and 
attached hereto in Addendum at A36-40). 
On January 24, 1986, FIBU sent a letter addressed to Dick 
Smith, on behalf of Park Meadows Racquet Club, giving notice of 
default on the Racquet Club Note, and giving notice that if the 
default was not cured by February 7, 1986, FIBU would take legal 
action. (R. at 1193 and attached hereto in Addendum at A41-42). 
At this time, FIBU did not provide notice of default to either 
the Dougans, the Beckers or PCRC. (Deposition of Frederick G. 
Becker, II, R. at 1525 and relevant portions are attached hereto 
in Addendum at A50-53; Deposition of J. Lynn Dougan, R. at 1526 
and relevant portions are attached hereto in Addendum at A43-49). 
When FIBU sent the notice to Dick Smith, $27,402.17 was required 
to bring the payments on the Racquet Club Note current. (R. at 
1193 and Addendum at A42). 
On or about February 10, 1986, FIBU executed the statutory 
notice of default which accelerated the Note and the notice was 
recorded on February 14, 1986. (R. at 1195 and attached hereto in 
Addendum at A54-55). After FIBU accelerated the Note, and shortly 
after February 21, 1986, Dougan received the statutory notice of 
default pertaining to the Racquet Club Note at the corporate 
office, 2010 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
(Affidavit of J, Lynn Dougan, R. at 1197-1202 and attached hereto 
in Addendum at A56-63). The Beckers have never received a copy of 
the notice of default that was executed by FIBU on February 10, 
1986. (Deposition of Frederick G. Becker, II, R. at 1252, and 
Addendum at A53). 
On March 13, 1986, FIBU filed an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition placing PMD in bankruptcy and automatically staying fur-
ther proceedings. The filing occurred twenty-seven (27) days after 
the statutory Notice of Default was recorded. 
An order granting relief from the stay as to PMD was 
issued on November 15, 1986. (R. at 1-28). Although FIBU had pre-
viously executed and recorded a statutory notice of default 
electing to sell the property by private power of sale under the 
deed of trust statute, it filed a complaint on December 15, 1986, 
pursuing judicial foreclosure. (Ic3. ) At no time did FIBU cancel 
the statutory notice of default. At the request and instance of 
FIBU, the parties allowed FIBU to proceed to sell the Racquet Club 
property at Sheriff's sale. FIBU received all of the proceeds of 
that sale in the amount of $425,000.00 (R. at 757). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Resolution of the PMD appeal is unnecessary and any judg-
ment rendered will be ineffective. FIBU does not seek a deficiency 
claim against PMD. The only relief sought by FIBU from PMD has 
been obtained in the foreclosure of the Racquet Club. Because 
there is no actual controversy left to be resolved between FIBU and 
PMD, FIBU's appeal regarding PMD is unnecessary and the judgment 
below dismissing PMD should be allowed to stand. 
FIBU's notice to PMD was defective. FIBU acknowledges the 
requirement to give fifteen days' notice of default as a condition 
precedent to acceleration. FIBU must strictly comply with the 
requirements of the Racquet Club Note. Although FIBU gave PMD 
notice of default, it did not give PMD fifteen days' notice as 
required by the terms of the Note. Because FIBU did not give PMD 
fifteen days' notice, FIBU's acceleration was improper. The trial 
court's decision that notice to PMD was defective should be 
affirmed. 
Acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was also improper as 
to the maker PCRC due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of 
the Note's acceleration clause. In the lower court proceedings, 
FIBU admitted that the Racquet Club Note required that notice of 
default be given to the maker prior to acceleration. PCRC, the 
original maker, did not receive notice of default prior to 
acceleration. Also, no notice was sent to Dougans and Beckers in 
their capacity as maker. This Court should affirm the lower 
court's finding that acceleration of the Racquet Club Note as to 
T-\nr 
the maker was improper. 
The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instrument 
and should be considered together and with reference to each other. 
In determining the rights and liabilities of the guarantors, 
Dougans and Beckers, the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty must be 
read and construed together. Thus, where the guaranty language 
specifically refers to the Racquet Club Note of which it is a part, 
and the Note and guaranty language were executed in the course of 
one transaction, Dougans and Beckers were entitled to the fifteen-
day notice of default which is a condition precedent to accelera-
tion by the bank. 
Dougans and Beckers did. not receive any notice whatsoever 
with regard to the default and that FIBU intended to accelerate. 
Where the contract of guaranty calls for notice, it is a condition 
which must be met in order to bind the guarantors on their promise. 
Dougans and Beckers should be discharged from their obligation as 
guarantors because notice of default was not given to them by FIBU 
as required by the terms of the parties' agreement. This Court 
should affirm the lower court's ruling that FIBU's failure to prop-
erly give notice relieves Dougans and Beckers from any liability on 
their guaranty. 
Dougans and Beckers are entitled to reimbursement of costs 
incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Dougans and Beckers were unable to develop the argu-
ments presented in their motion for summary judgment and in opposi-
tion to plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment without 
taking various depositions. Dougans and Beckers were the prevail-
ing parties in both proceedings. This Court should affirm the 
lower court's award of costs to Dougans and Beckers. 
The Order denying FIBU's September 26, 1988 Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is not a "final" judgment and is not 
appealable. The written order denying FIBU's 9-26-88 motion was 
entered on December 8, 1988. Appeal can be taken only from a final 
order. The lower court did not certify the 12-8-88 Order as a 
final judgment. Even assuming the 12-8-88 Order is a final judg-
ment and appealable, FIBU's appeal is untimely. FIBU did not file 
its Notice of Appeal until May 16, 1989. Thus, FIBU's appeal from 
the 12-8-88 Order cannot be considered by this Court. 
Assuming arguendo FIBU'S appeal from the 12-8-88 Order is 
proper, it failed to prove it was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law in the lower court proceedings. Genuine issues of material 
fact exist and FIBU is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RESOLUTION OF THE PMD APPEAL IS UNNECESSARY. 
The rule generally accepted by appellate courts is that an 
appeal will be dismissed if its resolution is unnecessary. 
The applicable rule is that when we have 
notice of facts which have the effect of 
making any determination of a question 
unnecessary, or which would render any 
judgment we might pronounce ineffectual, 
the appeal should be dismissed. 
State v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Wyo. 1983). The Supreme 
Court of Kansas has stated: 
This court, under decisions so numerous 
that their citation is neither necessary 
nor required, has long been committed to 
the rule that it will not consider and 
decide questions raised on appeal when the 
record makes it clearly appear that any 
judgment it might render with respect 
thereto would be unavailing or ineffective. 
Another rule of like import, and equally 
well-established, is that when a question 
becomes moot, judicial action ceases. 
Williams v. City of Wichita, 334 P.2d 353, 356 (Kan. 1959). Those 
general rules have been recognized and adopted by Utah, McRae v. 
Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974). 
Resolution of the PMD appeal is unnecessary and any judg-
ment rendered will be ineffective. FIBU does not seek a deficiency 
claim against PMD. FIBU has expressly stated on three separate 
occasions that it does not seek a deficiency from PMD in the case 
below. In response to PMD's Motion for Summary Judgment, FIBU 
asserted two objections to PMD's motion. The one pertinent here is 
that FIBU did not seek a deficiency against PMD. It stated: 
As a review of plaintiff's complaint 
clearly discloses, plaintiff has not 
asserted a deficiency claim against Park 
Meadows in this case. . . . 
The court should therefore, deny Park 
Meadows' Motion for Summary Judgment 
because: 
1. The issue on which it seeks 
summary judgment is not and never has 
been before the court in this action. 
(R. at 1469). FIBU affirmed its position in its Docketing 
Statement filed with this court. Paragraph 5(g) of FIBU's 
Docketing Statement identifies the following as one issue on 
appeal: 
Whether the District Court could prop-
erly grant summary judgment for Park 
Meadows when First Interstate had never 
filed suit against them [sic] for the 
deficiency. (Docketing Statement at p. 7). 
Finally, FIBU reaffirmed its position in response to PMD's Motion 
for Summary Disposition of the Appeal. It stated: 
First Interstate, accordingly, did not even 
name Park Meadows as a defendant under the 
deficiency claim. (Response to Motion for 
Summary Disposition). 
Thus, FIBU has abandoned any pursuit of a deficiency claim against 
PMD. 
The only relief sought by FIBU from PMD has been obtained. 
When FIBU commenced its foreclosure action, PMD possessed legal 
title to the Racquet Club. Because PMD possessed title, FIBU named 
PMD in the foreclosure action. The Trust Deed covering the Racquet 
Club has now been foreclosed and the Racquet Club has been sold at 
Sheriff's sale. (R. at 757). By FIBU's own admission, it has 
obtained all the relief sought from PMD. Therefore, there is no 
actual controversy left to be resolved between FIBU and PMD. 
Because there is no controversy, FIBU's appeal regarding PMD is 
unnecessary and the judgment below dismissing PMD should be allowed 
to stand. 
T-V^ 
II. 
FIBU'S NOTICE TO PMD WAS DEFECTIVE. 
A. The Note Requires Notice of Default. 
The terms of the Racquet Club Note, as drafted by FIBU, 
requires as a condition precedent to acceleration a fifteen-day 
Notice of Default: 
In the event: 
(a) Any installment provided for here-
under is not paid in full within fifteen 
(15) days after its scheduled due date 
. . . then, in any such events and upon 
fifteen [15) days written notice given to 
the undersigned by Walker or its assigns 
which default or event shall not be cured 
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days 
following such written notice, the entire 
remaining unpaid balance of both principal 
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the 
option of the holder hereof and without 
notice or demand, become immediately due 
and payable. (R. at 1175-77 and Addendum 
at A18.) 
FIBU cannot and does not dispute that notice is required. (Brief 
of Appellant First Interstate Bank "Brief of Appellant," at 12; R. 
at 1231). Although FIBU acknowledges the requirement to give a 
fifteen day notice, FIBU's sole argument is that it "substantially 
complied" and that stricter compliance is "hypertechnical." 
B. The Facts Regarding Notice to PMD is Undisputed. 
FIBU sent a letter addressed to Dick Smith on behalf of 
Park Meadows Racquet Club. That letter is dated January 24, 1986. 
There is no evidence in the record regarding when the letter was 
actually mailed. For purposes of argument, the parties have 
assumed it was mailed on January 24, 1986. The letter states: 
The total amount due, $27,402.17, must be 
received in our office by February 7, 1986; 
if not, the lender will take the legal 
actions available to them under the terms 
of the loan documents. 
Thus, the cure period terminated on February 7, 1986. 
C. FIBU Cannot Dispute That It Gave PMD Only Fourteen Days Notice. 
FIBU attempts to argue that it gave PMD fifteen days 
notice. PMD acknowledges that January 24, 1986 to February 7, 1986 
is precisely fifteen days, if the first and last days of the cure 
period are counted. In support of FIBU's position, it quotes from 
the Note the following provision: "Written notice shall be effec-
tive as of the time the same is deposited in the United Sataes 
[sic] mails addressed to the last known address of the undersigned 
or the time of the actual receipt thereof, if earlier." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 15). Based on that provision, FIBU counts the first 
day, January 24, 1986, and the last day, February 7, 1986, and con-
cludes that it gave PMD fifteen days notice. Id. 
Initially, the fact that the letter was deposited in the 
mail does not effect the time computation. Although written notice 
was "effective" as of the time deposited in the mails, this fact 
does not effect the well-established proposition that the day of 
the act or event from which the time period is to run is not 
counted. Kellar v. Eighth Judicial District, 470 P.2d 434, 436 
(Nev. 1970) (Notwithstanding presumption that letter duly mailed 
was received in regular course of mail, addressee was entitled to 
benefit of rule regarding computation of time in which day or act 
of event is not counted). The general time computation principles 
also apply to contracts. Messina v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 390 
N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y.App. 1979); Buehner Schokbeton Company v. 
Hoenfs Crane Service, 500 P.2d 140, 141 (Colo.App. 1972). FIBU 
fails to present any case law to the contrary. 
FIBU also fails to inform this Court that it agreed in the 
trial court that it had only given fourteen days notice to PMD. In 
its memorandum opposing the Dougans' and Beckers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, FIBU identified several facts which it claimed 
were disputed and therefore, precluded summary judgment. None of 
those facts dispute when notice was given or when the cure period 
terminated. (R. at 1232-34). In the argument portion of its 
opposing memorandum, FIBU made no reference to the Note's provision 
that notice is effective on the date the notice is deposited in the 
United States mail. (R. at 1224-85). Nor did FIBU argue that it 
had given PMD fifteen days notice. (Id.) 
Furthermore, FIBU agreed in that memorandum with the prin-
ciple espoused by the Dougans and Beckers that in computing time if 
the first day is counted, the last day is not. Specifically, the 
bank stated: 
The first 20 pages of defendant's memorandum 
(D. Mem. 4-24) are devoted to developing 
in extenso two propositions: (1) a creditor 
must comply with the express terms of an 
acceleration clause to accelerate a debt; and 
(2) in computing a time period a court includes 
either the first or the last day of the applica-
ble time period, but not both. First Interstate 
does not disagree with either proposition. 
(R. at 1237 ) . 
The first time FIBU contended that it had given PMD fif-
teen days' notice was during oral argument. (Reporter's Transcript 
of Proceedings Before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, April 19, 
1989, p. 31, R. at 1532 and attached hereto in Addendum at A64-110). 
At that time, FIBU for the first time quoted the Note's provision 
that notice was effective when it was deposited in the United 
States mail. Then, FIBU half-heartedly argued it had given PMD 
fifteen days' notice. (Icl. at 3 3 and Addendum at A97). In 
rebuttal, counsel for the Dougans and Beckers quoted to the trial 
court from FIBU's opposing memorandum where FIBU agreed to the gen-
eral principle that if the first day of a time period is counted, 
the last day is not. (Id. at 38-39 and Addendum at A102-03). In 
rebuttal, counsel for FIBU abandoned its argument that it had given 
PMD fifteen days notice and contended, as it does here, that its 
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the Note was 
merely hypertechnical. 
D. FIBU Must Strictly Comply With The Requirements of the Note. 
FIBU relies on four cases for the proposition that it sub-
stantially complied with the Note's requirements and that stricter 
compliance is merely hypertechnical and not required. They are: 
Local #1179, Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor Decorator's Union 
v. Merchants Mutual Bonding, 228 Kan. 226, 613 P.2d 944 (1980); 
Broward County Carpenter's Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Seygo 
Construction Co., Inc., 570 F.Supp. 817 (S.D.Fla. 1983); Sykes v. 
Sperow, 179 P. 488 (Or. 1919); McKegney v. Illinois Surety Company, 
155 N.Y.S. 1041 (1915). Those cases are inapposite. Each case 
involved a notice given to a "surety for hire" for payment under a 
construction bond. The notice in each case alleged a contractor's 
or subcontractor's failure to properly perform under the construc-
tion contract. 
None of the cases involved a "voluntary surety." Two of 
the cases expressly state that bonding companies engaged in the 
business of insuring the performance of others (sureties for hire) 
are not favored by the law and that any ambiguities in the bond 
should be construed against the bonding company.1 Merchants 
Mutual Bonding, 613 P.2d at 947; Seygo Construction Co., 570 
F.Supp. at 820. None of the cases involve or address notice of 
default given to the maker of a note as a condition precedent to 
a lender's rights to accelerate. 
Furthermore, none of the cases involve the failure to give 
notice within the applicable instruments' prescribed time limits. 
The dispute in each of those cases involve the method by which 
notice was given or the form of the notice. In each case, notice 
of the failure to perform was given within the express time limits 
of the bond. Furthermore, in one case the court expressly stated 
that notice had to be given within the specified time period. See 
MeKegney v. Illinois Surety Company, 155 N.Y.S. at 1043. (In 
rejecting the argument that the method by which notice was given 
was improper, the Supreme Court of New York stated: "Just how that 
notice is given is immaterial, so long as it is given and is 
received by the surety within the time specified in the contract." 
1
 This Court has recognized the difference between "sureties for hire" and "voluntary 
sureties." The former is not favored by the law and the latter is. American Bonding Co. v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988). See also, infra at 45, 52-55. 
(Emphasis added)) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed its displeasure with 
acceleration clauses. 
The clause which allows for accelera-
tion in case of default, if strictly 
enforced, is a severe covenant, the invoca-
tion of which has similarity to other 
forfeitures. The imposition of such severe 
conditions is not favored in the law. . . . 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 
(Utah 1976) (footnote omitted). 
This Court has similarly recognized the acceleration as 
a remedy is "a harsh one not favored in the law." Stacy Properties 
v. Wixon, 766 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779 
P.2d 688. Like other forfeitures, acceleration clauses should be 
strictly construed. This is especially true when the acceleration 
clause has been drafted by the party who seeks to impose it. 
Strict compliance is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's position reflected in KIXX, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 
610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980). In KIXX, the plaintiff and defendants 
entered into a contract for the purchase of plaintiff's assets. 
Id. at 1386-87. Among other things, the defendants executed a 
promissory note which was to be paid in installments. The note 
contained an acceleration clause. 
It is expressly understood and agreed 
that if default be made in the payment of 
any of the aforesaid installments as and 
when the same shall become due and payable, 
and after thirty days notice thereof, then 
and in that event, the unpaid balance of 
the aforesaid principal sum, at the option 
of the holder, may become due and payable; 
TIME BEING THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONTRACT. 
Id. at 1387. 
Defendants paid the first two installments a few days after the due 
date. Those payments were accepted. On November 18, 1977, the 
plaintiff sent a written notice to the defendants reminding them 
that the third installment would become due on December 1, 1977. 
That installment was not paid. On December 29, 1977, the plaintiff 
sent a notice to the defendants accelerating the entire amount due 
under the Note. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the language of the 
acceleration clause required the plaintiff to give defendants 30 
days written notice of default. Id. at 1389. The Supreme Court 
further held that the plaintiff failed to give the defendants the 
30 days notice and therefore, the plaintiff's acceleration was 
premature and improper. The Court further held that there was no 
need for the defendants to tender the delinquent payment and that 
based on the plaintiff's notice it was reasonable for the defen-
dants to believe that nothing other than full payment would be 
accepted. Id. 
This case is similar to KIXX. Although FIBU gave notice 
of default to PMD, it did not give PMD 15 days notice as required 
by the Note. The notice expressly stated that any cure had to be 
made on or before February 7, 1986. It was therefore reasonable 
for PMD to believe that nothing less than full payment would be 
accepted after February 7, 1986. Therefore, PMD was not required 
to tender any delinquent payments to FIBU. Because FIBU did not 
give PMD fifteen days notice, FIBU's acceleration was improper. 
Although FIBU argues that strict compliance is unnecessary 
and that the defect presented by this appeal is hypertechnical, it 
has cited no law, especially Utah law, which states that strict 
compliance is not necessary. Existing Utah law is contrary to 
FIBU's position. Liberal construction of the Note would favor 
FIBU, who drafted the provision and disfavor individual makers and 
would be an extremely harsh result. As Judge Frederick in the 
trial court stated: 
While it may be true, for purposes of 
argument, that that determination is 
hypertechnical, I am persuaded that in a 
matter of this magnitude, the bank must, 
being the drafter of the document upon 
which all the parties here must rely, is 
expected as a minimum to comply with the 
terms of its own documents, particularly 
when it relates to something as serious as 
an acceleration of an obligation of this 
type. (Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings, R. at 1563, p. 45, and 
Addendum at A109). 
The trial court's decision that notice to PMD was defective should 
be affirmed. 
III. 
ACCELERATION OF THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE WAS 
IMPROPER AS TO THE MAKER DUE TO FIBU'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
NOTE'S ACCELERATION CLAUSE. 
In December of 1978, PCRC obtained an $800,000.00 loan 
from Walker Bank, now known as FIBU. The three-page promissory 
note was signed by the president and secretary of PCRC, Becker and 
Ayers, respectively. 
On or about January 24, 1986, FIBU sent a letter to Dick 
Smith, for Park Meadows Racquet Club, giving notice of default on 
the Racquet Club Note and giving notice that if the default was not 
cured by February 7, 1986, legal action would be taken. At this 
time, FIBU did not provide notice of default to PCRC, the maker. 
On February 10, 1986, FIBU executed a notice of default which 
accelerated the note and the notice was recorded on February 14, 
1986. Shortly after February 21, 1986, the Dougans received the 
statutory notice of default pertaining to the Racquet Club Note. 
To this day, Beckers have never received a copy of the notice of 
default that was executed by FIBU on February 10, 1986. 
The acceleration clause contained in the Racquet Club 
Note was not self-executing upon default. Pursuant to the terms 
of the acceleration clause FIBU had to give PCRC fifteen days 
notice of default. See Addendum at A18. If PCRC did not cure the 
default within fifteen days following the written notice, the 
entire remaining unpaid balance of the note was to become 
immediately due and payable. Id. 
The acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was improper 
due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the acceleration 
clause in the Note. More particularly, the acceleration was 
improper because FIBU failed to give PCRC notice of default. 
As previously set forth in pp. 20-23 of this brief, the 
Utah courts have expressed displeasure with acceleration clauses. 
Acceleration as a remedy is a harsh one, not favored in the law. 
Like other forfeitures, the courts of this state have repeatedly 
recognized that acceleration clauses should be strictly construed. 
See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976); KIXX, Inc. v. 
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); Stacey Properties 
v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779 P.2d 
688. FIBU's acceleration of the Racquet Club Note without giving 
notice to PCRC, the maker, was improper. 
Other jurisdictions have likewise found that acceleration 
of an entire amount of a promissory note is improper where the 
holder has failed to give proper notice of its intent to 
accelerate the debt. The Supreme Court of Texas held that equity 
demanded notice be given to a maker of a holder's intent to 
accelerate maturity of a promissory note upon the maker's default 
in Ogden v. Gibraltar Savings Association, 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 
1982). Ogden appealed a lower court's denial of damages for 
wrongful foreclosure under a deed of trust. The Texas Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and found that Ogden 
could recover his damages established at trial. 
The sole question before the court was whether the holder 
gave proper notice of acceleration of an installment note prior to 
foreclosing under a deed of trust. 
Undisputably, Ogden was in default on his note payments. 
Gibraltar sent him a letter in August which stated that "Your 
failure to cure such breach on or before said date may result in 
acceleration of the sums secured by the Deed of Trust and sale of 
the property standing as security thereunder." Ld. In November, 
Gibraltar posted a notice of trustee's sale and the property was 
sold to a third party. Id. 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the August letter was 
insufficient to give notice that Gibraltar intended to exercise 
its option to accelerate the debt. Ici. at 234. The court noted 
that the acceleration clause in the deed of trust gave Gibraltar 
the option to accelerate upon default. icL The letter gave no 
clear and unequivocal notice that Gibraltar would exercise the 
option to accelerate. id. The court found that, "the holder of a 
delinquent installment note must present the note and demand 
payment of the past due installments prior to exercising his right 
to accelerate." Ici. at 233. (citation omitted). 
The court recognized that there are essentially two types 
of notice -- notice of intent to accelerate and notice that the 
debt has been accelerated. Ic3. at 233-34. The court found that 
both types of notice are required and that "[njotice that the debt 
has been accelerated . . . is ineffective unless preceded by 
proper notice of intent to accelerate." ici. at 234. (citation 
omitted). In examining the necessity of both types of notice, the 
court stated: 
Notice of intent to accelerate is necessary 
in order to provide the debtor an 
opportunity to cure his default prior to 
harsh consequences of acceleration and 
foreclosure. Proper notice that the debt 
has been accelerated, in the absence of a 
contrary agreement or waiver, cuts off the 
debtor!s right to cure his default and gives 
notice that the entire debt is due and 
payable. id . at 234. ( c i t a t i on omi t t ed) . 2 
In the ins tan t ac t ion, based upon the Utah cour t s ' and 
cour t s ' of other j u r i s d i c t i o n s posi t ion with regard to accelera t ion 
c lauses , FIBU fai led to give not ice as required under the terms of 
the Racquet Club Note. The accelera t ion clause contained in the 
Racquet Club Note required tha t "f i f teen (15) days wri t ten not ice 
[be] given to the undersigned . . . . . " (R. at 1176). At no time 
did FIBU provide not ice to PCRC evidencing i t s in tent ion to take 
advantage of the accelera t ion provision contained in the Racquet 
Club Note. FIBU did not give proper not ice of i t s in ten t to accel-
e ra t e the debt. The attempted accelera t ion by FIBU as to PCRC, the 
maker, was improper. 
The bank, by fa i l ing to give not ice to PCRC as required by 
z
 Other decisions have required a holder of a promissory note to perform some clear, 
unequivocal, a f f i rmat ive act evidencing an intent to accelerate p r io r to accelerat ion, see 
Bauer Development Co. v. Nu-West, Inc. , 727 P.2d 1149 (Colo.App. 1988) ( In the case of an 
acceleration provision exercisable at the option of the cred i tor , the credi tor must perform 
some clear, unequivocal a f f i rmat ive act evidencing his intent ion to take advantage of the 
acceleration prov is ion) ; U.S. v. Roll inson, 629 F.Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986) (Creditor must take 
af f i rmat ive action to make 1t known to debtor that he exercised his option to accelerate where 
acceleration of instal lment payments in case of default is at holder's opt ion) ; Leasing v. 
F l igh t America, Inc. , 537 F.Supp. 745 (D.C.Va. 1982) (Option to accelerate maturity of 
promissory note must be made 1n manner so clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt as to 
holder's in tent ion and to appraise maker e f fec t i ve ly of fac t that option had been exercised); 
Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (Acceleration clauses are not 
self-executing and holder of an instrument must take some pos i t ive action to exercise his 
option to declare payments due); Rivers v. Rivers, 404 So.2d 1300 (La.App. 1981) (A clause 
allowing holder of a note to accelerate maturity at his option is not operative un t i l the 
holder takes some af f i rmat ive action c lear ly and unequivocally evidencing th is in tent ion to the 
maker); Oil lard v. Freeland, 714 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.App. 1986) ( In order to avail himself of the 
r igh t to accelerate the note, holder must make a clear, pos i t i ve , and unequivocal declaration 
1n some manner of the exercise of that r i g h t ) ; Baldazo v. V i l l a Oldsmobile, 695 S.W.2d 815 
(Tex.App. 1985) (Notice that a debt has been accelerated has no legal e f fect unless preceded by 
notice that the debt w i l l be accelerated); and Glassmaker v. Ricard, 593 P.2d 179 (Wash.App. 
1979) (Acceleration of balance due on a note must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner 
which e f fec t i ve ly appraises maker that holder has exercised his r igh t to accelerate). 
the terms of the Note, effectively destroyed the right of PCRC, its 
officers and shareholders to cure the default prior to 
acceleration. FIBU, by making this election, effectively waived 
its right to accelerate the Note as to the maker, PCRC, its offi-
cers and shareholders. Since notice under the Racquet Club Note is 
a condition precedent to FIBU exercising its right to accelerate, 
the Note was never legally accelerated as to PCRC, the maker, and 
as to its guarantors Dougans and Beckers. 
In its brief, appellant claims that PMD was the proper 
entity to receive "any notice" required by the Racquet Club Note. 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 19-24). First, appellant claims that 
notification of PCRC was "impossible because the corporation was 
dissolved." (Id_. at 19-20). Appellant improperly mischaracterizes 
the proceedings below in claiming that the documents demonstrating 
the dissolution were given to them "just prior to the summary judg-
ment motion" and that the documents "were presented to the district 
court." (Ic3. at 20). FIBU was aware of the Racquet Club dissolu-
tion in May of 1988 at the deposition of Frederick George Becker.3 
Additionally, the dissolution papers are a matter of public record 
and could have been obtained by counsel at any time in the 
proceedings. 
FIBU secondly mischaracterizes the proceedings below by 
J
 In Becker's deposition he was specifically asked by counsel for FIBU what happened to the 
Racquet Club and he Informed counsel that It was liquidated. At that time counsel was aware of 
documents pertaining to the dissolution of the Racquet Club. (Deposition of Frederick G. 
Becker, III, p. 75, lines 21-25 to p. 76, line 23, R. at 1525.) 
claiming that the dissolution documents "were presented to the dis-
trict court." (Brief of Appellant, p. 20). FIBU "presented" the 
issue of dissolution to the district court just hours before argu-
ment on the motion for summary judgment in the form of a supplemen-
tal memorandum. (R. at 1388-1407). FIBU did not cite any case law 
in its supplemental memorandum to support its present argument on 
appeal that the failure to notify PCRC "would have been excused 
because PCRC was no longer in existence." (Brief of Appellant, p. 
20). FIBU did not present this point to the district court in its 
oral argument on this matter. (R. at 156 3 and Addendum at 
A64-110). 
Despite the impropriety of FIBU's statements, its argument 
that the failure to notify PCRC of its intent to accelerate would 
have been excused is neither supported in fact nor in law. Fact-
ually, FIBU sent a statutory notice of default, after acceleration, 
to Park City Racquet Club at two separate addresses: (1) 1200 
Little Kate Road, Park City, Utah 84060 and (2) Highway 248, Park 
City, Utah 84060. (R. at 1280-82). In sending the Racquet Club 
these notices, FIBU recognized its obligation to do so under the 
terms of the Note and obviously did not deem its actions to have 
been "an idle gesture --a useless thing." (Brief of Appellant, p. 
20). 
The case law cited by FIBU to this court in their brief 
also does not support their argument that notice to PCRC, the 
maker, would have been useless. Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 2 
P.2d 688 (Wash. 1931), is distinguishable and does not govern this 
action. Factually in Sherman, on September 10, 1926, Washington 
and Idaho Theaters entered into a written conditional sales con-
tract whereby there was a sale and purchase agreement to be paid in 
monthly installments. Will Starkey and George Turner guaranteed 
the payment specified under the contract. Starkey and Turner were 
the sole incorporators of the Theaters Company and Turner acted as 
one of its directors continuously thereafter. The Theaters Company 
failed to meet the installments as they fell due and an action was 
brought against the Theaters Company, as principal debtor, and 
against Starkey and Turner, as guarantors. The trial court found 
against Starkey and Turner, holding them liable on the written 
guarantee. The guarantors appealed from that judgment. 
The court, on appeal, found that notice of default was 
unnecessary. Id. at 691. First, the court noted that the princi-
pal debtor was insolvent at the time of the first default. Id. 
Furthermore, the court emphasized that Starkey and Turner knew that 
the principal debtor defaulted in the payment which matured on 
January 15, 1927. The guarantors had also paid the theater's oper-
ation costs out of their "own pockets" from January 15 to July 15 
of 1927. Id. Thus, the court concluded that: 
From an examination of the record we are 
satisfied that the appellants were 
acquainted with the defaults which occurred 
during these six or seven months. Under 
these circumstances the giving of notice to 
the appellants would have been an idle ges-
ture -- a useless thing. I<3. (Emphasis 
added). 
Initially it must be noted that Sherman did not deal with 
notice of intent to accelerate. Rather, the case related to notice 
of default after acceleration. Also, Sherman is distinguishable in 
that in the instant action the record is clear that neither guaran-
tors knew that payments on the Racquet Club Note were in default. 
In the spring of 1985, PMD became delinquent on its payments of the 
Racquet Club Note. PMD and FIBU entered into discussions to reach 
an accommodation or work out agreement. Dougans and Beckers were 
not consulted by FIBU with regard to the work-out agreement and 
were not aware of the delinquency of the Note. Shortly after 
February 21, 1986, Dougan learned that the Note was in default upon 
receiving the statutory notice of default after the entire balance 
on the Note had been accelerated. To this date, the Beckers have 
not received the statutory notice of default. Clearly, under the 
circumstances of this action, notice of default to the guarantors, 
Dougans and Beckers, was necessary despite the dissolution of PCRC. 
Appellant also improperly asserts in its brief that PCRC, 
Dougans and Beckers were not entitled to notice of default prior to 
acceleration of the Note because Dougan instructed FIBU "to send 
further notices regarding the loan to Park Meadows." (Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 20-21). FIBU relies on Lynn Dougan?s deposition 
testimony to argue that the notices to which Dougan referred were 
notices of default required as a condition precedent to accelera-
tion by the Racquet Club Note. However, the testimony of Lynn 
Dougan, examined in context, clearly referred to payment notices or 
coupons which were provided by the bank to accompany payments. The 
complete testimony was as follows: 
Q. After the exchange, did you 
continue to receive payment notices on the 
Racquet Club for a period of time? 
A. No, not to my recollection. I 
think -- we very clearly noticed the bank 
not only were we exchanging our interest 
but that the Smiths and Park Meadows --
Smiths and Ayers and Park Meadows 
Development were assuming and paying the 
loan and they would do so after a date 
certain. And my recollection is that we 
didn't receive any further notices. 
Q. You directed the bank to send the 
notices some place else? 
A. I would -- yes. 
Q. You remember who you told --
A. No. 
Q. --At the bank? 
A. No. 
Q. You just remember you told the bank 
to send the notices elsewhere? 
A. (Witness indicates by nodding head 
up and down.) 
Q. That was a "yes?" 
A. Yes. That was a "yes." 
(Deposition of Lynn Dougan, p. 26, lines 
6-25 and Addendum at A43-49). 
When Lynn Dougan's testimony is taken in context, it is 
clear that he was merely referring to "payment notices" or coupons. 
The relevant question directed to Dougan was as to whether he 
received "payment notices on the Racquet Club for a period of 
time." (Deposition of Lynn Dougan, p. 26, lines 6-7 and Addendum 
at A45). Dougan did not mention the 15-day notice of default any-
where in his deposition. Clearly, when he stated he directed the 
bank to send "the notices" to PMD, he was referring to the "payment 
notices." 
Additionally, evidencing the fact that Dougan was merely 
referring to "payment notices" or coupons, is his testimony later 
in the deposition which reads: 
Q. Okay. You have no remembrance of 
calling up the bank and saying, "Hey, send 
the notices now on to the Smiths"? 
A. No. I can't say that I do. But I 
certainly can understand that I might have 
done that if they were still being sent to 
our offices. (Deposition of Lynn Dougan, 
p. 49, lines 9-13 and Addendum at A47). 
Clearly, the "notices" referred to in Dougan's deposition were 
"monthly payment notices" or the coupons which were provided by the 
bank to accompany payments on the Racquet Club Note. Dougan did 
not testify that he directed FIBU to send "notice of default" prior 
to acceleration to PMD. FIBU was required to send the fifteen-day 
notice of default prior to acceleration to PCRC, Dougans and 
Beckers under the terms'of the parties' agreement. 
Respondents did not waive their right to the fifteen-day 
notice of default prior to acceleration by directing the bank to 
send the "payment notices" elsewhere. FIBU concedes in its brief 
that finding of a waiver requires the conduct of the actor to dem-
onstrate "an intentional relinquishment of a known right." (Brief 
of Appellant, p. 21). Dougans and Beckers agree. The party's 
actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an intent to waive, or 
must be inconsistent with any other intent. Barros v. Wood, 750 
P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988). 
Additionally, the doctrine of waiver is an equitable doc-
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trine based upon fairness and justice. Riverside Development Co. 
v. Ritche, 650 P.2d 657, 662 (Idaho 1982). Waiver is primarily a 
question of intent and the best policy is to judge each situation 
on a case-by-case basis. idL at 663. Doubtful cases will be 
decided against waiver. A. J. Bayless Markets v. Industrial Comm., 
655 P.2d 363, 365 (Ariz.App. 1982). 
The record is clear that Dougan did not direct the bank to 
send the fifteen-day notice of default which is a condition prece-
dent to acceleration to PMD. In the lower court proceedings, FIBU 
failed to prove that PCRC, Dougans or Beckers "unequivocally" and 
"intentionally" relinquished their rights to the fifteen-day notice 
of default as required under the terms of the Racquet Club Note. 
No evidence was presented that Dougan knowingly and intentionally 
waived his right to notice of default when he directed the bank to 
send payment notices elsewhere. Dougan's request that FIBU send 
payment notices (coupons) to PMD and the Smiths did not relieve 
FIBU of its obligation to send the fifteen-day notice of default as 
required by the terms of the Racquet Club Note. Moreover, the bank 
does not assert or claim that Mrs. Dougan, the Beckers or PCRC 
waived the notice requirements. The waiver argument is directed at 
Lynn Dougan only. 
Finally, with respect to its claim that PMD was the proper 
entity to receive any notice required by the Note, the bank also 
erroneously asserts it was relieved of Its duty to notify PCRC, 
Dougans and Beckers of its intent to accelerate prior to accelera-
tion because to do so "defies common sense and commercial reality." 
D7 -34-
(Brief of Appellant, p. 21). Furthermore, the bank also improperly 
claims that PMD was the only proper entity to receive notice of 
default as assignee and primary obligor. (Icl. at 22-23). 
In the lower court proceedings, FIBU claimed that the 
assumption agreement operated as "an assignment of the assignor's 
[e.g., Beckers' and Dougans'] rights and a delegation of [their] 
unperformed duties under the contract." (R. at 1240). The bank 
further contended that "to the extent PCRC had a right to notice 
under the note, it assigned this right to Park Meadows . . . ." 
Id. Additionally, FIBU claimed that "Dougans and Beckers remain 
liable to First Interstate under their assumption agreement." (Id. 
at 1255). Taken as a whole, FIBU argued that as assignees, Dougans 
and Beckers were subject to the unperformed duties under the Note 
yet as assignees, were not entitled to the right of the fifteen-day 
notice of default prior to acceleration of the Note. 
FIBU's assertions are contrary to the Restatement law 
cited in their brief and the case law of this and other 
jurisdictions. The general rule is that assignees of contracts 
stand in the shoes of the assignor and receive all the rights under 
the contract and are subject to all the duties of the contract. 
First Investment Co. v. Anderson, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980). 
In the lower court proceedings, FIBU admitted that the 
Racquet Club Note required that notice of default be given to the 
maker prior to acceleration of the Note. (R. at 1242). Undisput-
edly, PCRC did not receive notice of default prior to acceleration. 
FIBU admits that it sent the fifeen-day notice of default to PMD. 
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No notice was sent to Dougans and Beckers as "assignees" of the 
Racquet Club Note. Dougans and Beckers took the Racquet Club Note 
subject to all of the defenses and equities under the Note. In 
their capacity as assignees, Dougans and Beckers were entitled to 
the fifteen-day notice of default which was a condition precedent 
to acceleration. Acceleration of the Racquet Club Note was 
improper due to FIBU's failure to comply with the terms of the 
Note's acceleration clause. 
Additionally, PCRC conveyed its interest in the Racquet 
Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers. As a part of that transaction, 
Becker, Dougan and Ayers assumed and agreed to pay the Racquet Club 
Note and thus stepped into the shoes of the maker, PCRC, and 
thereby became the maker. In their capacity as maker (as distin-
guished from their role as guarantors), Dougan and Becker became 
entitled to receive the fifteen-day notice of default as a condi-
tion precedent to the bank accelerating the Note. In their capac-
ity as maker, Dougan and Becker also did not receive notice in 
accordance with the terms of the Note. 
This Court should affirm the lower court's finding that 
acceleration of the Racquet Club Note as to the maker was improper. 
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IV. 
THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE AND THE GUARANTY ARE 
ONE INSTRUMENT WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 
TOGETHER AND WITH REFERENCE TO EACH OTHER. 
In December of 1978, shareholders of PCRC guaranteed pay-
ment of the $800,000 promissory note. (R. at 1177 and Addendum at 
A19). The one-paragraph guaranty is located on page 3 of the 
Racquet Club Note immediately following the signatures of PCRC's 
secretary and president. 
The guaranty reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
For good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby 
acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and 
severally guarantee payment of this 
promissory note (Secured by Deed of Trust) 
and further guarantee payment of the entire 
indebtedness evidenced thereby and the Deed 
of Trust securing the same. (emphasis 
added). 
It is clear that the promissory note is expressly incorporated into 
the guaranty. The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one 
instrument which should be read together and construed with refer-
ence to each other. 
Moreover, the guaranty and the Racquet Club Note were 
executed by the president, secretary, and shareholders of PCRC 
contemporaneously in the course of the same transaction. The two 
instruments concern the same subject matter. In determining the 
respective rights and interest of the parties, the Racquet Club 
Note and the guaranty must be read and construed together. 
The Utah courts on numerous occasions, have been faced 
with the interpretation of two documents that were executed 
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contemporaneously as far as determining the respective rights and 
interests of the parties. In Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 
1080 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688, this Court con-
strued the provisions contained in a promissory note along with 
those contained in a letter agreement and gave effect to each in 
light of the parties' intent. 
The background of Stacey Properties has been previously 
set forth in Point II of this brief. However, for purposes of this 
argument, the following facts are essential. The promissory note 
and letter agreement were executed by plaintiff and defendant on 
the same day. The record was clear that Golwix bargained for and 
received a contractual right to offsets. The operative provision 
of the promissory note stated: 
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset 
against any amounts due or to become due to 
[Stacey] under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section 
17 of said letter agreement or under any 
other provision thereof or of any document 
executed in conjunction therewith, provided, 
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey] 
written notice of the amount to be offset 
and the specific reasons therefor. _ldL at 
1083. (emphasis is original). 
The trial court considered the above-cited provision in the 
promissory note along with the following provision of the letter 
agreement: 
The properties have been inspected by 
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . . 
We represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order . . . Id. 
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Based upon the two provisions the trial court determined 
that when Golwix incurred a $22,758.00 expense to replace an air 
conditioner, it referred to the warranty provision in the letter 
agreement and exercised its contractual offset right under the 
promissory note. This Court agreed with the trial court's con-
struction of the promissory note and the letter agreement. This 
Court stated: 
These two instruments could be reasonably 
construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 
P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements 
which are related and executed 
contemporaneously must be construed as a 
whole and harmonized). The trial court 
could also properly balance the acceleration 
and offset terms of the note, giving effect 
to each of the provisions of the entire 
agreement. Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 
P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual 
provisions must be interpreted in light of 
the entire agreement, giving effect to every 
other provision). Stacey Properties, 766 
P.2d at 1083. 
Accordingly, this Court harmonized and construed the 
promissory note and letter agreement as a whole. In doing so this 
Court concluded that the trial court was correct in holding that 
the acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded the 
total payments due on the promissory note. Id. 
This Court was also faced with the interpretation of two 
documents that were executed contemporaneously in Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 
1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277. In Big Cottonwood, Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company ("Big Cottonwood") appealed from a 
declaratory judgment granted in favor of Salt Lake City ("Salt 
D7 
-39-
Lake") interpreting two agreements. 
On January 2, 1920, Big Cottonwood and Salt Lake entered 
into an agreement which purported to delineate responsibility for 
the maintenance and repair of the pipeline system between the 
parties. Id. at 1358. Several years later disputes arose as to 
the responsibilities of the parties and Big Cottonwood filed suit 
against Salt Lake which resulted in the execution of a settlement 
agreement on July 27, 1965. Id. The 1965 agreement attempted to 
clarify the parties' responsibilities and expressly ratified and 
declared to be in full force and effect the 1920 agreement except 
as it was "specifically changed, modified or amended by the 
express terms of this agreement." Id. 
In 1983, Salt Lake notified a Big Cottonwood shareholder 
that she had to pay the costs for the repair of her service line 
or the city would turn off her water pursuant to the 1965 
agreement. The shareholder refused to pay and Salt Lake shut off 
her water. id. Action was then brought for a declaratory 
judgment as to the interpretation of the two agreements. Id. 
This Court considered both agreements in determining the 
intent and obligation of the parties. In doing so, this Court 
relied upon the reasoning of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 
Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972), which held: 
[W]here two or more instruments are executed 
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at 
different times in the course of the same 
transaction, and concern the same subject 
matter, they will be read and construed 
together so far as determining the 
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respective rights and interests of the 
parties. . . . Big Cottonwood, 740 P.2d at 
1359. 
See also, First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 
1080 (Utah 1983) . 
Another Utah decision providing guidance to the instant 
action is Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah App. 1987). In 
Verhoef, plaintiffs appealed a ruling that the contract they 
entered into with defendants to purchase a house was binding and 
that they breached the contract. .Ed. at 1343. Plaintiffs bought 
a house from defendants Astons. The parties executed a uniform 
real estate contract which provided for $78,000.00 purchase price, 
with $10,163.32 as down payment. id. In addition to the down 
payment, plaintiffs also paid $9,836.68. Id. 
The central dispute involved the $9,836.68 payment. 
Plaintiffs argued the money was an additional down payment and 
should have reduced the balance on the house. icL Defendants 
asserted that the funds were held in escrow and were used to pay a 
part of the monthly payments on the house. IcL The dispute 
surfaced when plaintiffs failed to pay the unpaid balance of the 
loan as required by the uniform real estate contract. Id. 
The uniform real estate contract was executed in 
conjunction with execution of escrow instructions. .Id. at 1344. 
This Court found that the trial court was correct after examining 
the two documents as a whole and finding that the $9,836.68 was not 
a down payment but was placed in escrow to help fund plaintiff's 
monthly obligation. Id. The court stated: 
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Contracts should be construed so as to give 
effect to the parties' intentions, and such 
intent should be determined, if possible, by 
examining the written agreement executed by 
the parties. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). When 
agreements are executed "substantially 
contemporaneously and are clearly 
interrelated, they must be construed as a 
whole and harmonized if possible." Id. at 
229; Verhoef, 740 P.2d at 1344. 
The reasoning espoused by the Utah courts in the 
aforementioned cases is directly applicable to the instant action. 
In determining the rights and liabilities of the guarantors, 
Dougans and Beckers, the Racquet Club Note and the guaranty must be 
read and construed together. The Racquet Club Note and the guar-
anty were executed by PCRC, its officers and shareholders 
contemporaneously in the course of one transaction. Moreover, the 
guaranty refers specifically to the Note. The guaranty is physi-
cally a part of the Note and is on the same piece of paper. The 
Note and guaranty were prepared by the bank. (R. at 15 32 and 
Addendum at A109). The decisions of the Utah courts require the 
two instruments be construed as a whole. 
Other jurisdictions examining the construction of a 
guaranty contract have generally found that: 
Where the guaranty consists of separate 
instruments, or other instruments 
constituting parts of the same transaction 
are either by annexation or reference or 
otherwise constituted a part of the 
guaranty, such instruments should be read 
together and each construed with reference 
to the other. Thus a writing referred to 
in a contract of guaranty becomes a part of 
the guaranty contract by virtue of the 
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reference, and the two must be considered 
together in determining the construction and 
va l id i ty of the guaranty contract . 38 
C.J.S. Guaranty, §38 (1943).4 
Fi r s t I n t e r s t a t e "does not dispute" tha t as a general rul 
tha t where two or more instruments are executed by the same par t ie 
contemporaneously or at different times in the course of the same 
t ransact ion and concern the same subject matter, they wil l be con-
strued and read together . (Brief of Appellant, pp. 28-29). 
Clearly, case law holds that where the guaranty refers to a note, 
separate instrument, and the two cons t i tu te par ts of the same 
t ransac t ion , the instrument should be read together and each con-
strued with reference to the other. A writing referred to in a 
contract of guaranty becomes part of the guaranty contract by v i r -
tue of the reference and the two must be construed together . 
In i t s brief FIBU claims that courts have "repeatedly 
refused" to accept the argument propounded. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 30). FIBU c i t e s Western States Leasing Co. v. Adturn, Inc . , 50 
P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo.App. 1972), in support of i t s broad proposi-
See also, General M i l l s , Inc. v. Wallner, 628 F.Supp. 1573 (D.Minn. 1986) (Where col lateral 
security agreement was expressly or impliedly incorporated into the guarantee the instruments 
should be read together and construed with reference to each other) ; Paul Revere Protective 
L i fe Ins. Co. v. We1s, 535 F.Supp. 379 (E.D.Penn. 1981) (Lease agreement referred to in 
contract of guaranty was part of guaranty by v i r tue of references and the two were construed 
together 1n determining the construction and va l i d i t y of the guaranty contract) ; Davenport v. 
Strat ton, 149 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1944) (Three instruments for the purpose of in terpretat ion of the i r 
meaning were considered as one instrument where the contract of guaranty was executed in 
consideration of the execution of a lease): Berg Meadows Corp. v. Wilson, 339 P.2d 869 
(Cal.App. 1959) (Main agreement and guaranty were to be construed as one agreement where they 
were but parts of a single transaction); and Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 172 
N.E.2d 899 (Ind.App. 1961) (Agreement drawn and executed at same time of signing of promissory 
note was a contemporaneous instrument and was considered together with the note as one 
instrument). 
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tion that guarantors cannot create an express right to notice by 
inference. Initially it must be brought to this court's attention 
that the defendant guarantor in Western States defaulted and did 
not enter an appearance before the Colorado Court of Appeals. FIBU 
urges this court to rely on a default judgment where the case was 
not briefed or argued as persuasive authority. FIBU cannot base 
its arguments on a case which is entirely factually dissimilar from 
the instant action. 
Western States is additionally distinguishable in that 
guaranty and lease involved in that case were not executed within 
the course of one transaction. The guaranty was executed as a sep-
arate instrument and was executed on the following day. In the 
instant action, the terms of the guaranty specifically refer to the 
Racquet Club Note and the two were executed in the course of one 
transaction. Dougans and Beckers did not ask the lower court to 
create an express notice provision by inference: Clearly, the 
terms of the entire Racquet Club Note, including the guaranty lan-
guage required notice of default prior to acceleration. 
In its brief the bank also relies upon Corporation of 
the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736, 
745 (Utah 1939). Corporation of the President likewise does not 
provide any guidance to the resolution of the issues involved in 
this action. Corporation of the President is clearly distinguisha-
ble in that it involved Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, a 
corporate surety for hire, which gave a bond in the amount of the 
contract price. In the instant action, Dougans and Beckers are not 
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sureties for hire. It is well established that the rule of law 
with respect to sureties for hire is markedly different than the 
rule of law with respect to individual sureties who do not charge a 
premium. (See Id. at 741: "Those cases cited by respondent were a 
personal accommodation surety was held fully released are not in 
point.") 
This Court recently recognized the difference between a 
corporate surety for hire and a voluntary surety in American 
Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988). The facts of 
American Bonding are set forth in more detail in pages 51 to 54 of 
this brief. However, for purposes of this argument, it is impor-
tant to note that this Court required notice be given to the 
indemnitor pursuant to the Indemnity Agreement although the terms 
of the bond only implicitly required notice. Although the bond did 
not expressly require notice, this Court implicitly required notice 
based on the fact that "the contract of a surety, for hire, is to 
be strictly construed against the surety." Id. at 816, citing 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 688 P.2d 577, 560 
(Utah 1983) (Quoting J. F. Toplin Investment Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 77 Utah 226, 230, 293 P. 611, 612 (1930)). See also, 
Western States Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App. 
1988). This Court continued: 
The modern authorities seem to be almost a 
unit upon the proposition that a different 
rule of construction applies to different 
classes of sureties. In the case of a pri-
vate or voluntary surety without compensa-
tion the surety is held to be a favorite of 
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the law, and the contract, the performance 
of which he guarantees, is construed 
strictly in favor of the surety. 
Strictissimi Juris is the term used to 
express the rule by which his liability 
shall be determined. 
In the case of a surety who makes 
insurance a business for compensation, the 
rule is exactly the reverse. Doubtful pro-
visions of the contract, the performance of 
which the surety guarantees, are construed 
in favor of the insured. American Bonding 
Co., 763 P.2d at 816. (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). 
Under Utah law sureties for hire and voluntary sureties 
are treated quite differently. The strict construction of con-
tracts against sureties for hire is not applicable to the instant 
action. Dougans and Beckers, as guarantors, are favorites of the 
law and the Racquet Club Note, the performance of which they 
guaranteed, is to be construed in their favor. Thus, where the 
guaranty language specifically refers to the Racquet Club Note of 
which it is a part, and the Note and guaranty language were exe-
cuted in the course of one transaction, Dougans and Beckers were 
entitled to the fifteen-day notice of default as a condition prece-
dent to acceleration by the bank. 
Finally, appellant argues that even if this Court were to 
refer to the Note in construing the guaranty, then the fifteen-day 
cure period applies to the maker of the Note. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 34). More specifically, appellant argues that "the only express 
note [sic] provision that applies to 'guarantors' provides that the 
'guarantors . . . severally waived . . . notice of nonpayment.'" 
Id, The provision in the Racquet Club Note which FIBU relies upon 
D7 -46-
provides: 
The makers . . . guarantors, and endorsers 
hereof severally waive presentment for 
payment, protest, demand, notice of 
protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of 
nonpayment, and expressly agree that this 
Note, or any payment hereunder, may be 
extended from time to time by the holder 
hereof without in any way affecting the 
liability of such parties. (Record at 1177 
and Addendum at A19). (emphasis added). 
The Racquet Club Note's waiver provision does not apply to 
notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration. 
The provision by its terms pertains to notice of protest, notice of 
dishonor and notice of non-payment. The waiver provision does not 
specifically waive the fifteen-day notice of default, a right given 
to the parties in a preceding paragraph. While the aforementioned 
difference may seem semantic in nature, the difference is of great 
import. 
The court in Bowyer v. Clark Equipment Co., 357 N.E.2d 290 
(Ind.App. 1976), recognized the distinction between waivers con-
tained in a guaranty contract. Defendant Bowyer, a guarantor, 
appealed from a trial court judgment in favor of plaintiffs on an 
action for indebtedness. Defendant claimed that the creditor Clark 
was required to give him timely notice of his principal's delin-
quency and default before his liability accrued. 
Clark maintained that the language found in the guaranty 
agreement constituted an express waiver of Bowyer's right to notice 
of the principal's default. The relevant portions of the guaranty 
provided: 
The undersigned hereby waive: (1) Notice 
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of (and acknowledge due notice of) accep-
tance of this Guaranty by you or of the 
creation, renewal or accrual of any liabil-
ity of BORROWER present or future, or of 
your reliance upon this Guaranty (it being 
understood that any and every liability 
and obligation of BORROWER to you shall 
conclusively be presumed to have been 
created, contracted or incurred in reliance 
upon this Guaranty); (2) Demand of payment 
from any person indebted in any manner on 
or for any of the liabilities or obliga-
tions hereby guaranteed; (3) Presentment 
for payment of any instrument of BORROWER 
or any other person, protest thereof, and 
notice of its dishonor to any party thereto 
and to the undersigned; (4) Any right of 
contribution from guarantors other than 
ourselves. Ld. at 29 3. (emphasis in 
original). 
In interpreting the language of the guaranty, the courts 
construed the contract like any other contract according to the 
intention of the parties. Ic3. at 294. The court recognized that: 
[T]he instrument should receive a fair and 
reasonable interpretation to attain the 
parties1 objectives. 1(3. (citations 
omitted). 
The court was unable to find that the language in the guaranty con-
veyed an express intention of waiving the right to notice of 
default. More specifically, the court stated: 
[T]he waiver clause does not specifically 
state that the guarantor waives notice of 
default of any liability but rather states 
that the guarantor waives notice of dis-
honor on any instrument. 
While the aforementioned difference may 
seem to be somewhat semantic in nature, we 
are of the opinion that the difference is 
of great import. As previously stated, we 
are bound by the words of the guaranty con-
tract and the reasonable intention of the 
parties. Id. 
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Naum v. Naum Bros., Inc., 456 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y.App.Div. 
1982), is another case in which a court recognized the distinction 
between types of waivers contained in a waiver provision of a pro-
missory note. Defendants appealed from a judgment for plaintiff in 
an action on a promissory note. 
Defendant questioned plaintiff's compliance with the 
requirement of a written demand prior to acceleration. Plaintiff 
claimed the waiver provision in the note relieved it of the notice 
requirement. In examining the note's waiver provision, the court 
stated: 
The purpose of the waiver provision in the 
two promissory notes sued upon was to 
excuse presentment, and notice and protest 
of dishonor which otherwise would be neces-
sary to charge secondary parties, 
(citations omitted). That provision was 
not intended to waive the specific require-
ment of a written demand as a condition 
precedent to acceleration of the note's 
for default in the payments of interest. 
Id. at 551. (emphasis added). 
The New York Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling upon a 
finding that plaintiff complied with the written demand requirement 
before defendants made any tender of payments of the past due 
interest. Id. 
In the instant action, the waiver clause pertains to 
notice of protest, notice of dishonor and notice of non-payment. 
Notice of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration is 
not specifically waived. The Racquet Club Note expressly grants 
the right to the fifteen-day notice of default in a preceding 
paragraph. In construing the contract according to the intention 
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of the parties, it is clear that the waiver provision in the 
Racquet Club Note did not waive notice of default which is a condi-
tion precedent to acceleration. 
Rules of construction applicable to contracts in Utah 
require that an agreement be construed to achieve harmony between 
various provisions and language is construed against the drafting 
party. In Re Estate of Orris, 662 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1980); Park 
Enters, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 
1982); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rightway Concrete, 742 P.2d 105, 
110 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277; Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 
App. 1988)- In this case one must construe the agreement, "Racquet 
Club Note," to make sense and the construction, in case of ambigu-
ity or difficulty is against the interest of FIBU, the drafter. 
Since one paragraph specifically grants a right to notice of 
default and a cure period prior to acceleration, a following 
paragraph's reference to waiver of notice of non-payment must be 
construed to apply to something else. This is particularly so, 
when one considers that FIBU drafted the document. FIBU cannot now 
be allowed to argue that the agreement it drafted expressly 
provided a benefit then caused the other party to waive the 
benefit. Such an argument is entirely contrary to Utah's rules of 
construction. 
FIBU also erroneously relies upon Waikiki Seaside, Inc. v. 
Comito, 641 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Hawaii App. 1982), to support its 
waiver argument. (Brief of Appellant, p. 34). Waikiki is distin-
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guishable from the instant action in that the specific language of 
the guaranty waived any right to notice of default. Idl. at 1365. 
Hence, the court determined that there is no requirement to give 
such notice. Id. 
In the instant action, the right to the fifteen-day notice 
of default which is a condition precedent to acceleration has not 
been waived by the language of the Racquet Club Note. To the 
contrary, the Racquet Club Note expressly grants the right to 
notice of default as a condition precedent to acceleration of the 
Note. Thus where the parties' contract expressly covered the sub-
ject of the notice, that provision is controlling. 
v. 
FIBU WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
TO THE DOUGANS AND BECKERS PRIOR TO 
ACCELERATING THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
The Racquet Club Note and the guaranty are one instrument 
which must be read together and construed with reference to each 
other. In determining the rights of the Dougans and Beckers as 
guarantors concerning notice of default, the terms of the Racquet 
Club Note govern. 
In the instant action, the Racquet Club Note specifically 
provides that notice of default must be given to the undersigned. 
Indeed appellant recognizes in its brief that: "All courts agree 
that if the contract of guaranty affirmatively calls for notice, it 
is a condition which must be met in order to bind the guarantor on 
his promise." (Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-25) (citations omitted). 
A recent decision by this Court is very similar factually 
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to the case before this court. In American Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 
763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed the dismissal of 
plaintiff's claims under a blanket indemnity agreement. The trial 
court granted a motion to dismiss as to Maureen Nelson ("Maureen"), 
an indemnitor. In September, 197 3, defendant Keith R. Nelson 
("Keith") was doing business as AAA Electric Service. IcL At that 
time Keith was married to Maureen. As part of his work with the 
United States Government, Keith was required to obtain surety bonds 
for his contracts. IcL Keith and Maureen executed a "Blanket 
Indemnity Agreement" with plaintiff, American Bonding Company 
("American") in order to obtain surety bonds. Id_. at 815. Keith, 
doing business as AAA, was listed as principal, while both Keith 
and Maureen were identified as indemnitors. IcL Based on the 
agreement, American issued performance bonds for Keith's contract 
jobs. Id. 
American, as one of two sureties, executed a performance 
bond in favor of the United States Government listing Keith doing 
business as AAA as a principal. IcL American was subsequently 
notified of the claims against the bond and discovered that AAA's 
contracts in Denver had been placed in default by the contracting 
officer. IcL American's attorney spoke to Keith concerning the 
contract situation and sent individual letters to Keith and Maureen 
which notified them of claims against the bond. Ic3. Subsequently 
American and the other surety entered into a takeover agreement 
with Keith in which the sureties agreed to complete the contracts 
and AAA assigned its rights and duties to the sureties. Id. 
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Subsequently, American filed a complaint against Keith and Maureen 
to recover all costs of enforcing the agreement. Id. 
The trial court concluded that Maureen should not be 
bound as an indemnitor based on the finding that notice of default 
was vague and insufficient. The conclusion that Maureen should 
not be bound as an indemnitor was based on the following findings 
of the trial court: 
1. Timely notice of default was given to 
both Keith and Maureen Nelson as prescribed 
by the Agreement of Indemnity (General) to 
which they were indemnitors. 
2. Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and 
insufficient and therefore did not afford 
reasonable notice to her so as to 
intelligently form any rational basis for 
deciding whether she should exercise her 
right under paragraph 13 of the Agreement of 
Indemnity (General) to defend or prosecute 
any particular claims that AAA Electric 
might have had against the United States 
Government in order to avoid or reduce 
liability against her as an indemnitor. 
* * * * 
4. The record is silent as to efforts made 
by American Bonding Company and [the other 
surety] to ascertain how to keep Maureen 
Nelson informed or to ascertain what 
information, if any, she was receiving. The 
record is also silent as to any opportunity 
she was given to be a party to the take-over 
agreement, and Maureen Nelson was not a 
party to the take-over agreements nor was it 
submitted to her for approval or was she 
advised of the terms thereof by American 
Bonding Company. Ic[. at 815-16. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of 
Maureen's liability under the blanket indemnity agreement. In 
reaching this determination, this Court recognized that two para-
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graphs in the agreement demonstrated an ambiguity since one para-
graph stated all notices were waived whereas another paragraph gave 
the indemnitors the right to request American to litigate claims or 
demands against the bond- icL at 816. In order to exercise those 
rights, the indemnitors must have been given notice. Id. 
Therefore, while notice was waived by one paragraph, it was a 
necessity in the other. Id. 
This Court found that the two paragraphs appeared to be in 
irreconcilable conflict with each other and were therefore 
ambiguous. IcL This Court concluded that the conflicting para-
graph had to be "construed to require adequate notice to Maureen 
concerning the claims against the surety." idL (emphasis in 
original). Because of Maureen's lack of involvement in the affairs 
of AAA, it was found the notice was "substantially defective." Id. 
Specifically, this Court found that the trial court record 
was silent as to any efforts made by American to ascertain how to 
keep Maureen informed or to ascertain what information, if any, she 
was receiving. Id. at 817. Moreover, there was no evidence that 
she was advised of the terms of the settlement agreement as was her 
husband. Thus, based upon the record, this Court affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing all claims as to Maureen. 
American Bonding provides guidance in the instant action. 
The Dougans and Beckers were in a position similar to that of the 
indemnitor Maureen Nelson. Like Maureen, the Dougans and Beckers 
were not informed of the work-out agreement entered between FIBU 
and the Smiths. Also, similar is the fact that the Dougans and 
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Beckers did not receive notice concerning the default and that the 
bank intended to accelerate the note. 
The Racquet Club Note/guaranty specifically provided that 
notice of any default must be given "to the undersigned" and 
Dougans and Beckers were "the undersigned" guarantors. In 
addition, when Dougan and Becker assumed the Racquet Club Note at 
the time the Club was conveyed to them, they became makers of the 
Note and as a maker became the "undersigned." It is undisputed 
that Dougans and Beckers did not receive any notice whatsoever with 
regard to the default and that the bank intended to accelerate. As 
held in American Bonding, Dougans and Beckers should be discharged 
from their obligation as makers and as guarantors because notice of 
default was not given to them by FIBU as required by the terms of 
the parties' agreement. 
Other jurisdictions have examined the identical issue 
involved in the case at bar wherein the guaranty contract 
specifically required written notice of default. In Fife v. 
Anderson Realty Brokers, Inc., 271 S.E.2d 9 (Ga.App. 1980), the 
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's overruling of 
a guarantor's motion to dismiss and grant of summary judgment as 
to the payee. The Court of Appeals found that the payee did not 
have a cause of action under the note and it was error to overrule 
the guarantor's motion to dismiss. 
In Fife, the payee Anderson Realty Brokers ("Anderson") 
sent a notice of default and demand to the maker of a note of 
which Fife was the guarantor. id. at 10. The notice provided: 
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"Pursuant to the terms specified in said note, relative to default 
in payment, Anderson Realty Brokers, Inc. hereby declares the full 
balance on said note due and payable now. . . . " icL (emphasis 
in original). No other notice was given either to the maker or 
the guarantor. I_d. Nearly three months later, Anderson filed 
suit on the note against Fife, the guarantor. 
Fife urged that it was error to find that the notice 
given to him, as guarantor, was in sufficient compliance with all 
the terms and conditions of the note. id. The terms of the note 
provided that: 
In the event of default. . . [the] payee may 
not accelerate subsequent payments until 
first giving maker notice of such default, 
following which notice maker shall have 
thirty (30) days. . .to cure such default 
following which, absent the curing of 
default by maker, payee may accelerate and 
declare due, payable and in default all 
remaining obligations. Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
The Georgia Court of Appeals found that it "was very 
clear that by the terms of the note, the payee could not 
accelerate and declare due and payable and in default the entire 
obligation until the maker was notified of the particular default 
and was given the required 30 days' grace to cure the default." 
Id. The "notice of default" did not give the required 30 days in 
which to cure the default- IcL Instead, it accelerated the debt 
obligation and declared due and payable the full note balance. 
The Court of Appeals determined that Anderson did not 
have a cause of action against Fife, the guarantor, because there 
was no notice as the note required. IcL at 11. The court stated, 
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"The notice which was given accelerated and declared due and 
payable the entire debt, which could not be done without first 
giving notice of default and 30 days' grace to cure it." Id. 
Thus, the court found it was error to overrule Fife's motion to 
dismiss. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court likewise examined a situation 
directly analogous to the case at bar in Lee v. Vaughn, 534 
S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1976). In Lee, the trial court rendered a 
judgment for the assignee of the note and against the guarantor. 
The guarantor Lee appealed the decision contending that lack of 
notice by the assignee "constituted failure of consideration" with 
a resultant release of the guarantor from liability under the 
guaranty. 1x3. at 222. Lee guaranteed payment of the first 
$3,000.00 of a $4,000.00 note from Norville & Rofena Akin, which 
he assigned to appellee, B. J. Vaughn. Id. The guaranty 
agreement provided that "if any monthly installment is past due 
more than 15 days, B. J. Vaughn shall promptly mail notice of that 
fact to the said Lee . . . ." Id. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
held that the assignee could not recover from the guarantor 
because the guarantor was not notified according to the terms of 
the guaranty agreement upon default of the maker of the note. The 
court recognized that no Arkansas case had construed a guaranty 
contract that contained an express requirement of notice of the 
principal's default. icL at 223. However, the court recognized 
that "the great majority of states" that have considered a similar 
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situation have concluded in conformity with the Restatement of 
Security, §136 where it is stated: 
Subject to the rules pertaining to 
negotiable instruments, the surety's 
obligation to the creditor is not affected 
by the creditor's failure to notify him of 
the principal's default unless such 
notification is required by the terms of the 
surety's contract. Id. (emphasis in original). 
The Arkansas court recognized the leading decision on 
point to be Yama v. Sigman, 165 P.2d 191 (Colo, 1945), in which 
the debtor was obligated to make bi-weekly payments and the 
guaranty was conditioned upon immediate notice of default. Lee, 
534 S.W.2d at 224. In Yama, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
under such an agreement, the guarantor could not be held liable 
after the debtor's default, when the creditor failed to prove that 
he had given the necessary notice. id. The Colorado court stated 
that their failure in this respect relieved the defendant of all 
liability under his guaranty. Id. 
The Arkansas court also recognized a New York decision, 
Pergament v. Herrick Credit Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 535 (New York 
1960), where the rule was summarized as follows: 
Where a contract of guarantee [sic] 
specifically provides for notice of default, 
the failure to give such notice discharges 
the guarantor's obligations. (citations 
omitted). The guarantor may limit his 
liability as such by whatever conditions he 
may see fit to impose, and non-compliance 
with them will preclude recourse to him. As 
stated above, his undertaking is 
strictissimi juris and cannot be extended 
beyond the fair import of its language. 
Lee, 524 S.W.2d at 224. 
The Arkansas court also recognized the Ohio court's adher-
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ence to the same principle in the case of Lakemore Plaza, Inc. v. 
Shoenterprise, 188 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1962), where the court stated: 
Where a guarantor attaches a certain 
condition or conditions to his agreement, 
such condition or conditions must be 
construed in favor of the guarantor, and the 
failure of a creditor to strictly comply 
with any condition or conditions invalidates 
the guaranty. Lee, 534 S.W.2d at 224. 
Another decision recognized in Lee as adopting the above 
analysis was the opinion issued by the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals in United States Plywood Corp. v. Continental Casualty 
Corp., 157 A.2d 286 (D.C.App. 1960), where the court said: 
Since the foundation of any rights of the 
donee or creditor is the promisor's 
contract, it follows that his rights are 
restricted by the terms of the promise and 
any conditions, express or implied, 
affecting them. A stipulation for notice of 
default is a condition of liability which 
may always be imposed. The weight of 
authority holds that where the notice 
provision is reasonable and is stated as a 
condition precedent to the right of 
instituting legal action, failure to observe 
it will discharge the surety. Lee, 534 
S.W.2d at 224. 
Based upon the foregoing case law enunciated in other 
jurisdictions, the Arkansas Supreme Court found in Lee that the 
guarantor "was entitled to the protection that he had insisted 
upon in guaranteeing the note; after all, the note contains an 
acceleration clause under which the entire indebtedness could have 
become immediately due and payable following the . . . default." 
Id. The court determined that the assignee of the note could not 
recover from the guarantor because he was not notified according to 
the terms of the guaranty agreement upon default of the maker of 
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the no t e . 5 
The reasoning set forth in these cases i s d i r ec t ly appl i -
cable to the case at bar. The Racquet Club Note/Guaranty contained 
a specif ic provision regarding notice of defaul t . No notice of 
default was given to e i ther the Dougans or Beckers as guarantors. 
In accordance with the reasoning espoused in the decided cases, the 
Dougans and Beckers cannot be held l i ab l e on the Racquet Club Note 
when FIBU failed to provide them with the necessary notice which 
was a condition to the i r entering into the agreement. Based upon 
the foregoing, t h i s Court should affirm the lower cou r t ' s ruling 
tha t the Dougans and Beckers are released from a l l l i a b i l i t y under 
the Racquet Club Note/guaranty because FIBU failed to comply with a 
condition precedent to accelerat ion of the Note and l i a b i l i t y on 
the guaranty. 
In i t s brief, FIBU claims that even if Beckers and Dougans 
were en t i t l ed to not ice , they should not be released from a l l 
l i a b i l i t y under the Racquet Club Note/Guaranty. (Brief of 
See also, American Bankers L i fe Assurance Company of Florida v. United States, 12 CL.Ct. 
166 (1987)(Government's maritime guarantee obligations terminated under guarantee contract when 
lender's assignee fa i l ed to demand payment on guarantee wi th in 60 days of borrower's I n i t i a l 
payment of defau l t ) ; Walter Heller & Co. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. , 262 S.E.2d 151 
(Ga.App. 1979) (When a guaranty is a col la tera l continuing one general rule is that the 
guarantor 1s en t i t l ed to reasonable notice of default of the c red i to r ) ; Qrkin Exterminating Co. 
v. Stevens, 203 S.E.2d 587 (Ga.App. 1973) (Failure to give notice was a bar to maintenance of a 
successful cause of action on the contract where the contract provided for wr i t ten notice of 
claim for breach of guaranty); Waikiki Seaside, Inc. v. Comito, 641 P.2d 1363 (Hawaii App. 
1982) (Where the contract of guaranty expressly covers the subject of notice, those provisions 
are con t ro l l ing . Thus where guaranty provides that notice of the default of the pr incipal 
debtor must be given to the guarantor, f a i l u re to give notice is a defense for the guarantor); 
and Bowyer v. Clark Equipment Co., 357 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.App. 1976) (Guarantor was released from 
l i a b i l i t y where guaranty was co l la tera l and credi tor f a i l ed to give notice of p r inc ipa l ' s 
defau l t ) . 
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Appellant, pp. 34-38). The bank claims that Beckers and Dougans 
could have been injured by lack of notice "only if they would have 
cured PMD's default within the fifteen-day cure period provided by 
the Note." (Ic3. at 36). Further, the bank argues that "even if 
First Interstate somehow wrongfully deprived them [Dougans and 
Beckers] of the 15-day cure period established by the Note -- the 
Beckers and Dougans nevertheless failed to take advantage of a sub-
sequent three-month statutory cure period." (Id.) The bank states 
that Beckers' and Dougans' failure to cure PMD's default during the 
statutory cure period "established beyond peradventure that their 
'loss' of the 15-day contractural cure period did not result in any 
actual prejudice . . . the guarantors obviously lacked either the 
will or the ability to cure Park Meadow's [sic] default at any time 
'during the first months of 1986.'" (Brief of Appellant, pp. 
37-38). 
The bank's argument as to whether Dougans and Beckers 
could have cured under the statute is misplaced. The question is 
what were the terms and conditions of the guaranty? What did FIBU 
have to do as a condition precedent to accelerating the Note and 
seeking to enforce liability of the guarantors? 
The answer to those questions is clear. The bank had to: 
(1) give fifteen days' notice of default to the guarantors because 
the guaranty and Note should be construed together; or (2) as a 
bare minimum, give fifteen days' notice of default to PCRC, the 
maker of the Note, as a condition precedent to the right to accel-
erate the Note and to call on the guarantors to perform on their 
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guaranty. This admittedly the bank did not do; or (3) give notice 
to Becker and Dougan as makers of the Note which they became when 
PCRC conveyed the Racquet Club to them and they assumed and agreed 
to pay the Note thereby stepping into the shoes of PCRC as the 
maker of the Note, which the bank again admittedly failed to do. 
It is not a question of whether Beckers and Dougans had an 
opportunity to cure the default under the statute. The question is 
what were the terms of the Note that Beckers and Dougans guaranteed? 
Again, the answer is clear—Beckers and Dougans are not sureties 
for hire and thus are entitled to the benefit of the rules requir-
ing strict construction of the contract and strict compliance of 
the bank with the terms of the Note and guaranty. 
FIBU was duty bound as a condition precedent to accelerat-
ing the Note and calling on the guarantors to make good on their 
guaranty to give the fifteen-day notice of default as set forth in 
(1) or (2) or (3) above. As this Court held in American Bonding, 
763 P.2d at 817, FIBU's failure to properly give notice relieves 
Dougans and Beckers from any liability on their guaranty. This 
Court should affirm the lower court's ruling that Dougans and 
Beckers are released from all liability because FIBU failed to 
provide them notice as required by the terms of the parties' 
agreement. 
D7 -62-
VI. 
DOUGANS AND BECKERS ARE ENTITLED TO 
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS INCURRED PURSUANT TO 
RULE 54(d) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Beckers and Dougans are entitled to reimbursement of costs 
incurred pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that: 
The costs of depositions are taxable 
"subject to the limitation that the trial 
court is persuaded that they were taken in 
good faith, and, in light of the 
circumstances, appear to be a center for 
the development and presentation of the 
case. Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984); Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
774 (Utah 1980), and cases cited therein; 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 
12 Utah 2d 235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961). 
The complexity of issues presented in Dougans' and Beckers' motion 
for summary judgment and in FIBU's motions for partial summary 
judgment made it virtually impossible to obtain sufficient informa-
tion for preparation without deposing various individuals with 
knowledge of the transactions at issue in the motions. The 
depositions were taken in good faith and were essential for the 
development of the issues which were subject of the motions. 
FIBU attempts to understate the complexity of issues pre-
sented in the lower court on Dougans' and Beckers' motion for sum-
mary judgment. The district court's order with respect to the 
motion for summary judgment was that the fifteen-day notice 
required by the loan documents to be given prior to accelerating 
the Racquet Club Note was not given by FIBU to the original maker, 
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Park City Racquet Club, to Dougans, Beckers and Ayers who assumed 
the Racquet Club Note and thereby became makers, nor to Dougans, 
Beckers and Ayers in their capacity as guarantors. Moreover, the 
lower court ruled that the notice required to be given by FIBU to 
PMD prior to FIBU's exercising its option to accelerate was 
defective. Finally, the lower court ruled that the giving of a 
proper fifteen-day notice was a condition precedent to the right of 
FIBU to exercise its option to accelerate the Racquet Club Note. 
Dougans and Beckers were unable to develop the arguments 
presented in their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to 
FIBU's motions for partial summary judgment without taking various 
depositions. The depositions were essential for the development 
and presentation of the Dougans' and Beckers' motion for summary 
judgment and arguments in opposition to FIBU's motions for partial 
summary judgment. Dougans and Beckers seek the deposition costs of 
individuals who had knowledge of the transactions at issue in these 
motions. A brief description of the individuals deposed clearly 
demonstrates Dougans1 and Beckers' need to obtain the testimony of 
the individuals to develop the issues which were the subject of the 
respective motions: 
(a) Robert Owens -- bank official who made decisions 
regarding the Racquet Club Note, acceleration and 
foreclosure; 
(b) Robert ward -- bank official who made decisions 
regarding the Racquet Club Mote, acceleration and 
foreclosure; 
(c) Hardin A. Whitney -- attorney with knowledge of 
the loan history from the assumption through acceleration; 
(d) Linda Franke -- bank official who executed docu-
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ments regarding the Racquet Club Note; 
(e) Larry Whitney -- bank official who had a diary 
of events relative to the Racquet Club Note; 
(f) Wayne Gray Petty -- attorney involved in the 
negotiation and execution of the work-out documents; 
(g) Dougas Matsumori -- attorney involved in negoti-
ation and execution of work-out documents; 
(h) Mark D. Howell -- bank official involved with 
the work-out documents; 
(i) Ross Varoz -- bank official responsible for the 
Racquet Club Note after the work-out; 
(j) Ralph Nielsen -- bank official familiar with the 
assumption agreement, notice of default, and foreclosure 
action; 
(k) Lynn Dougan -- guarantor of the Racquet Club 
Note; and 
(1) Frederick Becker -- guarantor of the Racquet 
Club Note. 
In light of the circumstances of Dougans1 and Beckers' 
motion for summary judgment and FIBU's motions for partial summary 
judgment, it is clear that the depositions of the individuals set 
forth above were essential for the development of the issues. The 
lower court denied FIBU's motions for partial summary judgment and 
granted Dougans' and Beckers' motion for summary judgment. Dougans 
and Beckers were the prevailing parties in both proceedings. 
Dougans' and Beckers' Memorandum of Costs is therefore proper pur-
suant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Court should affirm the lower court's award of costs to Dougans and 
Beckers. 
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VII. 
THE ORDER DENYING FIBU'S SEPTEMBER 26, 19 88 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT 
A "FINAL" JUDGMENT AND IS NOT APPEALABLE. 
FIBU filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
September 26, 1988 (the "9-26-88 Motion"). (R. at 723-25). Oral 
argument on the 9-26-88 Motion was heard on November 28, 1988 
(November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 1; R. at 1533). The written 
order denying the 9-26-88 Motion was entered on December 8, 1988 
(the "12-8-88 Order"). (R. at 1098-1100 and attached hereto in 
Addendum at Alll-114.) FIBU filed a Notice of Appeal from the 
12-8-88 Order on May 16., 1989. 
An appeal can be taken only from a final order. Ahlstrom 
v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979, 979 (Utah 1986); Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, 3. "A final judgment generally 'ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.'" Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1987). FIBU 
cannot claim that the 12-8-88 Order is final. The 12-8-88 Order 
denied FIBU's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Obviously, the 
merits of the action were not determined. All claims remained to 
be tried and judgment could not be entered by the trial court. 
FIBU admits that certain claims are pending. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 12). They include: FIBU's claim against Vic and Marion Ayers, 
the Beckers' and Dougans' third-party claim against the Smiths and 
the Smiths' fraud claim against FIBU. Thus, the 12-8-88 Order is 
not final, but only interlocutory. 
The trial court may certify an interlocutory order as 
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final, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the Court may direct the entry of 
a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the 
Court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment. Any absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however, designated 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 
all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, 
and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all of 
the parties. (Emphasis added). 
FIBU has never requested that the 12-8-88 Order be certified pursu-
ant to Rule 54(b). The 12-8-88 Order does not reflect any certifi-
cation by the trial court. (R. at 1098-1100; Addendum at 
Alll-114). No determination has ever been made by the Court that 
there was no reason for delay. Some confusion may exist because of 
FIBU's May 16, 1989 Notice of Appeal, That notice attempted to 
appeal from the May 3, 1989 Judgment granting Dougans' and Beckers' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the 12-8-88 Order. (R. at 1426-28 
and attached hereto in Addendum at A115-118). Although the trial 
court certified the May 3, 1989 Judgment as a final judgment, 
(R. at 1416), it did not, and never has, certified the 12-8-88 
Order as a final judgment. FIBU's own brief implicitly acknowl-
edges that the December 8, 1988 order has not been certified. 
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Although FIBU states that the May 5, 1989 judgment regarding the 
Beckers1 and Dougansf motion for summary judgment has been 
certified, it fails to state, nor could it, any jurisdictional 
basis for its appeal from the December 8, 1988 Order. (Brief of 
Appellant at 1)• FIBU's appeal from the 12-8-88 Order cannot be 
considered by this Court. Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 
(Utah 1987) . 
VIII. 
FIBU'S APPEAL FROM THE DECEMBER 8, 1988 
ORDER IS UNTIMELY. 
Assuming arguendo that the December 8, 1988 Order is a 
final judgment and appealable, FIBU's appeal is untimely. An 
appeal from a final judgment or order must be filed within thirty 
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, 4. FIBU did not file its Notice of 
Appeal until May 16, 1989. Thus, FIBU's appeal is untimely. 
IX. 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO FIBU'S APPEAL FROM THE 
12-8-88 ORDER IS PROPER, IT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THE ABSENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT AND THAT IT WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Standard of Review. 
When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, 
this Court applies the same standard used by the trial court. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 
1988). Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
party is entitled to summary judgment if (1) there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. This Court must 
"construe the facts and view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion." Lucky Seven Corp,, 755 P.2d at 
752. Because summary judgment deprives a party of a full trial on 
the merits, courts are reluctant to grant it. Brandt v. 
Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (1960). 
We are cognizant of the desirability of 
permitting litigants to fully present their 
case to the court and that a summary judg-
ment prevents this. For that reason courts 
are, and should be, reluctant to invoke 
this remedy. icL (footnote omitted). 
Furthermore, "[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party." Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 
389 (Utah 1984) . 
B. FIBU Possesses the Burden of Proof. 
In general, a party moving for summary judgment has the 
burden of proving the absence of disputed material facts. Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981). 
On appeal, the trial court's actions are presumed valid and 
correct. Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 
1981) . 
This Court indulges the findings and 
judgment of the trial court with a presump-
tion of validity and correctness and 
reviews the record in the light favorable 
to them, and will not disturb them if they 
find substantial support in the evidence. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Furthermore, FIBU bears the burden of demonstrating the trial 
court's error to this Court. Id. FIBU has made no attempt to 
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establish on appeal what facts were material to its 9-26-88 Motion 
and that those facts were undisputed. FIBU failed to meet its bur-
den in the trial court, and on appeal. 
C. Assuming FIBU's Appeal is Proper, Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Exist and FIBU is Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter 
of Law. 
For purposes of argument only and to respond to FIBU's 
brief, respondents address the reasons why FIBU is not entitled to 
summary judgment. 
1. Disputed Material Facts - FIBU's 9-26-88 Motion sought 
to have the trial court decide summarily that the Beckers, Dougans 
and Ayers were liable to it on their guaranty. (R. at 739). The 
following material facts were, and are, disputed by FIBU:6 
A. Did Park Meadows, Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic 
Ayers assume the Racquet Club Note? 
B. Did FIBU release Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers from 
the Racquet Club Note? 
C. If no written release of Enoch Smith from the 
Racquet Club Note exists, should FIBU have executed a 
release of Enoch Smith from the Racquet Club Note? 
D. Does the term "FIUT's PMD . . . loan" include the 
Racquet Club Note? 
E. Did the parties intend to integrate the closing 
documents? 
F. Has the collateral been impaired? 
G. What was the fair market value of the collateral 
when it was sold? 
(November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 35-37; R. at 1533). Those dis-
D
 FIBU cannot, produce evidence to dispute these facts. However, for purposes of argument, 
respondents will assume FIBU can support its dispute to the facts with evidence. 
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puted material facts precluded the trial court from granting FIBU 
summary judgment. 
2. Release of a Principal Obligor Releases a Guarantor -
For purposes of argument, FIBU conceded that PMD assumed the 
Racquet Club Note. (November 28, 1988 Transcript, at 38; R. at 
1533). FIBU argues that PMD's assumption of the Racquet Club Note 
is immaterial because "the release of a partner does not release 
either the partnership or the guarantors of the partnership's 
debt." (Brief of Appellant, at 40). FIBU then argues that because 
the release of a partner does not release the partnership, the 
entire basis for the guarantors' release is eliminated. Id. 
FIBU's position is fraught with error. 
FIBU cannot dispute that a guarantor is released if the 
principal obligor is released. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 
1352-54 (Utah App. 1987). In so holding, this Court quoted 
Restatement of Security §122 (1941): "'Where the creditor releases 
a principal, the surety is discharged, unless (a) the surety con-
sents to remain liable notwithstanding the release, or (b) the 
creditor in the release reserves his rights against the surety.'" 
Id. at 1354. That principle's rationale is explained in comment b 
to Section 122: 
[I]f the surety could be compelled to pay 
after the principal's release, he would be 
entitled to reimbursement if he had become 
a surety at the principal's request or with 
his consent. Such an outcome would be 
unfair to the principal after release 
because it would afford the creditor a means 
of attacking the principal indirectly through 
D7 
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the surety. Restatement of Security §122, 
comment b (1941) (emphasis added), 
"Another reason for the rule . . .is, that it would be a fraud on 
the principal debtor to profess to release him, and then to sue the 
surety, who would in turn sue him.'" Continental Bank & Trust Co, 
v. AKWA, 206 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1973) (emphasis added). 
Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic Ayers individually assumed 
the Racquet Club Note. (Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R, at 
1188-91 and Addendum at A36-40; Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith, 
at 57; R. at 1527). Although FIBU has not produced any evidence to 
the contrary, FIBU hotly disputes those individual assumptions. 
The individual assumptions by Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Vic Ayers 
are significant. When the Smiths and Ayers assumed the Racquet 
Club Note, they became principal obligors and the Dougans and 
Beckers became secondarily liable, as sureties. FIBU's release of 
Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers discharged the Beckers and the Dougans 
under, Horman v. Gordon. 
In Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987), 
J. 0. Kingston ("Kingston") purchased a shopping center from 
Ecotek. 1x3. at 1348. As part of the purchase, Kingston assumed 
primary liability to repay three promissory notes owed by Rodney 
Gordon ("Gordon") to Sidney Horman ("Horman"). IcL at 1348, 1352. 
Although Horman knew about the assumption, Horman did not agree to 
it. Id_. at 1348, 1353. Furthermore, Gordon did not ask Horman to 
release him from the obligation to repay the notes and Horman did 
not release Gordon. 1x3. In an attempt to work out payment of 
these notes and others, Kingston paid certain funds to Horman. Id. 
D7 -72-
at 1349. In exchange, Horman released all claims against Kingston 
without reserving his rights against Gordon. ixL Horman later 
sued Gordon on the notes which Kingston had assumed. Id!. Gordon 
argued that Horman's release of Kingston also released him. icL at 
1352. This Court agreed and reversed the trial court. 1(3. at 
1352-54. 
In reversing the trial court, this Court held that 
Kingston became the primary obligor when he assumed the three 
notes, and Gordon became secondarily liable to Horman, as a surety. 
Id. at 1352-53. This Court relied on Restatement of Security §83 
(1941) which states: 
The suretyship relation is created where 
the surety . . . (c) having been a princi-
pal obligor, his obligation, without a 
novation, has been assumed by another or 
his property has been transferred under 
such circumstances as to place the property 
under the primary burden of the obligation. 
Next, this Court held that Horman was affected by the incidents of 
Gordon's suretyship when he obtained knowledge of Kingston's 
assumption. It was not necessary that Horman consent to it. Id. 
at 1353. Then, this Court adopted Restatement of Security §122 
(1941). Id. at 1354. Finally, this Court held that because Gordon 
did not consent to Kingston's release and because Horman did not 
expressly reserve his rights against Gordon, his release of 
Kingston also discharged Gordon. Id. 
Horman v. Gordon is directly applicable to this case. The 
Dougans and Beckers were guarantors and principal obligors on the 
Racquet Club Note. PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers assumed and 
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agreed individually to pay the Racquet Club Note. The Dougans and 
Beckers intended that PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers should have 
primary liability for the Racquet Club Note. Horman v. Gordon 
makes it clear that the Smiths and Vic Ayers thereby became princi-
pal obligors. The Beckers and Dougans, who transferred the obliga-
tion to the Smiths and Ayers, became sureties. The Dougans and 
Beckers were also sureties in their capacity as guarantors. 
Section 82 of the Restatement of Security treats "guaranty" 
synonymously with "surety." Dougan notified FIBU of the assumption 
by PMD,'the Smith and Vic Ayers. FIBU knew of those assumptions 
before it released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers. 
Absent their consent to remain liable or a reservation of 
FIBU's rights against them, the Dougans and Beckers were released 
when Enoch Smith or Vic Ayers were released. FIBU produced no evi-
dence that the Beckers and Dougans consented to remain liable or 
that it reserved its rights against them. Resolution of the fac-
tual issue of whether or not the Smiths and Vic Ayers individually 
assumed the Racquet Club Note which is strongly disputed by FIBU is 
vital. 
3. Release of One Partner Releases the Partnership - When 
FIBU released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers without reserving its 
rights against PMD, it released the partnership as well. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 151 
P. 521, 527 (Utah 1915) : 
It is a well-recognized rule of law that, 
in ordinary partnership, a release by a 
D7 -74-
creditor of one or more members from part-
nership liability operates as a release of 
all the members from such liability. Id. 
In Palle v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 7 P.2d 284 (Utah 1932), 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding implied that to collect on a part-
nership obligation, a plaintiff could sue either the partnership 
or all members of the partnership. lcL at 288. The holding also 
implies that if a plaintiff brings suit against the partner for a 
partnership debt, the plaintiff must join all parties. Id.• 
Because a plaintiff can bring an action on a partnership obligation 
against all partners, and the release of one partner releases all 
partners, it is axiomatic that the release of and failure to join a 
partner on a partnership obligation releases the partnership. 
Furthermore, partnership liability in Utah is joint. Utah 
Code Ann. §48-1-12 (1989 Replacement) states: 
All partners are liable . . . 
2. Jointly for all other debts and obliga-
tions of the partnership, but any partner 
may enter into a separate obligation to 
perform a partnership contract. Id. 
Judge Winder recently relied on Utah Code Ann. §48-1-12 in holding 
that a general partner is personally liable for a partnership 
obligation. First Security Bank v. Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175, 
178-79 (D. Utah 1987). Accordingly, partnerships are governed by 
the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. §§15-4-1 to -5 
(1986). Under that act, if an obligee releases one or more joint 
obligors without a reservation of rights against the remaining 
obligors, he releases the remaining co-obligors. Under Utah law, 
the release of any partner in PMD by FIBU on the Racquet Club Note, 
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discharged all partners and PMD by operation of law. Such a 
release also discharges the Dougans' and Beckers' obligations on 
the Racquet Club Note. 
4. The Beckers and Dougans are discharged under Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) (1981) - The Uniform Commercial Code, Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(a) (1981) states: 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of 
rights releases or agrees not to sue 
any person against whom the party has 
to the knowledge of the holder a right 
of recourse or agrees to suspend the 
right to enforce against such person 
the instrument or collateral or other-
wise discharges such person . . . . Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court applied §70A-3-606(1)(a) in Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 
1987). Although the Supreme Court held that there were issues of 
fact regarding the Watts' status as accommodation parties, it 
addressed the question of discharge under §70A-3-606(1)(a) to give 
guidance to the trial court on remand. Id_. at 158. The Supreme 
Court held that §70A-3-606(1)(a) is a "suretyship defense." rd. at 
160. The Supreme Court further held that the release of a primary 
obligor discharges the surety absent an express reservation of 
rights against the surety. Id_. at 160-61. Finally, the Supreme 
Court held that because the plaintiff had released the primary 
obligor from "all" liability, the surety had been completely dis-
charged and not just from the deficiency determined in the 
foreclosure. idN at 162. Based on Watts, the Dougans and Beckers 
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have been discharged. 
The original maker of the Racquet Club Note was PCRC. Its 
position was assumed by PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers. FIBU was 
notified of their assumption and agreement to pay the Racquet Club 
Note. The Racquet Club Note states that it "shall be binding upon 
their respective . . . successors and assigns." Dougans and Beckers 
therefore have recourse against PCRCfs assignees, including PMD, 
the Smiths and Vic Ayers. It has been held that the recourse 
rights of accommodation parties are not affected by the transfer 
and assumption of the obligation to pay a note. Fithian v. Jamar, 
410 A.2d 569 (Md. 1979). The Dougans' and Beckers' right of 
recourse against PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers is further supported 
by common law principles set forth in Restatement of Security 
§83(c). Section 70A-3-606(1)(a) discharged the Dougans and 
Beckers, when FIBU released Enoch Smith and Vic Ayers, unless FIBU 
expressly reserved its rights against the Dougans and Beckers. 
5. FIBU Released Vic Ayers - Vic Ayers was one of the 
original guarantors on the Racquet Club Note. As stated 
previously, Vic Ayers individually assumed the Racquet Club Note. 
In 1983, Vic Ayers entered into a workout arrangement with his 
creditors, including FIBU. In that workout, Vic Ayers was released 
from personal liability on PMD's obligations to FIBU, including the 
Racquet Club Note. As a primary obligor, that release discharged 
the Dougans and Beckers. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 
1987). As a guarantor, that release also discharged the Beckers 
and Dougans. Columbia Bank, N.A. v. New Cascadia Corp., 682 P.2d 
D7 
-77-
966, 968 (Wash.App. 1984). 
6. FIBU Released Enoch Smith - The most fundamental fac-
tual dispute concerns the release of Enoch Smith, In early 1985, 
PMD experienced financial difficulties. First Security Bank 
("FSB") had filed suit to foreclose on some of PMD's properties. 
PMD entered into negotiations with FSB and FIBU to work out its 
financial problems. 
During those negotiations various proposals were offered 
and discussed. The critical negotiations occurred on June 12 and 
13, 1985. Two key issues were discussed: (1) the release of 
Enoch Smith; and (2) additional collateral to be given by the 
Smiths. Ultimately, the Smiths agreed to give the banks approxi-
mately $4,000,000.00 of additional personal unencumbered 
collateral, including the Smith's family ranch. In exchange, the 
banks agreed to release Enoch Smith from all loans except a 
$500,000.00 FIBU loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company. 
A Workout Agreement was prepared, reviewed and executed. 
(R. at 1184-86 and Addendum at A31-35). Paragraph 5 of the 
Workout Agreement states: 
5. Enoch and Margaret Smith will be 
released from whatever personal liability 
may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD, 
Enoch Smith Company and Smith Park Acres 
loans and the "Ayers" loan. Enoch Smith 
will retain whatever liability he now has 
on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company 
loan. Dick Smith will not have personal 
liability on the "Ayers" debt. Id. 
Dick Smith understood that paragraph 5 of the Workout Agreement 
released Enoch Smith from all PMD loans owed to FIBU, including the 
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Racquet Club Note. (Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith, at 130-131; 
R. at 1527-28). Absent that release, the Smiths would not have 
given the banks $4,000,000.00 of additional unencumbered 
collateral. 
Furthermore, FiBU believed Enoch Smith had been released. 
On August 14, 1986, Larry V. Whitney, an assistant vice president 
of FIBU, drafted a credit authorization report after the workout 
had been implemented. (R. at 1522, Exhibit F thereto). The report 
states at page 4: 
For the consideration of pledging per-
sonal assets, including the 280 acre Park 
Acre Ranch, Enoch and Margaret Smith have 
been released from all personal liability 
to FIUT except the $500,000 unsecured loan 
to ESSCO which is guaranteed by Enoch and 
Dick. Id_. (emphasis added). 
Whitney admitted he prepared this report after reviewing the work-
out documents on behalf of FIBU. (Deposition of Larry V. Whitney, 
at 33-34, R. at 1521) . 
Whether or not the Workout Agreement released Enoch Smith 
is a factual question. A court construing a document must, if 
possible, first attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions 
as determined from the document itself. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). If there is uncer-
tainty or ambiguity, parol evidence can be relied upon. 1(3. Big 
Butte Ranch v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). The facts establish 
that all parties, including FIBU representatives, understood that 
the Workout Agreement released Enoch Smith. Any uncertainty should 
be resolved against the party who drew the agreement. Sears v. 
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Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982)- The Workout Agreement 
was drafted by the banks, primarily by FIBU. 
Furthermore, when the Workout Agreement was executed, it 
constituted an executory accord: "An executory accord is an agree-
ment that an existing claim shall be discharged in the future by 
the rendition of a substituted performance. If agreed to, it does 
not discharge the existing claim, but rather the existing claim is 
discharged by the substituted performance." Golden Kay Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985). The Smiths agreed 
to convey and encumber personal assets valued at approximately 
$4,000,000.00 to FIBU. As consideration, FIBU agreed to release 
Enoch and Margaret Smith from all personal liability they had on 
then existing PMD loans owed to FIBU except one. The loan excepted 
was not the Racquet Club Note. Thus, the Workout Agreement 
released the Smiths when they subsequently performed the acts 
required by the Workout Agreement. FIBU has never claimed that the 
Smiths failed to perform. 
Assuming arguendo that the workout documents do not con-
tain a release of Enoch Smith, FIBU cannot dispute that Enoch and 
Margaret Smith are entitled to a release. The Smiths have fully 
complied with the requirements of the workout. The Smiths have 
given up $4,000,000.00 of personal unencumbered assets. Those 
assets cannot now be recovered by the Smiths. The Smiths have sub-
stantially changed their position relying on what they were led to 
believe was a release. If a jury were to find that a release has 
not been given, FIBU would be in breach of its contract. In fact, 
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the Smiths have filed a Complaint against FIBU alleging such a 
breach. Substantial issues of fact regarding the extent of that 
release remain to be resolved. Those issues include whether or not 
a release has been given, whether or not the release includes the 
Racquet Club Note and whether or not that release should have been 
included in the Workout Agreement. 
7. The Indemnity Agreement Does Not Preclude the Dougans 
and Beckers from being discharged. - FIBU contends that the Beckers 
and Dougans cannot be discharged because they have been fully 
indemnified by PMD's partners. FIBU quotes from L. Simpson, 
Handbook of the Law of Suretyship, (1950) and F. Childs, Law of 
Surety and Guarantee (1907). FIBU's quote from Simpson fails to 
include the following statement: "The rule more in accord with 
logic and with the actualities of the situation is the Restatement 
rule that the release of the principal discharges the surety from 
his personal obligation, but leaves him liable to account to the 
creditor for the security." L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of 
Suretyship, 306 (1950). The very authority FIBU relies upon to 
support its argument disagrees with its position. 
Simpson goes on to favorably comment on the restatement 
position. Restatement of Security § 122, comment C states: 
C. Secured Surety. Where the surety has 
received security from or for the benefit 
of the principal, the creditor has an 
interest in the security (See § 140). 
Since the creditor is entitled to an inter-
est in such security, the release of the 
principal by the creditor, where the surety 
is secured by the principal, is presumably 
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an indication that the creditor intends to 
rely upon the security. The release of the 
principal has the effect, therefore, of 
releasing the surety from his personal 
obligation, subject to his duty to account 
to the creditor for The security. 
Section 122 was adopted by Utah in Horman v. Gordon, supra. The 
specific issue of the indemnified surety was addressed in 
Continental Bank & Trust v. AKWA, 206 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1973) when 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited Simpson's treaties and followed 
the restatement approach. The "security" referred to is any secu-
rity given by the principal to protect the surety. There was no 
security given to Becker and Dougan and thus, they need not account 
to FIBU for anything. The indemnity Dougan and Becker obtained 
from PMD and its partners does not affect the release because the 
law does not so provide, and as indicated, they have received no 
security. Furthermore, PMD, the Smiths and Vic Ayers did not agree 
to indemnify Mrs. Dougan and Mrs. Becker. 
8. Subsequent Closing Documents Did Not Supersede the 
Work-Out Agreement - FIBU argues that the Workout Agreement was 
merged with and superseded by the additional closing documents. 
The three cases cited by FIBU are inapposite. (Brief of Appellant, 
at 41-42). FIBU cites National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen 
Brothers, Inc,, 511 P.2d 731 (Utah 1973), Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 
P.2d 769 (Utah 1951) and Beck, v. Meqli, 114 P.2d 305 (Kan* 1941) 
for the general proposition that the subsequent closing documents 
superseded the Workout Agreement. (Brief of Appellant, at 41-42). 
In each of those cases, the final contract either expressly stated 
that the parties intended the document to be final or a preliminary 
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document expressly stated the need to reduce the agreement to a 
final contract. Those are not the facts here. Furthermore, FIBU 
ignores the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Mawhinney that: 
[W]here it may be shown that the terms used in 
the latter instrument did not correctly embody 
the prior intention of the parties because of 
inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, evidence as 
to what was really intended by the terms of the 
instrument or what was inadvertently omitted or 
added may be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Workout Agreement was not a preliminary draft. The 
Smiths intended that the Workout Agreement be the final agreement. 
Only the Workout Agreement is supported by consideration. No sin-
gle subsequent document entirely covers the terms of the Workout 
Agreement. Each subsequent document effectuates only one of the 
terms of the Workout Agreement. The consideration for each is dis-
cerned by reference to the Workout Agreement. None of the docu-
ments indicate that the parties intended the closing documents to 
supersede the Workout Agreement. Under the analysis of Horman v. 
Gordon, there is no merger. 
FIBU argues that in a subsequent closing document, it lim-
ited its recourse against Enoch and Margaret Smith on certain 
loans, but not the Racquet Club Note. (Brief of Appellant, at 41-
42). FIBU's statement is misleading. PMD had obtained certain 
commercial loans which had become due prior to the workout. They 
were not amortized loans. As part of the workout, those loans were 
to be extended. The Amendment and Extension Agreement was intended 
to extend those commercial loans only. It was not meant to be the 
exclusive agreement or to alter the terms of the Workout Agreement. 
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It merely implemented one term of the Workout Agreement. The 
Racquet Club Note, however, was an amortized real estate loan which 
was brought current from additional funds loaned by FSB in the 
workout, and it did not need to be extended. FIBU disagrees with 
that interpretation. That dispute precluded summary judgment. 
9. The Term "FIUT'S PMD . . . loans" Includes the Racquet 
Club Note. - The second, most fundamental factual dispute is 
whether or not the release included the Racquet Club Note. FIBU 
disputes that it did. "The only wording in this paragraph that 
even arguably relates to release under the note is the language 
referring to 'FIUT's PMD . . . loan [sic] . ' . . . First Interstate 
contends that this language does not refer to the note." 
(Brief of Appellant, at 39-40.) (citations and footnotes omitted 
and emphasis added). 
There is substantial evidence that the Racquet Club Note 
is included in the release. FIBU knew that PMD, the Smiths and Vic 
Ayers had assumed the Racquet Club Note. On September 2, 1982, 
Dougan sent a letter to FIBU informing it of those assumptions. 
Furthermore, FIBU consented to the exchange of Dougan!s and 
Becker's interests in the Racquet Club to PMD. On November 11, 
1982, Dougan wrote FIBU again informing it of the Indemnity 
Agreement between PMD, the Smiths, Vic Ayers, Becker and Dougan. 
In late 1984, Larry v. Whitney, an assistant vice presi-
dent of FIBU, was assigned by top FIBU management to review the 
overall PMD indebtedness and report on the extent of and security 
for the debt. During the spring of 1985 when the workout was being 
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negotiated, it was Whitney's perception that the Smiths or PMD 
owned the Racquet Club. 
During the workout negotiations, PMD submitted two written 
proposals to the banks. (R. at 1522, Exhibit 0 thereto). The 
Smiths' initial objective was to give the banks a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure. PMD's proposals included the Racquet Club as one 
asset to be conveyed to the banks. (Id.) The Smiths' accountant 
prepared a list of all loans the Smith entities owed to the banks. . 
(R. at 1522, Exhibit T thereto). During the workout negotiations, 
that list was circulated and considered by the parties. The list 
includes the Racquet Club Note, and identifies it as a "Park 
Meadows" loan owed to FIBU. (Id.) 
After PMD received title to the Racquet Club in 1982, all 
payment notices were sent to PMD. On June 11, 1985, First 
Interstate Mortgage, FIBU's subsidiary that was servicing the 
Racquet Club Note, sent letters to Dick Smith for PMD reminding Mr. 
Smith that the Racquet Club Note was in default for the May and 
June 1985 payments, and demanding payment. Linda Franke, a vice 
president in FIBU's real estate department, was aware in June 1985, 
that the Racquet Club Note was delinquent. 
During the negotiations through May and June 1985, the 
term "Park Meadows Project" was used generally by all participants 
to refer to the land, the Racquet Club and the golf course. The 
Smiths understood that "FIUT's PMD . . . loans" included the Racquet 
Club Note. Dick Smith testified he recalled specific discussions 
regarding the Racquet Club Note during the workout negotiations. 
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The Racquet Club was included in the blanket mortgages 
given to FIBU and FSB. After the Workout Agreement had been 
negotiated, funds from an additional $1,000,000 extended by FSB, 
were used to bring the Racquet Club Note current, pursuant to the 
FIBU's express approval. Finally, as indicated previously, Larry 
Whitney wrote on August 14, 1985, after reviewing all the workout 
documents for FIBU, that Enoch and Margaret Smith had been released 
from "all" personal liability to FIBU except the $500,000 unsecured 
loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company which was guaranteed by Enoch and 
Dick. 
At the very least, those facts create a substantial ambi-
guity regarding what was meant by the parties in using the term 
"FIUT's PMD . . . loans." Because of that ambiguity, the parties' 
intent must be considered. The resolution of that ambiguity is a 
material question of fact. 
10. Whether or Not the Collateral was Impaired Is a 
Question of Fact - The Beckers and Dougans agreed to guarantee the 
Racquet Club Note with certain understandings of the risk. The 
Dougans and Beckers were cognizant of that risk when they sold the 
Racquet Club to PMD, including PMD's, the Smiths' and Vic Ayers' 
agreement to assume and pay the Racquet Club Note. The Dougans and 
Beckers believed that their exposure was adequately protected. 
When we entered into this transaction with the 
Smiths, we did so knowing full well that these 
were substantial, responsible people. By 
"substantial" and "responsible," I mean they 
had a reputation in this community and in Park 
City for discharging their obligations, and 
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they generally had the reputation of being 
people of means with the financial wherewithal 
to discharge their obligations. (Deposition 
of J. Lynn Dougan, p. 18, lines 13-19, R. at 
1526) . 
On February 21, 1986, FIBU sent to Lynn Dougan the statu-
tory notice of default. When Dougan received the notice, he con-
tacted Rick Becker. Becker had not received a copy of the notice, 
and was surprised. Dougan and Becker decided to get a title 
report. Just before Dougan contacted Becker, Dick Smith called 
Becker, and told him that Bob Ward, FIBU's executive vice 
president, instructed him to stop making payments on the Racquet 
Club Note. Dougan had not received prior notice of the default and 
was surprised by the Smiths' inability to respond on the note and 
the indemnity. 
The title report, effective March 20, 1986, disclosed cer-
tain liens of which Dougan previously had no knowledge. (Affidavit 
of J. Lynn Dougan, R. at 1197, Addendum at A56-65). Item 12 
reflects the FSB blanket mortgage from the workout and its amend-
ment which added the Racquet Club as collateral. That blanket 
mortgage secured the $1.0 million FSB loan provided in the workout, 
and approximately $4.0 million previously loaned by FSB to PMD, a 
total of $5.0 million. (Deposition of Hardin A. Whitney, p. 30, 
line 23; R. at 1529). Item 13 reflected the FIBU blanket mortgage 
from the workout, and it encumbered the Racquet Club to secure 
$9,787,275.25, plus interest. The total debt encumbering the 
Racquet Club was approximately $15 million. Item 15 disclosed the 
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding commenced against PMD by FIBU. 
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Although not listed in the title report, the parties to 
the workout executed a Subordination Agreement on June 28, 1985, 
which was amended in July 1985. (R. at 1522, Exhibit U thereto). 
The Subordination Agreement and its amendment subordinated certain 
of FIBU's first lien positions to certain liens of FSB. 
(Deposition of Robert J. Ward, Exhibit 33 thereto, R. at 1524). 
Dick Smith understood that the Racquet Club Note and FIBU's blanket 
mortgage were subordinated to FSB's loans, so that FSB had first 
lien position on the Racquet Club. (Deposition of E. R. Smith, pp. 
100-104, R. at 1527-28) . 
Paragraph 2 implements the subordination. The first sen-
tence generally states FIBU's liens in the collateral are subordi-
nated to FSB's liens in the collateral. The third sentence 
provides "that all security interests and liens in any property or 
asset, securing the Junior Debt, . . . shall be subordinate to 
all security interest and liens in the same property or assets, 
securing the Senior Debt." (Emphasis added). 
The Junior Debt consists of FIBU notes totalling 
$4,411,000.00," "all other existing obligations of Debtors" (PMD, 
Smiths and related companies) to FIBU listed and all future obliga-
tions of Debtors to FIBU. Certain Smith/PMD debts listed totalled 
approximately $9.7 million. The FIBU blanket mortgage was to 
secure $9,787,275.25 debt of PMD, Smiths and their related 
companies, and the collateral includes the Racquet Club. (R. at 
1522, Exhibit R thereto). Therefore, the Racquet Club is property 
securing the Junior Debt and the Racquet Club Note is a subordi-
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nated lien. The Senior Debt consists of the $1,000,000.00 workout 
loan and FSB's approximately $4.0 million previous loan to PMD. 
The $5.0 million FSB loans were given priority over the Junior 
Debt, which includes the Racquet Club and the Racquet Club Note. 
The amendment to the Subordination Agreement clarified 
that the FSB blanket mortgage and its amendment were part of the 
liens securing the Senior Debt. The amendment to FSB's blanket 
mortgage modified the collateral description which would be subject 
to the lien, to add the Racquet Club among other things. (R. at 
1522, Exhibit V thereto). The recorded documents therefore estab-
lish that the FIBU deed of trust (blanket mortgage) and the FSB 
amended deed of trust (blanket mortgage) both are liens upon the 
Racquet Club, and that the FIBU lien on the Racquet Club was subor-
dinated to the FSB lien as Dick Smith understood in the negotiations. 
This Court held in Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Rite Way 
Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1277, that a guarantor is discharged when a creditor 
impairs the collateral securing the debt. Ic3. at 108-09. In Rite 
Way, Valley Bank extended a loan to Rite Way which was guaranteed 
by Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe (the "Lowes"). 1(3. at 106. 
The loan was secured by certain collateral. id. Briefly, the loan 
became delinquent, Valley Bank released its interest in some of the 
collateral and it sued the Lowes. _£d. at 107. The Lowes argued 
that Valley Bank impaired the collateral and thus, they were 
discharged. The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment 
to Valley Bank. Id. This Court found the existence of certain 
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material facts and reversed. icL at 110. 
In reaching that conclusion, this Court first analyzed the 
nature of the Lowes' guaranty. id. at 107-08. Holding that the 
guaranty was absolute, this Court turned to the question of 
impairment. Id. at 108-09. This Court held that a guarantor, 
absolute or conditional, "has a right of subrogation to any collat-
eral pledged as security." Ic3. at 108. This Court then held that 
the creditor is in a trustee relationship with the guarantor, and 
that if it breaches that trust duty, the guarantor is discharged. 
The rationale is that the creditor, 
having elected to proceed against security 
for payment of the debt, is deemed to be in 
a trustee relationship with the guarantor. 
The creditor may liquidate the security and 
apply the proceeds to the obligation, or he 
may forego recourse to the security and 
proceed against the guarantor of payment, 
provided he does not subvert the 
guarantor's subrogation rights against col-
lateral pledged by the principal obligor. 
If he breaches that trust duty by 
destroying, losing, or otherwise 
improvidently dissipating the collateral, 
he may not hold the guarantor wholly liable 
because the guarantor would have been 
subrogated to the creditor's right of 
resort to that security.7 
Id. This Court recognized that that general rule had been codified 
in Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(b) (1981). 
There is one exception to the rule articulated by this 
Court in Rite Way. A guarantor may explicitly waive or consent to 
1
 Other cases which discuss and follow the trust relationship principle Include: Industrial 
Investment Corp. v. C M . Rocca, 596 P.2d 100 (Idaho 1979); Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 
481 (5th C1r. 1967); Behlen v. Manufacturing Co. v. First National Bank of Englewood, 472 P.2d 
703 (Colo.App. 1970). 
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the creditor's impairment of the collateral. Rite Way, 742 P.2d at 
109. That waiver or consent must be unequivocal and explicit. Id. 
Impairment of collateral is not limited to physical damage 
to the collateral. It is broadly construed to include conduct of 
the creditor which diminishes the value of the collateral, or which 
makes the collateral unavailable to the surety and thus increases 
the surety's risks. Beneficial Financial Co. of Norman v. Marshall, 
551 P.2d 315, 319-20 (Okla.App. 1976). Subordination of a mortgage 
has specifically been held to be an impairment of collateral. 
Poynot v. J & T Developments, Inc,, 355 So.2d 1052 (La.App. 1978). 
Like the guarantors in Rite Way, the Dougans and Beckers 
had a right of subrogation to the Racquet Club which secured the 
Note. FIBU elected to proceed against the Racquet Club and 
therefore, owed a duty of trust to the Dougans and Beckers. FIBU's 
imposition of a blanket mortgage of $9,787,275.25 against the 
Racquet Club, allowance of FSB to obtain a blanket mortgage of 
approximately $5.0 million against the Racquet Club, subordination 
of its Racquet Club lien and note to FSB's blanket mortgage, initi-
ation of the involuntary bankruptcy against PMD and its dealings 
with PMD from 1983 to 1986 constitute an impairment of the value of 
the Racquet Club. The Dougans and Beckers did not consent to or 
waive FIBU's actions. FIBU presented no evidence of such a waiver 
or consent. Thus, issues of fact regarding FIBU's impairment and 
any claimed consent or waiver precluded summary judgment. 
The common law also discharges a guarantor to the extent 
the collateral has been impaired, or the creditor has increased the 
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guarantor's risks. The discharge is based on the trust 
relationship, and the fact that the guarantor is subrogated to the 
creditor's rights against the principal and the collateral. 
Restatement of Security, §141, Circumstances giving rise to the 
discharge are: modification of the principal's duties to the 
creditor, Restatement of Security, §128; extending time for 
principal's performance, Restatement of Security, §129; and surren-
dering or impairing security on the obligation, Restatement of 
Security, §132. 
11. FIBU Produced No Evidence of the Racquet Club's Fair 
Market Value. - FIBU alleged in its supporting memorandum in the 
trial court that there was due and owing to FIBU principal of 
$719,517.54 together with accrued interest of $97,435.00. (R. at 
738). The only evidence produced in support of that allegation was 
the Affidavit of Ross Varoz. FIBU produced no evidence regarding 
the fair market value of the Racquet Club at the time of the sale. 
In the order entered by Judge Wilkinson, on October 16, 1987, among 
the issues reserved to defendants were, the amount owed to FIBU by 
any of the defendants and the fair market value on the date of the 
sale. (R. at 353-60). The order further provided that the parties 
had stipulated that the determination of any deficiency shall be 
reserved by the court, and that any deficiency shall not exceed the 
difference between the fair market value at the time of the fore-
closure sale or the bid price at the sale, whichever is more, and 
such amount as shall subsequently be determined by the Court to go 
to FIBU. The fair market value of the property is a question of 
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that material issues of fact exist and FIBU is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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ADDENDUM I 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
DETEFHJ.NA! i ^ L<ULES 
"t^h Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. Judgments; costs , 
i) Definition; form,, "Judgment" as used in these rules 
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a 
master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) J udgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, tr\e court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but-
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express deter-
mination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer r;han a ; i the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabi ] ities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Gener a] 1 y» Except as to a par ty against whom a judg-
ment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in is 
pleadings. If may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it,' 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
• -.o, >
 Waar , > •• ^m.,,-.,, them.se] ves , 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default si lall 1 10 1 : 
be different in kind from, or exceed In amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment, 
,il" ,1 C Il C 
[j wriom awarded, Except when express provision 
therercr u mdue eithei in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be a L Lowed as of course to the prevail, irig party 
unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
anneal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, 
otner than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding 
fov" H '-* 1 ihide the final determination of the cause. 
Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse 
party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the 
items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and 
file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stat-
ing that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a 
motion to have the bill of costs taxes by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, 
or at the time of subsequent to the service and filing of the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of 
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on 
the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The 
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on 
the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the 
costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk 
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert 
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that 
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of 
actions and in the judgment docket. (Amended effective January 1, 
1985) . 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 4(a). Appeal as of Right: 
When Taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the district 
court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court of Appeals, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
15-4-1. Definitions• 
In this chapter, unless otherwise expressly stated, 
"obligation" includes a liability in tort; "obligor" includes a 
person liable for a tort; "obxiye^ . J U U C ^ a ^ L O ^ H U-JVIMM -. 
right based on a tort; "several obligors" means obligors severally 
bound for the same performance. 
15 4 • 2 . Discharge of co-obJ igors by ji idgment. 
A judgment agai i ist one c r i i tore of several obligors., or against 
one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, shall not 
discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to the proceed,.] ng 
wherein the judgment was rendered, 
The amount ;r value or any consideration received by the 
obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from one or more 
of joint and several obligors, in whole or in partial satisfaction 
of their obLigations shall be credited to the extent of the amount 
received on the obligation of all co-obligors to whom the obligor 
or obligors Turing the consideration did not stand in the relation 
of a suret 
15-4-4, Release of co-obligor • • Reservation of rights* 
Subject to the provisioi is of §15-4 -3, the obligee's release or 
discharge of one or more of several obi igors, or of one or more of 
joint or of joint and several obligors, shall not discharge co-
obligors against whom the obligee in writing and as part of the 
same transaction as the release of discharge expressly reserves hi s 
rights; and in the absence of such a reservation of rights shal 1 
d i s ch a r g e co • o b1 i go rs o n 1 y t o t he extent p r o v ided i n §15-4-5. 
l •, * . _ ' - * • aee, 
_r an obiigee reLeasing or discharging an obligor withe 
express reservation of rights against a co-obligor then knowj or 
has reason to know that the obligor released or discharged did not 
pay as much of the claim as he was bound by his contract or rela-
tion with that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim against that 
co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew 
or had reason to know that the releasee -r discharged obligor was 
bound f o su u •-> *•::'•'•: :jor to pay, 
obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not 
then sucn knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against 
the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of 
two amounts, name! y: (a) the ai nount c:; the fractional share of the 
obligor released or discharged, or (b) the amount that such obligor 
was bound by his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay. 
48-1-12, Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to 
the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the 
partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate obligation 
to perform a partnership contract. 
70A-3-606. Impairment of recourse or of collateral* 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the 
extent that without such party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or 
agrees not to sue any person against whom the party 
has to the knowledge of the holder a right of 
recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce 
against such person the instrument or collateral or 
otherwise discharges such person, except that failure 
or delay in effecting any required presentment, pro-
test or notice of dishonor with respect to any such 
person does not discharge any party as to whom 
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effec-
tive or unnecessary; or 
(b) unjustifably impairs any collateral for the instru-
ment given by or on behalf of the party or any person 
against whom he has a right of recourse. 
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a 
right of recourse.the holder preserves 
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when 
the instrument was originally due; and 
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of 
that time; and 
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others. 
ADDENDUM II 
JUDGMENT MAY 3, 1989 
GLENN C. HANNI #A1327 
MARK J- TAYLOR #4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Becker and Dougan 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
•MO. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CO., a Utah partnership, et al. 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER II, et al. 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., et al., 
Third Party Defendants 
ENOCH SMITH JR., et al., 
Third Party Defendants, 
vs. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
P l a i n t i f f 
F I L E D -
1
 . i 
^'erx jj ±u mmir < v
~ounty 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l No. 9159 
Judge J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k 
. ^ < - ^ 
A8 
j . j . i . ' - J i 
The motion of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady 
Dougan, Frederick G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, for summary 
judgment and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment came 
on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on 
April 19, 1989. Plaintiff was represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood 
of the firm of Holme, Roberts & Owen. Defendants Beckers and 
Dougans were represented by Glenn C. Hanni and Victoria Kidman 
of the firm of Strong & Hanni. On motion of defendants, all 
depositions were ordered opened and published. After hearing 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised, the court determines: 
1. The 15 day notice required by the loan documents to 
be given prior to accelerating the Racquet Club note was not given 
by plaintiff to the original maker, Park City Racquet Club, to 
defendants Dougans, Beckers and Ayers, who assumed the Racquet 
Club note and thereby became makers, nor to defendants Dougans, 
Beckers and Ayers in their capacity as guarantors. 
2. The notice required to be given by plaintiff to defendant 
Park Meadows Development prior to plaintiff exercising its option 
to accelerate was defective. 
3. The giving of a proper 15 day notice was a condition 
precedent to the right of plaintiff to exercise its option to 
accelerate the Racquet Club note. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The motion of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady 
Dougan, Frederick G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, for 
summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered 
in favor of defendants, J. Lynn Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan, Frederick 
G. Becker II and Margaret M. Becker, and against plaintiff, no 
cause of action, 
2. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is 
hereby denied. 
3. The court determines there is no just reason for 
delay in entering this judgment as a final judgment, and the 
clerk of the court is directed to enter it as a final judgment 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(b), URCP. 
Dated this ffij>^ day of-t&Pf/L. 1989, f -^24, i< 
BY THE COURT: 
rederick, Judge 
1 -'j. I O 
A1CL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this QU day of 
April, 1989, to: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
Suite 900 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Jeff Robinson 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Attorneys for Defendant Park Meadows 
Investment Co., a/k/a Park Meadows 
Development Co., 
J. Michael Kelly 
Kent H. Murdock 
Enid Greene 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0358 
Attorneys for Defendant 
First Security Bank of Utah 
Victor Ayers 
50 Thayne Canyon Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Ce X^dJT, 
All 1 ,. ; 7 
ADDENDUM III 
ORDER GRANTING PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A12 
NO 
Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) and 
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P. C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone (801) 521-0250 
BY. 
FILED 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., ) 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO., 
a Utah Partnership; FREDERICK G. 
BECKER, II; MARGARET M. BECKER; 
VICTOR R. AYERS; MARION P. AYERS; 
J. LYNN DOUGAN; DIANA LADY DOUGAN; 
and FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a banking corporation with 
its principal place of business in 
Utah, 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER II; MARGARET 
M. BECKER; J. LYNN DOUGAN and 
DIANA LADY DOUGAN, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH 
RICHARD SMITH, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
ORDER GRANTING PARK 
MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9159 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
w_L'i 
ENOCH SMITH JR and ENOCH RICHARD 
SMITH, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A. 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Upon the motion of Defendant Park Meadows Investment Company 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Motion of defendant Park Meadows Investment Company 
is granted as prayed. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant Park 
Meadows Investment Co. a/k/a Park Meadows Development Co. and 
against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
3. The court determines there is no just reason for delay 
in entering this judgment as a final judgment and the clerk of 
the court is directed to enter it as a final judgment in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 54 (W , URCP. 
/ V"^ 
DATED this h day of^Iun€7 1989. 
BY T: 
/ Dennis Frpdcriclc-, Judge 
1 ' ' 
JL w X v> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _ £?%C day of 5^^-^r ' 1 9 8 9' 
M\fl~ _>L^u*i ^ <JA4^^&n<»' ->t'wn>m#'*j '^rU*^yrnd^J '( ' -2 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER,, was mailed, first- J vna&ej*. 
class postage prepaid, to: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
Richie D. Haddock 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Hardin A. Whitney 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No, 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Kent H. Murdock 
Enid Greene 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for First Security Bank 
Victor Ayers 
50 Thayne Canyon Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
David R. Olsen 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680 
Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327 
Mark J. Taylor, #4455 
Victoria K. Kidman, #5302 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants Becker 
and Dougan 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
-1901 
Defendants Smith 
N0....3A?.?.... 
F I L E D 
JUL 6 1989 
Cier* ot bummit County 
BY - • • 
Deputy Clert 
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ADDENDUM IV 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
A16 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
(SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST) 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to 
pay to the order of WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY {hereinafter termed 
"Walker") or its assigns, at the main office of Walker, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may 
designate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($800,000.00) in lawful money of the United States of 
America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at 
the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum until paid. Principal 
and interest shall be paid in equal monthly installments of Seven 
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,341.00) each com-
mencing with a payment on the 1st day of January, 1979, and 
continuing with a like payment on the first day of each succeeding 
calendar month thereafter until the entire remaining unpaid balance 
of principal and interest has been paid in full; provided, however, 
that the final payment hereunder shall be in an amount equal to 
the then remaining unpaid balance. Installments shall be applied 
first toward the payment and satisfaction of accrued and unpaid 
interest and the remainder shall be applied toward the reduction 
of principal. Interest for each monthly payment and period snail 
be computed on a 3 60-day year basis. Interest, if any, which 
accrues during the period commencing with the date of this Note 
and ending prior to the date of the first installment due here-
under shall be deducted from the proceeds of the loan evidenced 
hereby. 
The undersigned shall have the option to prepay all or any 
portion of the unpaid principal balance of the Note in any one 
(1) year without penalty. In the event the undersigned shall 
exercise such option, the same shall not relieve the undersigned 
nor waive any obligation of the undersigned to make timely monthly 
installment payments thereafter maturing. Walker or its assigns 
shall, at any time following the expiration of ten (10) years 
from and after the date cf execution hereof, at any time during 
the remainder of the term hereof have the sole and exclusive cpticr. 
to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable upon giving 
to the undersigned sixty (60) days notice in writing of its intent 
to declare the same due and payable. 
The undersigned further agrees to pay to Walker or its assigns, 
at the sole and exclusive option of Walker or its assigns, budget 
payments on a monthly basis in addition to principal ar.d interest 
as hereinabove set forth. Such budget payments snali be in an 
amount equal to one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual real property 
taxes and casualty insurance premiums on the real property ar.d 
improvements described in the Deed of Trust securing tr.is ::cte 
and with respect thereto, the undersigned further ackr.cwledges and 
agrees that neither Walker nor its assigns is obligated to pay and 
the undersigned specifically waives any claim to the payment of 
interest, earnings or other sums or amounts by Walker or its 
assigns on such budget payments. Neither Walker nor its assigns 
shall pay interest or earnings on any ether sums or amounts 
held for the benefit cf or deposited by the undersigned in 
connection with this Note or the Deed of Trust securing the same. 
1 
2£ ^1 
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In the event of the exercise of said option, Walker or its 
assigns shall give to the undersigned thirty (30) days notice 
in writing of its intent to require payment by the undersigned 
of said budget payments. 
In the event any installment or payment (including an install-
ment or payment with respect to which the late charge provided for 
in this Paragraph has previously been imposed) provided to be made 
hereunder, or under any instrument given to secure the payment of 
the obligation evidenced hereby, has not been paid in full on or 
before the fifteenth (15th) day of any month the same is due as 
provided herein, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand 
of and receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to four 
percent (4%) of the entirety of such installment or payment. 
In the event: (a) any installment provided for hereunder is 
not paid in full within fifteen (15) days after its scheduled due 
date; or (b) the undersigned defaults in the performance of any 
covenant or promise contained herein or in any instrument given 
to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby; or (c) 
a petition is filed seeking that any of the undersigned or any 
general partner in any of the undersigned be adjudged a bankrupt; 
or (d) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of the 
undersigned makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; 
or (e) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of the 
undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (f) any of 
the undersigned or any general partner in any of the undersigned 
becomes insolvent; or (g) any of the undersigned or any general 
partner in any of the undersigned undergoes liquidation, termi-
nation, or dissolution, then, in any of such events and upon 
fifteen (15) days written notice given to the undersigned by 
Walker or its assigns which default or event shall not be cured 
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days following such written 
notice, the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal 
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the option of the holder 
hereof and without notice or demand, become immediately due and 
payable. Thereafter, said unpaid balance, including interest, 
shall, until paid and both before and after judgment, earn interest 
at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum. As used herein, 
written notice shall be effective as of the tine the same is de-
posited in the United Sataes Mails addressed to the last known 
address of the undersigned or the tine of the actual receipt 
thereof, if earlier. The acceptance of any installment or pay-
ment after the occurrence of a default or event giving rise to 
the right of acceleration provided for in this Paragraph shall 
not constitute a waiver of such right of acceleration with respect 
to such default or event or any subsequent default or event. 
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any 
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any instru-
ment given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not satis-
fied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the 
undersigned agrees to pay any and ail costs and expenses 'regard-
less of the particular nature thereof and whether cr net incurred 
in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment, cr m 
connection with exercise of power of sale provided for m the 
Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the 
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its 
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument, including 
court costs and reasonable Trustee's and Attorney's fees. 
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note 
or in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby 
(i) the rates of interest, charges and penalties provided for 
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges, 
and penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate 
equaling the maximum allowed by law; and (ii) if, for any reason 
-2-
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whatsoever, th_ holder hereof ever received as interest in connec-
tion with the transaction of which this Note is a Dart an amount 
which would result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding 
the maximum allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as 
would otherwise be excessive interest shall automatically be apolied 
toward reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding 
hereunder and not toward payment of interest. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof 
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice 
of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and ex-
pressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, may be 
extended from time to time by the holder hereof without in any 
way affecting the liability of such parties. This Mote shall'be 
the joint and several obligation of all makers, sureties, 
guarantors and endorsers and shall be binding upon their respec-
tive heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
In the event any of the undersigned is a partnership or 
corporation, each person executing this instrument on behalf of 
such entity individually and personally represents and warrants 
that this Note and each instrument signed in the name of such 
entity and delivered to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is 
in all respects binding upon such entity as an act and obligation 
of said partnership or corporation. 
This Note and the Deed of Trust securing the same shall be 
fully and freely assignable in whole or in part by Walker or its 
assigns as they shall deem advisable without notice to the under-
signed. 
This Note is given in consideration of a loan made by Walker 
to the undersigned for business purposes and not personal, faruiy, 
household, or agricultural purposes and is principally secured by 
a Deed of Trust covering real property situated in Surjnit County", 
State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
DATED this day of , 1978. 
PARK CITY RACQUET CLU3, a Utah 
ATTEST: corooration 
3y 
Secretary President 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and suificie: 
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and 
severally guarantee payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by 
Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the entire ir.cebte: 
r.ess evidenced therebv zr.d the Deed of Trust securir.c the sar.e. 
FREDERICK G. 3ECXER II, 
MARGARET M. 3ZCZZZ, Individual: 
VICTOR R. AVERS, Individually 
MARION ?. AVERS, Individually 
015731 ±~i< _3_ f 3-3^' 
ADDENDUM V 
DEFENDANT VICTOR R. AYERS' 
AMENDED ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
A20 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendants Victor R. 
and Marion P. Ayers 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
17S South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. , 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, et al., | 
Third-partv Plaintiffs, 
vs. ; 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH j 
RICHARD SMITH, ] 
Third-party Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANT VICTOR R. AYERS' 
) AMENDED ANSWERS TO REQUEST 
) FOR ADMISSIONS 
I Civil No. 9159 
Defendant, Victor R. Ayers, by and through his counsel 
of record, David R. Olsen, Esq., of and for Suitter Axland Armstrong 
& Hanson, hereby responds to Requests for Admissions as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the Promissory Note, which 
is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's Complaint, was transferred 
from Park City Racquet Club, Inc. to Park Meadows Development Com-
pany. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that the obligations of the Promis-
sory Note, which is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's com-
plaint, were assumed by Park Meadows Development Company, and by 
Victor R. Ayers, one of its partners. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that the transfer and assumption 
of the Promissory Note, referred to in Request No. 1 and 2 supra, 
occurred in August, 1982. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
DATED this ^L ^ day of November, 1988. 
% 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Ayers 
DR07.15 
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ADDENDUM VI 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
CXH/8/T 
INDEMNITY -'scsa„-
i'l fidf*rs Lined , Park Meadows Development. Company and 
i t s p a r t n e r s i u i n i i v ,1 Jij.'i 11 s|'i-.» • i I i .: !"i I I v" I1 n 'n h '.'im i, I I I 
EM-'H'IM R i c h a r d Smi th , and Victor: F* A y e i i , do he reby i ndemni ty 
and h o l d h a r m l e s s I, Lynn Dougan and F rede r i ck , '3, flecker 1" C 
w i u i i !"",«,|i ii 1:1 i ,i i i , in in bil i g a r , i o n * < d a m a g e s o r c l a i m s w i t h 
i 1" r ,1 ' L'I c e r t a i n P romis so ry Note ilaUnl i'eremha i I I , I "I1,"1! 
t h e amount of 5800,000 s e c u r e d by Deed of T r u s t c o v e r i n g 
p r o P"e i, r y k n <• 'i 'n ir; t hi e P a r k C i t y P acque t C1 ub s howi n g a s ho 1 
ot the P r o m i s s o r y tJo^u "r "' hen el i !.ii ', J " ' ' '" > * " • • " 1 |f: T r u s t 
Walker Bank, and TnitJC Company now Known as F n : s c 2 niters t a t e 
Bank and S u r e t y Lifp I n s u r a n c e Company and F i r s t F e d e r a l S a v i n g s 
i.i i II I I i i ii I i r HI riini!" i ii r i MM MM m i l if mi * H C J f*y « The above i, n dentin i ty 
i n c l u d e s the payment ot a t t o r n e y s 1 :. •»» «•• n I*IJU IIMI, , 
e n to r e m g th i, s i v .iemni f i c a t ion . 
y - \ 
i-1-'-' JA>-~<A ^1 Al? . 
* % 
r> 
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.z Wp<cK dnJitfiV j / 
-t<-
c Enoch Richard Snutih ^ 
Vic tor RVAyerjr 
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ADDUMDUM 
PTEMBER ,\ L!)82 DOUGAN LETTER 
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D 0 U C A N & ASSOCIATES 
INVESTMENTS b CONSULTANTS 
2120 S O U T H 1300 EAST, SUIT'S 301 • 5 M "! , *JCC C I T Y , 1 IT *H 54106 • ' i lA • Tfl, gPHONC ^0I» M6JM9 
37ao*H 
2 September 1982 
FI rsc Interstate Bank of Utah 
L75 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gentlemen: 
As y ou are aware, Frederick G Becker, 11 and J I .yixn 
Dougan recently obtained your consent and the consent of 
those lenders who participate with you to the exchange » of 
our two-thirds interest in the Park City 'Racquet Club 
A copy of this executed Consent to Exchange I s enclosed 
herewith for your files. 
Please be advised that this exchange has been consummated 
and Park Meadows Development Company, a Utah partnership 
composed of Enoch Smith, Dick Smith and Victor Ayers, have 
assumed ownership and responsibility for the operation of 
the Club and, specifically, assume full responsibility and 
liability for the Promissory Mote dated December 11, 1978 in 
the amount of $800,000 secured by Deed of Trust cover: ng che 
property known as the Park City Racquet Club. 
If you need anything further to complete y our fi 1 • is 
in connection with this transaction please notify me. 
Sincerely, 
) 
- ^ -
; 
J. Lynn Dougan 
J .
 5 
End. 
I 1 
ADDENDUM 
NOVEMBER 1 I. , 1.98 2 DOUGAN LETTER 
D O U G A N S. A S S O C I A T E S 
i Ill 'ill T II f "f" 9 
11 November 1932 2 1 20 SOU TW 1300 E AST. SU (T6 303 
SALT I AK.6 C1T i , UTAH 3 4100 
(801) 406 2M9 
Mrs. Linda Franke • 
Real Estate Department 
First Interstate Bank of Utah 
175 South Main 
Salt Lake CI cy, Utah 8 4111 
Dear Lindai 
I am enclosing a Indemnity in connection with the trans 
action whereby Becker arid 1 exchanged our .interests in the 
Park City Racquet Club for other properties. In connection 
with this transaction Park Meadows Development Company and the 
individual partners of Park Meadows Development Company 
indemnified us with regard to the Promissory Note described 
in the indemnification. I thought that you and your participating 
banks should have a copy of this indemnity for your files and 
for your i nformacion 
Park Meadows Development Company also furnished us with a 
certification as to the nature and ownership of Park Meadows 
Development Company which I am also enclosing. 
As aIways , thank '" i i tot y Jui ". on';; 
and accommodation in LJiiniie matters, 
n i,Je' 1 "ji Kc; e 1,1 en r ,service 
Jin J, 
Lynn Dougan 
l£nc 1 s 
ADDii:-
CONSENT V" EXCHANGE 
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CONSENT TO EXCHANGE 
THE UNDERSIGNED, Walker Bank and Trust Company now 
known as First Interstate Bank, Surety Life Insurance Company 
and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake 
City, being holders of mortgages covering certain property 
located in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, described 
on Exhibit "A9 attached hereto and Incorporated herein and com-
monly known as the Park City Racquet Club do hereby consent to 
the exchange by J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. Becker II of an 
undivided two-third1s interest in the subject property to Park 
Meadows Development Company, a Utah partnership* The under-
signed each acknowledges that the completion of the transaction 
above-described shall not' of itself result in the exercise by 
the undersigned of any rights to accelerate the indebtedness 
secured by the applicable mortgages, nothing In this document 
waives the right to acceleration of the mortgages for other 
reasons other than the accomplishment of the transaction herein 
described, or with regard to the accomplishing of any later 
sales or exchanges of the subject property. 
DATED this 17th day of August , 1982. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 
ay. /U<U/A* \dl4it£t 
its &4U&++ /& Marked 
I t s 
iofrn *W~. Schuizrann 
V i c e P r e s i d e n t 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
By f^^J^^X^^ 
^ - ^ I z a b e d i J . H a r r i s 
I t s A s s i s t a n t Sec r - e^a rv 
— 
riRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION 
sy_ 
Its 
ADDENDUM X 
WORKOUT AGREEMENT 
A31 
v^vt j^u 
PARS MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ENTITIES: 
WORKOUT ARRANGEMENT WITH FIUT AND FSB 
At the contemplated closing, Interest in the approximate sum 
of $600,000, will be brought current on all loans of both 
Banks to Park Meadows Development and related entities. The 
source of funds will be $200,000 .from the Smiths and loans 
proceeds from FSB, if approved. 
Mark Howell will geek FSB approval of § loan to PMD in the 
maximum sum of $1,000,000 to be utilised to pay the balance 
of accrued interest, general claimants ($164,000), and Jack 
•icklaus ($13,900), and to provide working capital needs in 
the future. Such future draws will be permitted only after 
submission and approval of detailed budgets and/or invoices 
to both banks. PMD will provide notification of actual 
expenditures to both banks. Such loan shall be secured by 
a first priority lien (by reason of subordination) on all 
properties subject to the blanket mortgage mentioned in 
paragraph 4 hereafter (except for First Federal's trust deeds). 
PMD will be allowed to pay the $300,000 debt to Enoch Smith 
Sons Company out of lot sale proceeds at the rate of 5 percent 
of such proceeds. This will require total sales of 
$6,000,000. 
A blanket mortgage for the benefit of FSB and FIUT will be 
placed on all of Park Meadows properties (exclusive of Park 
Meadows Mountain), and the assets of Enoch and Dick Smith. 
This mortgage will not disturb the first trust deeds of First 
Federal or FSB as to Gleneagles and Lot 1765, but will cover 
any equity in those properties. Said mortgage will exclude 
the following assets of Enoch and Margaret Smith: Their home, 
two cars, Country Club membership, $250,000 in cash, $184,000 
worth of securities to be identified, two stud horses, life 
insurance, and Enoch Smith Sons Company and its assets. Also 
excluded are the real property where Enoch Smith Sons Company 
is located and all other stock in that company. Enoch Smith 
Sons Company will remain liable to FIUT on the $500,000 loan. 
The blanket mortgage will secure all debt of PMD to FSB and 
FIUT, and also the debts to FIUT of Smith Park Acres Ranch, 
Enoch Smith Company, Weaver Quality Welding, and the #Ayers-
loan. The *Ayers" loan will cease to be an obligation of .__ \ 
Enoch "Smith Sons Co. 7^' 
Enoch and Margaret Smith will be released from whatever 
personal liability may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD, 
Enoch Smith Co, and Smith Park Acres loans and the *Ayersw 
loan. Enoch Smith will retain whatever liability he now has 
f/^^EXHiBtrJj£j£ 
FOR U>. b'Z'Xl 
KELLY BROWK, NP, CSR. RPR . 
WITNESS PnUi r^Ar^/y^ce.' 
on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company loan. Dick Smith 
will not have personal liability on the "Ayers' debt. 
6. The Enoch Smith Sons Company $500,000 loan will be repayable 
by quarterly interest only payments for one year with a due 
date in one year at a rate of FIUT's prime rate plus K\ and 
prime rate plus 2%\ after default. It will be renewable on 
the same terms for an additional year if no default exists. 
7. Smiths to provide Banks with budgets acceptable to banks and 
schedule of price listings for lots, including variables for 
bulk sales, for Banks' approval. If parties can't agree with 
respect to prices, the parties agree to select a mutually 
acceptable third party to set prices, considering current 
market and need to sell within a relatively short period of 
time. 
B. Sales proceeds to be allocated as follows after payment of 
commissions: Allowed first trust deeds release prices where 
applicable (First Federal and First Security's Gleneagles, and 
lot 1765); some allowance for working capital needs; balance 
to FZUT and FSB for their agreed pro rata distribution. 
9. Pro 1-afra distribution with FIUT and FSB: Straight pro rata 
based on relative total debt for accrued interest (exclusive 
of "Ayers" debt): ixincipjil reductions to pay off FSB first, 
including the loan under paragraph 2 above, then remainder to 
FIUT. Essentially, FIUT subordinates to FSB. The order of 
payment of FIUT's loans secured by the blanket mortgage will 
be as follows: $100,000 loan to Enoch Smith Co.; $250,000 
loan to Smith Park Acres Ranch; $150,000 loan to Weavers 
Quality Welding; loans to Park Meadows Investments; "Ayers" 
loan. In the event that the Kentucky ranch is sold, the 
proceeds will be applied to the extent necessary to pay the 
Smith Park Acres loan, with any excess to be considered 
proceeds of the blanket mortgage. If assets of Weavers 
Quality Welding are sold, the net proceeds will be applied to 
that company's loan. 
L0. Require retention of professional sales or project manager 
either initially or if performance falters. 
LI. Banks to be informed of any and all offers, firm or tentative, 
to purchase lots, parcels, the whole project, etc. 
L2. Banks-will use best efforts to satisfy obligations out of 
collateral other than Park City ranch. 
-2-
Dismissal of FSB's pending foreclosure action and press 
release of game. 
Enoch and Dick Smith will subordinate their right as partners 
of Park Meadows Investment to receive proceeds from Park 
Meadows Mountain to FIUT's "Ayers- loan. 
All of the loans to be secured by the blanket mortgage and the 
new loan which is provided in paragragh 2 above shall be 18 
saonth term loans, with interest payable on a quarterly basis 
commencing September 1, 1985, interest accruing at the rate of 
%\ above the prime rate of the respective banks. Interest on 
"Ayers* loan to be deferred to maturity date. Loan 
documentation shall include the agreement and obligation of 
Park Meadows Development and the Borrowers to meet agreed 
upon dollar volumes of property sales from the Park Meadows 
project by agreed upon guideline dates. A failure to meet 
those goals will constitute a default under the terms of the 
loan documentation, provided however, that a reasonable period 
(to be hereafter determined in the reasonable discretion of 
the Banks) will be allowed for cure and reinstatement. Cure 
end reinstatement will be conditioned upon evidence, 
satisfactory to FSB and FIUT that the sales required for 
satisfaction of the goals are immediately forthcoming or that 
they, in fact, have occurred; and, further, upon reasonable 
satisfaction of FSB and FIUT that the reasons for the failure 
to meet the goals are not to continue or result in any 
substantial likelihood of further defaults and failures. FSB 
end FIUT will agree that an additional 18 month term will be 
granted so long as the aforesaid sales goals are being met and 
no other defaults exist under the loan documents. In this 
connection, it is agreed that, net of amounts due to First 
Federal on properties on which it maintains 1st priority 
encumbrances, all sale proceeds shall be applied as set forth 
in the paragraphs above. 
If default occurs and is not cured §s provided in paragraph 15 
above, interest will accrue at the rate of 2%\ above the 
respective prime rates of the respective banks. 
Agreed to this 19th day of June, 1985. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
By: . ^^T>^ft%^ 
Richard Smith - fo~r 
Park Meadows Investment 
fka Park Meadows Development 
Enoch Smith Sons Company 
Enoch Smith Co. 
Smith Park Acres Sane) 
Weavers Qualj<r\Weld/ng, 
FIRST IWTERSTA 
UTAH, 
Enoch Smith 
0354M 
-4-
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ADDENDUM XI 
AFFIDAVIT OF ENOCH RICHARD SMITH 
A3 6 
Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) and 
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Telephone (801) 521-0250 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CO., a Utah partnership, 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, 
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R. 
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, J. LYNN 
DOUGAN, DIANA LADY DOUGAN, and 
FIRST SECURETY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, 
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN 
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ENOCH SMITH, J R . , and ENOCH 
RICHARD SMITH, 
T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s . 
118 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH 
Civil No. 9159 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
ENOCH SMITH, J R . , and ENOCH ) 
RICHARD SMITH, ) 
Third-Party Defendants, ) 
- v s - ) 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, ) 
N-A-, a Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, having first been duly sworn on his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. He makes this affidavit on his own personal knowl-
edge and in opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
2. During the negotiations between Smiths, First 
Interstate Bank of Utah (FIBU), and First Security Bank (FSB) in 
May and June, 1985, he participated as a representative of 
himself, Enoch and Margaret Smith, Park Meadows Development a/k/a 
Park Meadows Investment, Enoch Smith Sons Company, and Enoch 
Smith Company, Weaver's Quality Welding, and Smith's Park Acres 
Ranch. It was his initial intent to obtain a solution based on 
giving FIBU and FSB a deed in lieu of foreclosure for the assets 
already having liens to the banks. One of those assets was the 
Racquet Club. During the negotiations, the banks accepted a 
"qualified deed in lieu'1 approach. 
3. In early June, 1985, the focus of the workout 
negotiation shifted from "deed in lieu" to discussing the extent 
to which FIBU and FSB would release Enoch and Margaret Smith from 
the personal liability they had to the banks, so that Enoch and 
Margaret Smith could peaceably live out their few remaining years. 
4. As a result of the negotiations in June, 1985, it 
was determined that Enoch Smith would only remain liable to FIBU 
on his guarantee of the $500,000 loan to Enoch Smith Sons Company. 
None of the discussions or negotiations mentioned Enoch Smith 
remaining liable on the Racquet Club note. Enoch Smith was to be 
released from all PMD obligations to FIBU and FSB. 
5. It was his understanding that the release and the 
workout agreement included the Racquet Club loan, and he under-
stood the phrase "FIUT'S PMD . . . loans" to include the Racquet 
Club Note. 
6. Smiths and their related companies performed all the 
requirements of the Workout Agreement and no one from FIBU has 
requested further performance. Smiths and their related compa-
nies conveyed 33,641,000 additional collateral, and executed all 
documents required of them by FIBU. 
7. In about November or December, 1985, Robert Ward, 
Executive Vice President of FIBU, told him not to make any fur-
ther payments on the Racquet Club Note. 
8. As a partner in PMD, and therefore as an owner of 
the Racquet Club, and as one familiar with the Park City real 
estate market, Dick Smith formed the opinion that in January, 
1 i J U 
D6 -3-
1986, the Racquet Club had a fair market value in excess of the 
unpaid balance on the Racquet Club Note, and if the blanket mort-
gage had been released, it would have sold for enough to pay off 
the unpaid balance of the Racquet Club note; and further that the 
value of the Racquet Club on November 9, 1987, was substantially 
in excess of the $425,000 bid price received at the sheriff's 
sale. 
DATED this / day of November, 1988. 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH v^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this "Z7- day of 
/UlLt^^*^ , 1988. 
& & • NOTfiRV PUBLIC > / 
R e s i d i n g a t 2 ^ " 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on this / day of November, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Enoch 
ADDENDUM XII 
FIBU JANUARY 24, 1986, LETTER 
A41 
Q First I Interstate 
Mortgage 
55 Madison, Suite 5W 
P.O. Box 65001 
Denver. CO 80206 
(303) 399-6699 
A subsidiary of 
First interstate Bancorp 
January 24, 1986 
Mr. Dick Smith 
Park Meadows Racquet Club 
1200 Little Kate Road 
Park City, UT 84060 
L J .iX 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
RE: Loan Nos. 
Property: 
910333, 910343 and 910344 
1200 Little Kate Road 
Park City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
These loans are in default for failure to pay the December 1, 1985 
and the January 1, 1986 mortgage payments. The following amounts 
are due in order to bring these loans current. 
Loan No. 
Dec. Pmt. & late chg. 
Jan. Pmt. & late chg. 
February payment 
Total 
910333 
$ 
$ 
$ 
4, 
4, 
± 
,665. 
,665. 
,486. 
,74 
,74 
29 
$ 
$ 
$ 
910343 
2,038.65 
2,038.65 
1,960.24 
$ 
$ 
$ 
910344 
2,548. 
2,548. 
2,450. 
,29 
29 
28 
$13,817.77 $ 6,037.54 $ 7,546.86 
The total amount due, $27,402.17, must be received in our office by 
February 7, 1986; if not, the lender vill take the legal actions 
available to them under the terms of the loan documents. 
Sincerely, 
Michael J. Sell 
Vice President 
Commercial Loan Administration 
lvo 
cc: First Interstate Bank of Utah 
iLlo 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST 
N.A. , 
INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
VS. 
Plaintiff, ) 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., ) 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT ) 
CO., a Utah partnership, et al., ) 
FREDERICK G. 
vs 
ENOCH 
ENOCH 
Third 
• • 
SMITH, 
RICHART 
Third 
Defendants. ) 
BECKER II, et al.f ) 
l-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
JR., ana ) 
) SMITH, ) 
-Party Defendants. ) 
^.rf.&fte&T 
C i v i l No . 9159 
NO. 
BY. 
F I L E D " 
Clerk of iummiT 
*~ounry 
Deputy Car* .idV 
DEPOSITION OF J. LYNN DOUGAN 
May 10, 1988 
Reported by SUSAN WILCOX KINGSBURY, CSR, RPR 
Utah CSR Uc«nta 66. California CSR License 2758 
CttlHtod Shorthand Reporters 
r*r£s 
1 A No, he did not. 
2 Q Or Enoch or Vic? 
3 A No. 
4 Q So any information you have is simply by rumor? 
5 A Right. 
6 Q After the exchange, did you continue to receive 
7 payment notices on the racquet club for a period of time? 
8 A No, not to my recollection. I think — We very 
9 clearly noticed the bank not only were we exchanging our 
10 interest but that the Smiths and Park Meadows — Smiths and 
11 Ayers and Park Meadows Development were assuming and paying 
12 the loan and they would do so after a date certain. And my 
13 recollection is that we didn't receive any further notices. 
14 Q You directed the bank to send the notices someplace 
15 else? 
16 A I would — Yes. 
17 Q Do you remember who you told — 
18 A No. 
19 Q at the bank? 
20 A No. 
21 Q You just remember you told the bank to send the 
22 notices elsewhere? 
23 A (Witness indicates by nodding head up and down.) 
24 Q That was a "yes"? 
25 A Yes. That was a "yes." 
fs£Z^?tC..**; ~-J~C1O*S-;SI<IAC 
Never. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
We would have done it in a minute, in a New York 
minute. 
I just don't understand that. 
Q You say that neither you nor Lynn, to your 
knowledge, ever received a call from the bank saying that 
payments had been missed? 
A Never. 
Q So you had no knowledge that there was any 
difficulty there until December of '86 when you had this 
conversation with Dick Smith; is that correct? 
A When the bank said — When he reported to me that 
the bank told him to stop making payments on the racquet club. 
My assumption at the time was the whole deal's gotten worked 
out, everything is fine, whatever is going to be done is going 
to be done. 
Then the next thing I know is — 
MR. HANNI: Mr. Becker, you keep talking about December 
of '86. I think you're off a year. December of '85? 
MR. HANNI: December of '85. 
Q (By Ms. Wood) So this conversation occurred in 
December of '85. And the first you understood that Dick Smith 
was in financial difficulty was that phone call you got in 
December of '85? 
A No. What I said was I didn't think there was 
• r - yrVi/^ • n ,-. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I don't — Subsequent to the ent- — The entire period 
subsequent to? Is that what your question is? 
Q Yes. 
A No, I don't have any recollection of any subsequent 
Subsequent to the consummation of this transaction and the 
writing of these letters I don't recall any other 
conversations or correspondence with any of the bankers in 
connection with this loan. 
Q Okay. You have no remembrance of calling up the 
bank and saying "Hey, send the notices now on to the Smiths"? 
A No, I can't say that I do. But I certainly can 
understand that I might have done that if they were still 
being sent to our offices. 
Q And you have those records, and you're going to 
provide them to us, the records on the notifications you 
received from the bank with respect to this loan. Is that 
correct? 
MR. HANNI: Wait a minute. He didn't say he received 
any. He said: If I did get any I would have called them and 
told them to send them to somebody else. Your question 
implies that he said he received them. He didn't say that. 
MS. WOOD: I understand that he didn't. 
But since you haven't provided any documents, with 
respect to payment on the notes, you're going to provide those 
documents and they will establish where the notices were sent; 
Mark that. 
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (By Ms. Wood) Ifm handing you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 10 and ask you if you can identify that document. 
A Yes. I believe this is — this is the document 
whereby — yes — that we liquidated the corporation and took 
title in the racquet club to — as individuals for tax 
reasons. 
Q So originally, if I understand your testimony, the 
Park City Racquet Club, a corporation, owned the Park City 
Racquet Club; is that correct? 
A I believe it did. 
Q And then with this document, the racquet club was 
distributed in undivided one-third interests? 
A To the three shareholders. 
X3 To the three shareholders? 
A Yes. 
Q Which would have been Dougan, Ayers and Becker? 
A Right. 
Q What happened to the Park City Racquet Club at that 
point? 
A It was liquidated under one of those liquidation 
titles when you liquidate a corporation — 30-day liquidation, 
I believe. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 7 5 
Q Are there any documents that evidence that 
liquidation? 
A Yes. 
Q Who has those documents? 
A I believe that I either have a copy of themf or Ifm 
certain that the accountant who performed it did. 
Q And who is the accountant? 
A Ernst & Whinney. 
Q Salt Lake office? 
A No. San Jose. 
Q And these were your individual accountants? 
A You mean did they do my own work as well as this? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q And why was this done? 
A Because we were no longer able to use the 
depreciation to offset other income for federal tax purposes. 
Q And so your accountants recommended that you do 
this? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q I'd like to see the documents that dissolve the 
corporation. 
A Sure. 
Q I note on the second page of the exhibitf the 
bottom paragraph on what is called Exhibit Af that it says 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 7 6 
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A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST 
N.A. , 
INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
VS. 
Plaintiff, ) 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., ) 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT ) 
CO., a Utah partnership, et al., ) 
FREDERICK G. 
V£ 
ENOCH 
ENOCH 
Third 
> • 
SMITH, 
RI CHARE 
Third 
Defendants. ) 
BECKER II, et al., ) 
[-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
JR., and ) 
i SMITH, ) 
-Party Defendants. ) 
C i v i l No. 9159 
N
°F I L E ' D " 
NOV 231939 
O V . . . . . . • • • • • 
Dsputy Cerk 
DEPOSITION OF FREDERICK GEORGE BECKER II 
May 9, 1988 
Reported by SUSAN WILCOX KINGSBURY, CSR, RPR 
Utah CSR License 06, California CSR License 2758 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1 I don't — Subsequent to the ent- — The entire period 
2 subsequent to? Is that what your question is? 
3 Q Yes. 
4 I A No, I don't have any recollection of any subsequent 
5 Subsequent to the consummation of this transaction and the 
6 writing of these letters I don't recall any other 
7 conversations or correspondence with any of the bankers in 
8 connection with this loan* 
9 Q Okay. You have no remembrance of calling up the 
10 bank and saying "Heyf send the notices now on to the Smiths"? 
11 A No, I can't say that I do. But I certainly can 
12 understand that I might have done that if they were still 
13 being sent to our oftices. 
14 Q And you have those records, and you're going to 
15 provide them to usf the records on the notifications you 
16 received from the bank with respect to this loan. Is that 
17 correct? 
18 MR. HANNI: Wait a minute. He didn't say he received 
19 any. He said: If I did get any I would have called them and 
20 told them to send them to somebody else. Your question 
21 implies that he said he received them. He didn't say that. 
22 MS. WOOD: I understand that he didn't. 
23 But since you haven't provided any documents, with 
24 respect to payment on the notesf you're going to provide those 
25 documents and they will establish where the notices were sent; 
CV£ZOrtQ*.«r, »*S'GfO/^i/t9»0 
1 what went on, I'm sure that there may be some additional 
2 things, 
3 Q So essentially you're determined not to pay on this 
4 guarantee, and you're looking for reasons why you don't have 
5 to; is that correct? 
6 A No. 
7 MR. HANNI: That's exactly right. 
8 Q (By Ms. Wood) Mr. Dougan, when did you first 
9 become aware that the racquet club note was in default? 
10 A When I received the notice of default. 
11 Q By "the notice of default," you mean the notice 
12 that the bank sent out prior to instituting foreclosure 
13 proceedings on the deed of trust? 
14 A Correct. 
15 Q Do you remember approximately when that was? 
16 A Well, I guess that would have been year-end '85. 
17 Is that correct? Or year-end '86. 
18 MR. HANNI: I don't know. Don't speculate on it. There 
19 is a copy of it around someplace. 
20 Q (By Ms. Wood) What did you do when you received 
21 that notice of default? 
22 A I talked with Becker. 
23 Q What did you say? 
24 A Just made — Didn't say anything. Just made him 
25 aware of the fact that I had received it. 
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
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E'Jrot In ters ta te Bank of U 
toan Recovery 
P.0\ Box 30057 
Salt Lakja City, Utah 84142-0180 
N.A. 
Recorded: l-e «.ary 14, 1986 
Entry No.: 2^6485 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVES: 
That FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., (formerly Walker Bank and Trust 
Conrpctny}, Is Trustee under a Trust Deed dated f v ^ m h ^ n 19 78 , 
CDODCUtod b y Vnck C i t y K.ic<pu*i Clul> t ;i l i i n h Corpor.-t t ! on 
. as Trustor(s) to secure certain 
obligations In favor of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N.A., as taneficiary, 
recorded fw,.mii..r 1? , 19 78 , as Entry No. 1S16S7 In Book 
M.174 at Page r,iuriir, of the Official Records of the County Recorder 
of /MW'ffli ' mr County, Utah, describing land therein as: 
SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE "A" 
Said obligations Include a note for the principal sura of 3 800,000.00 . 
The beneficial Interest under such Deed of Trust and the obligations secured 
thereby are now owned and held by FIHST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N- A. . 
A breach of and default in the obligations for which ouch Deed of Trust Is 
secured has occured In that payment has not be*n made for the following: 
Mort>;.i»;c payments due December lf 1985 through February lf 1986, plua late 
cli«ir>;w.s <*nd lorcclosurc costs lo dace. 
TOTAL AMDUNT DUE 3 27.902.17 
By reason of such default, the Trustee under said Deed of Trust, does hereby 
declare all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and 
does elect to causa the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
secured thereby. Dated this 10th day of February , 19 86 . 
TRUSTEE: FIRST INTERSTATE BASK OF UTAH, N.A. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BY: ^ r'^^ 
DONN CLARKIN 
Assistant Vice President 
(801) 264-5766 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Or\ t h i s IQth day Of February 19 86 , personally appeared before ne. 
Donn Clarkln, who being by me duly sworn did say for hloself, that, the said Donn 
Clarkln is Assistant Vice President of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 0? UTAH, H.A.. as 
Trustee, with full auttorlty of resolution of Its Board of Directors end said 
Donn Clarkin acknowledged to me that oa^d corporation executed the saoo as such 
Trustee. 
My Camvlssicn Expires NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Sal t Lake City, Utah 
! 
ADDENDUM XVI 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. LYNN DOUGAN 
A56 
Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327 
Mack J. Taylor, #4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Becker and Dougan 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, ) 
N.A., a Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
-vs- ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., ) J. LYNN DOUGAN 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT ) 
CO., a Utah partnership, ) 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, III, ) 
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R. ) 
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, J. LYNN ) 
DOUGAN, DIANA LADY DOUGAN, and ) 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, ) 
N.A., a banking corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, III, ) 
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN ) 
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) Civil No. 9159 
-vs- ) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH } 
RICHARD SMITH, ) 
-1 -
Third-Party Defendants. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH 
RICHARD SMITH, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
vs. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff. 
J. Lynn Dougan, having first been duly sworn on his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is a defendant in the present lawsuit, and 
makes this affidavit based on his own personal knowledge. 
2. He received the statutory notice of default 
pertaining to the Racquet Club note shortly after the date of 
postmark, February 21, 1986. A true and correct copy of the 
notice of default with envelope is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. He obtained a title report on the Racquet Club 
property, effective March 20, 1986, from Summit County Title 
Company. A true and correct copy of the title report is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. J. Lynn Dougan and Fredrick G. Becker III were 
willing and able to cure the default on the Racquet Club note in 
the first months of 1986, and would have done so if they had 
ii'Jo 
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received timely notice of the default from First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, if the collateral for the Racquet Club had not been 
substantially impaired by the blanket mortgages and bankruptcy 
proceedings disclosed in Summit County Title Company's letter 
report, and if their subrogation and indemnity rights against 
Park Meadows Development and its partners Enoch Smith, Dick 
Smith, and Vic Ayers had not been substantially destroyed by the 
acts of First Interstate Bank of Utah. 
5. The Racquet Club property had a fair market value in 
excess of the unpaid balance of the Racquet Club note in the 
first months of 1986. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
J. LYNN DOUGAN 
WASHINGTON ) 
DISTRICT OF : SS. 
COLUMBIA ) 
On the day of , 1988 personally 
appeared before me J. LYNN DOUGAN, the signer of the foregoing 
Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the same 
and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his 
D6 
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information, knowledge and belief. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of J. 
Lynn Dougan was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Brent v. Manning 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Kent H. Murdock 
Enid Greene 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security Bank 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David R. Olsen 
SUITER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Victor R. Ayers 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680 
1 .uU 
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Hardin A. Whitney 
Jeffrey Robinson 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
D6-AFFIDll/7/88bc 
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rven i^ ^v-w* ^^*~^* 
i n o t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of U ^t N.A. 
c a n Recovery 
.0'. E^ xx 30057 
a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84142-O180 
Recorded: 
Entry No. : 
[ 
I- uary 14, 1986 
24,485 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
CTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: 
That FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A. , ( former ly Walker Dank and Trust 
JorrTpuny), i s T r u s t e e under a Trust Deed dated rv>^mh^ n , 19_2S t 
DOOCUtod b y l '.trk C i t y k.iCfpifl C l u b . :i t ' l n h C(>ri>or.i( t o n 
, as Trustor(s) to secure certain 
obligations in favor of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., as taneflciary, 
recorded tw,-mlj.-r l? , 19 7H , as Entry No. 1S16S7 in Boole 
M,I?6 at Page r,"n-r, V> of the Official Records of the County Recorder 
3f l/lUIIfflL' f County, Utah, describing land therein as: 
SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE "AM 
Said obligations include a note for the principal sura of 3 800,000,00 . 
The beneficial interest under such Deed of Trust and the obligation secured 
thereby are now owned and held by FIKST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH. N, A. 
A broach of and default in the obligations for which ouch Deed of Trust is 
secured has occured in that payment has not be«i made for the following: 
. Mort>;.i>;c pnyments due December 1, 1985 through February 1, 1986f plus late 
charges and foreclosure costs to date. 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 3 27.902,17 
By reason of such default, the Trustee under said Deed of Trust, does hereby 
declare ail annas secured thereby Immediately due and payable and has elected and 
does elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obllcttlora 
secured thereby. Dated this 10th day of February , 19 86 . 
TRUSTEE: FIRST INTERSTATE BANX OF UTAH, N.A. 
B Y : ^ f\$4*«l-
DONN CIARKIN 
Assistant Vice President 
(801) 264-5766 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this lQth day of February , 19 86 personally appeared before me, 
Dcnn Clarlcin, who being by ca duly sworn did say for himself, that, the said Dann 
Clarkin is Assistant Vice President of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 0? UTAH, N.A., as 
Trustee, with full authority of resolution of its Board of Directors and said 
Dcnn Clarkln acknowledged to me that oa^d corporation executed the saao as such 
Trustee. 
My CcnrrUoslcn Expires NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
i v U U* 
First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, N.A. 
Loan Recovery 
Sail lake City, UT 84142-0180 .MP**555! 
Diana Lady Dougan 
7. Dougan & Associates 
1220 South 1300 East, Suite #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
U M I M I , . I M . H U M M I I M , M I U 
First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, N.A. 
Loan Recovery 
Salt Lake City. UT 84142-0180 
A v 0>>*^ " TTn «: n n v i A f f ^ 1 USP0S1AU 
J. Lynn Dougan 
7. Dougan & Associates 
2120 South 1300 East, Suite #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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UKlblNAI. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. 
aka PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CO., a Utah Partnership, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
/ /}(s> 
,.<£.# v*^V 
Civil No, 9159 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
(MOTIONS) *" i i'$:§ r**^  
a, i e r k j
'^r tCu4 
BY. 
°^Jty C/cV1 •<£€ 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
3EF0RE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
April 19, 1989 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants 
Dougans, Beckers: 
MARY ANNE WOOD 
RICHIE HADDOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
HOLME; ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
GLENN C. HANNI 
VICTORIA K. KIDMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
License No. 220 
240 East 400 South, #A337 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing the 
respective motions in the matter of First Interstate Bank 
of Utah versus Park Meadows Investment Company, et al, 
case number 9159. 
Counsel, state your appearances for the record, if 
you will, please. 
MS. WOOD: Mary Ann Wood and Richie Haddock of Holme, 
Roberts & Owen on behalf of First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
Plaintiff. 
MR. HANNI: Glenn C. Hanni and Vickie Kidman on behalf 
of the Defendants Beckers and Dougans. 
THE COURT: Very well, counsel. Let me state for the 
record this matter is being heard in Salt Lake as an 
accommodation to counsel and the Court, based upon the 
difficulty we've had in trying to schedule the matter for 
hearing, and I understand that this is an agreeable time 
and location to here these respective motions. Mr. Hanni? 
MR. HANNI: It is. 
THE COURT: Ms. Wood? 
MS. WOOD: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. I will further state for the 
record that I have received and reviewed the various memo-
randa filed both in support of and in opposition to the 
[respective motions, and accordingly will ask you to focus 
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your arguments on your best points. 
Mr. Hanni, you were first with your filing, so you may 
proceed with your motion. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, if we could, your Honor, there 
is one preliminary matter. Last week, a week before hearing, 
Defendants Dougan and Becker filed an affidavit of Lynn 
Dougan which we believe should be stricken from the record. 
The affidavit on its face lacks foundation for the allega-
tion.; in the affidavit. Also, your Honor, it was filed two 
and a half months rafter the original motion was filed, a 
month and a half after the reply brief was filed, and merely 
a week before this hearing was scheduled, your Honor. 
Under those circumstances, I -- although I do not think 
it is dispositive of the Courtfs ruling in this case, we 
believe that to keep the record straight that that affidavit 
should be stricken. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to respond? 
MR. HANNI: There was a footnote in the very last 
brief that the bank filed that said when we made our argument 
that our statement in our brief that the bank had prepared 
the promissory note and the guaranty, there was a footnote 
in the bank's brief that said there's no record citation to 
that, so we filed a record citation showing from the 
jdeposition of Linda Frank, who is an assistant vice-president 
of the bank, that the note and the guaranty were prepared by 
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the bank in fact, and we -- just to supplement that, we 
filed an affidavit from Dougan to say he didn't prepare them 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, that is not what the affidavit 
says. The affidavit says he has personal knowledge that 
Walker Bank prepared the documents and Linda Frank's affidavili 
does not state -- I mean, Linda Frank's deposition does not 
state that Walker Bank prepared the documents in question. 
As I say, we don't think it's a big issue, but there is 
no foundation for hiss statement in his affidavit that to his 
personal knowledge, Walker Bank prepared those documents. 
There were other parties involved in the negotiations and 
we frankly don't know who prepared the note in question. 
We don't think that it is dispositive of this motion, but we 
do not think that the affidavit shows foundation for the 
allegations made and it was not filed in a timely manner. 
They certainly had adequate time to provide record citation 
for that particular representation in their brief. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I have been receiving, over the 
course of these several months, memoranda in support of and 
in opposition to the various motions dating all the way from 
February the 3rd to this morning, this morning being the 
time I received your, Ms. Wood, supplemental memorandum in 
[opposition. 
accordingly, this matter being heard today, I am not 
(persuaded that it's of such moment that the affidavit you're 
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referring to needs to or should be stricken. Your request 
is denied. 
Mr. Hanni, you may proceed. 
MR. HANNI: If it please the Court, I am -- first of 
all would like to make a motion that all of the depositions 
in this case be opened and an order entered publishing 
them. 
THE COURT: Is there objection to the motion to 
publish the depositions, counsel? 
MS. WOOD: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. HANNI: Your Honor, I, having appeared before you 
many times, am fully aware of the fact that youfve read 
all those briefs, so I do not intend to get into a detailed 
discussion of all the cases, nor of all the facts. I would 
like to zero in on just a few fundamental facts and then tell 
the Court basically whet our position is. 
As your Honor knows, Park City Racquet Club was the 
original maker of the note that is involved in this lawsuit 
when it borrowed $800,000 from Walker Bank in 1978, and at 
the same time, on the same day Beckers and Dougans signed 
the guaranty which is physically a part of the note. 
Another fact that is admitted and is not in dispute 
is that in May of 1982 the Racquet Club Corporation conveyed 
its interest in the Racquet Club property to its three 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
shareholders and officers and directors, Dougan, Becker 
and Ayers, and as a part of that, Dougan, Becker and Ayers 
assumed the obligation of the Racquet Club note and thereby 
stepped into the shoes of Park City Racquet Club as a 
maker of that note, so basically what we've got here, your 
Honor, is a promissory note and we've got a guarantor. 
Now, a guarantor, as we know, undertakes, if the maker 
of the note doesn't perform, to pay the note according to its 
tenor, according to its terms. 
Now, what are the terms of this note? One, it's for 
$800,000. Two, it's an installment note. Three, it calls 
for interest at 11 percent; and four, it says this note can 
not be accelerated by the holder without giving 15 days 
written notice of the intent to accelerate. 
Now, that's the kind of a obligation that Beckers and 
Dougans guaranteed. That's what they said they would pay 
if the maker didn't do it. We take the position in this case 
that the bank had an obligation, and there are three basic 
points. One is it's undisputed that notice v/as not given 
to the Racquet Club, Park City Racquet Club Corporation, 
who is the initial maker. It is undisputed that the 
alleged notice that they were going to accelerate was not 
given to Dougan and Becker who were makers of that note, and 
in that connection, your Honor, we ought to pause just for 
a moment and observe that the bank, as part of its argument 
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in this case, has said not only is Dougan and Becker liable 
to us because they1re guarantors, but they're liable to us 
because they acquired title in May of 1982 to the Racquet 
Club itself and because as a part of that, they assumed the 
obligation of the Racquet Club note and agreed to pay it, 
which is true, and they say that they are obligated to the 
bank independent, based on that assumption, from their 
obligation as guarantors, and we admit that. There's no 
question about it. 
But having said that, they step into the shoes of 
the maker and as such, they had an absolute right to be given 
notice as a condition precedent to the bank exercising its 
right of acceleration. It's without question. It's not in 
dispute. They did not get that notice. 
Now, we have a third point, and the third point is that 
the note and the guaranty should be construed together, and 
if they are construed together, then the bank was obligated 
to give Dougans and Beckers notice, their 15 days notice, 
before they accelerated in their capacity as guarantors, and 
it is without dispute that they did not do that. 
Now, how does the bank try to get around that undis-
puted fact? The only way it tries to get around it is to 
point to the deposition testimony of Lynn Dougan and that 
deposition testimony is quoted verbatim in our brief, and 
in that testimony Dougan was asked the question, well, after 
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you sold to Park Meadows, did you tell the bank to send the 
payment notices to Park Meadows? 
And Dougan said yes, they assumed -- Park Meadows and 
all of its partners assumed the Racquet Club note and they 
were responsible for those payments from that time on, and if 
you read that testimony, there isn't any question but what 
Dougan was talking about the payment notices, the notices 
that the mortgage company sends for their monthly install-
ments. He was not, your Honor, talking about another 
notice that is given in a different paragraph that's 
referred to in a different paragraph of the note, which is 
the 15-day acceleration notice. There isn!t any doubt. 
He did not say to the bank, "All notices, any notice of 
acceleration should be sent to Park Meadows, not to us." 
He was talking about the monthly payments. 
Now, the only other way now that the bank tries to 
get around their admitted failure to give notice is to point 
to the fact that the Racquet Club was dissolved in May of 
1982 and they did that belatedly. I got it at 5:30 last 
night, and your Honor got it this morning, and the clear 
import of the letter of counsel is that the bank's counsel 
didn't know anything about that, the Racquet Club dissolution, 
until they got the documents from us yesterday, and that 
just isn't so. 
I'm going to file a short reply to that thing I was 
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served with last night and that your Honor got this 
morning, because in Becker's deposition that was taken in 
May of 1988, almost a year ago, he was specifically asked 
what happened to the Racquet Club, and he said, "It was 
dissolved." 
And he was asked, "Have you got the dissolution 
papers?" 
And he said, "Yes." 
Those papers, your Honor, are a matter of record. 
They're up there at the Capitol and counsel could have 
gotten them. They're a matter of public record and all that 
counsel had to do was ask for them. This point wasn't even 
raised in their first brief and if they v/ere going to raise 
it, they certainly should have raised it at that time, not 
belatedly 5:30 in the evening before we're going to argue 
today, but the thing I'd like to focus on, your Honor, is that) 
the Utah Supreme Court in three different cases, Stallion 
Music and in Williamson -- two cases -- Supreme Court, Court 
of Appeals in Stacey Properties has talked about this 
acceleration clause, and the Supreme Court as well as the 
Court of Appeals in those three cases point out the fact 
that acceleration is kind of like a forfeiture. It's not 
a favorite of the law. It's something that will be enforced 
but if you're going to expect it to be enforced, you've got 
to follow it very strictly, and if you tried to -- if you 
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fail to follow that, what the instrument itself says, you 
don't effectively accelerate, and thatfs exactly what 
happened in this case. 
First of all, the people that were entitled to notice, 
the Racquet Club itself, the maker, original maker, Dougan 
and Becker as makers when they assumed it, and Dougan and 
Becker in their third capacity as guarantors admittedly 
never did get notice. The only one that got the notice was 
Park Meadows. 
Now, your Honor, if you look at what the Supreme 
Court says in those cases and what the Court of Appeals 
very recently said in Stacey Properties, they say accelera-
tion is like a forfeiture. it's not a favorite of the law, 
and if you're going to rely on an acceleration, you're going 
to have to do it strictly and if you don't do it, you fail. 
Now, that's point one. 
The next thing that we have to look at here, your 
Honor, is that the deed from the Racquet Club to Dougan, 
Becker and Ayers where they assumed that obligation and 
agreed to pay it was executed in May of 1982. It was 
recorded May 20th, 1982, up in the Summit County. The bank 
knew that Dougan and Becker had acquired title to the Racquet 
Club and that's in 1982. Because they consented to that --
and I want to call your Honor's attention to that fact becausd 
Exhibit 7, attached to the bank's brief, is the consent and 
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I specifically call that to your Honor's attention because 
it clearly says -- this is a document signed by the bank, 
Surety Life and First Federal -- clearly says that the 
bank consents to J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. Becker the 
Second for them to exchange their interest in the Racquet 
Club for some other things with Park Meadows Development 
Company, so they actually knew that this happened. 
Another thing, your Honor, Title 16, Chapter 10 of the 
Utah Code specifically provides that if you're going to 
dissolve a corporation on a voluntary basis, the directors 
and the officers, you've got to make provision to see to it 
that all the debts of the corporation are paid or adequately 
provided for. Section 16-10-82 of the Code specifically 
says it's a statutory mandate that if you're going to 
voluntarily dissolve, you're going to give notice to all 
your creditors that that's what you're doing so that they 
can be sure you don't get your dissolution until you've 
either paid all the debts or made adequate provision therefor,, 
and that's exactly why Dougan and Becker assumed the obliga-
tion, to make adequate provision for the Racquet Club note 
and that's why they stepped into the shoes of the maker, and 
I just say, your Honor, if the bank is going to rely on the 
fact that they assumed and that they're liable to the bank 
on this note because of that assumption, independent of the 
guaranty, then they certainly are entitled, they're not just 
11 
1
 saddled with all of the obligations, they're entitled to 
2
 all of the rights, and one of the rights of the maker is to 
3
 receive that 15 days notice before anybody can accelerate. 
4
 Your Honor, we've got another point here that we ought 
5
 to talk about. I think what I've said is dispositive of 
6
 this case. The bank admittedly did not give notice. It was 
1
 obligated to do it, and if it didn't do it, the result is to 
8 discharge the guarantor. 
9
 Now, the case, your Honor, that deals with that 
10 problem, and I think it's a controlling case in Utah, it's 
11 a Court of Appeals decision, it's the American Bonding case 
12 which we have cited in our brief. That was a case where a 
13 fellow by the name of Nelson and his wife Maureen were --
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Nelson was in a business and he required a surety company to 
put up a series of bonds for him on various construction 
jobs that he was getting, and he and his wife signed as 
indemnitors and said to the surety company, "Look, if you get 
called on any claims on any of these bonds, we'll indemnify 
you against any loss," and the significant part of that 
case, your Honor, is this. There were two provisions in it. 
One said that the indemnitors, Nelson and his wife, waived 
all notices of any kind, including the default of the maker 
of the note or the fact that there had been any claims made 
against the bank. I didn't mean maker of the note. I mean 
waived notice of the fact that claims had been made against 
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the bond. Now, that's right in the indemnity agreement, and 
generally speaking, that's the end of the story if you've 
got that kind of a specific provision in the instrument 
itself- But in that same instrument there was a provision 
that the indemnitors, if there was a claim made against the 
bond, they had a right to require the surety to litigate that 
before they'd be called on to pay. 
Now, the court, the trial court said here you've got 
two provisions that are in irreconcilable conflict. One 
says on the one hand chat you waived that kind of notice if 
there's a claim against the bond. The other one says that 
if there is a claim, you've got a right to require the surety 
to litigate it. 
Now, how are you going to require, be able to exercise 
that right unless you're given adequate notice? The trial 
court said -- and actually, in that case, your Honor, it's 
a pretty strong case, there was actual notice went out to the 
indemnitors, but it just wasn't adequate, wasn't adequate 
to put them on notice that claims had actually been made 
against the bond .so that Mrs, Nelson could intelligently 
exercise her right to decide whether she'd require that 
surety to litigate or not, so the court, trial court, held 
the fai.lu:,"n to give that notice -- and that's American 
Bonding again -- was fatal and that Mrs. Nelson was dis-
charged as a result of the failure to give notice. 
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Now, that's exactly the kind of situation that we've 
got here, your Honor. It was a condition precedent to the 
bank's right to accelerate that note that it give a 15-day 
notice, give them that much time to cure and bring up the 
installments that were in arrears as a condition to 
exercising the right to accelerate. 
Now, when you take what the Supreme Court said in 
Williamson and in Stallion Music, and when you take what the 
Court of Appeals said in Stacey Properties about how we 
view the acceleration clause as being not something that is 
a favorite in the law, and if you take what the Court of 
Appeals said in American Bonding where it said if you don't 
give notice to these indemnitors and the indemnitor's sort 
of like a guarantor or a surety, you're called on to pay if 
somebody else has to pay, and if you don't give that kind of 
a notice, it results in a discharge. 
Now, that's where we are, your Honor, and if we go one 
step further, now, we do have the note that clearly 
provides for the 15-day notice as a condition to acceleration, 
You do have the guaranty which is a physical part of the 
note. The guaranty itself refers to the note. In our brief 
we've cited two or three cases where if you've got two 
different instruments that are executed at the same time and 
that refer to each other, that you construe them together. 
You don't even need to reach that point, however, your Honor, 
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because the first two points, there isn't any doubt about 
them. The record is also clear here that the bank prepared 
these, the note and the guaranty, and the general rules of 
construction are that if there's any ambiguity, why, you 
construe it against the one that prepared them. The bank 
has not come forward with anything in this record that says 
they didn't prepare them. The only thing the bank has said 
in a footnote is that we didn't give a record citation when 
we made the statement in our brief that the bank did pay --
or did prepare them, so what we are urging your Honor to do 
is construe these two together and so you've got three 
different bases for finding that the bank did not perform the 
condition precedent; one, didn't give notice to the Racquet 
Club itself, the original maker; two, it didn't give notice 
to Becker and Dougan when they assumed the obligations of 
the note; and three, didn't give notice to Becker and Dougan 
in their capacity as guarantors as they were required to do 
if you construe the note and the guaranty together. 
Now, we submit, your Honor, based on that that the 
bank's acceleration was absolutely and totally in violation 
of what the Supreme Court has said you have to do if you're 
going to exercise your right to accelerate, and the result 
of that, if you don't meet the condition precedent as 
American Bonding teaches us, is that discharges the guarantor 
from any and all liability, and we submit, your Honor, that 
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the motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hanni, thank you. 
Ms. Wood? 
MS. WOOD: Thank you. Your Honor, Defendants Dougan 
and Becker move for summary judgment alleging, and as Mr. 
Hanni has argued, that First Interstate Bank of Utah failed t 
properly accelerate the Racquet Club note because it failed 
to give notice to the proper parties. 
In response, First Interstate Bank of Utah has itself 
moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration of this 
Court, based on the undisputed facts and the clear note of 
the clear law that the note was properly accelerated. 
Although there are facts clearly in dispute between 
the parties, the facts required to grant the motion which 
First Interstate Bank of Utah has brought are undisputed 
and this Court can properly conclude as a matter of law that 
First Interstate Bank of Utah properly accelerated the 
Racquet Club note. 
In any event, the factual disputes between the parties 
preclude the relief of which Defendants Dougan and Becker 
seek today. It's clear your Honor has read the documents 
and there's been enough paper filed in this case to fell a 
Lree of some considerable size, so I'll try not to duplicate 
what we have obviously exhaustively argued in our briefs, 
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1
 but I would like to emphasize some of the undisputed facts 
2 and the law we think which is critical and which mandates 
3
 the relief which First Interstate Bank of Utah seeks. 
4
 It's clear that in December 1978 Park City Racquet 
5 Club, Inc., a corporation, obtained an $800,000 loan from 
6
 I Walker Bank and executed a note, a copy of which is attached 
to several of the pleadings and I assume your Honor has 
before you; if not, I have a copy of it. The note was 
secured by a deed of trust on the Park City Racquet Club. 
The note was personally guaranteed by six individuals: 
Frederick Becker, Margaret Becker, Victor Ayers, Marion P. 
Ayers, J. Lynn Dougan and Diane Dougan. 
Two paragraphs of the note and the attached guaranty 
we think are critical to the Court's resolution of this 
issue. The first -- the paragraphs are not numbered, but I 
call your attention, your Honor, and I will come back to it 
later in argument, to the second full paragraph on page 2 
of the note which sets forth the obligation of "irst 
Interstate Bank of Utah to provide 15 days notice to the 
undersigned or the maker of the note prior to accelerating 
the note. I should also point out in that paragraph that 
at the bottom of that paragraph it says that, "As used herein, 
(written notice shall be effective as of the time the same is 
deposited in the United States Mail addressed to the last 
[known address of the undersigned, or at the time of actual 
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receipt thereof, if earlier. 
I then call your Honor's attention to the first full 
paragraph on page 3 in which the makers, sureties, guarantors J 
and endorsers waive demand, notice of protest, notice of 
dishonor and notice of nonpayment. I call your attention 
to the fact that the note is signed by the Park City Racquet 
Club Corporation by its president, and then following that 
signature is the guaranty which states, "For good and 
valuable consideration the receipt and sufficiency of 
which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and 
severally guarantee payment of the promissory note secured 
by the deed of trust and further guarantee payment of the 
entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the deed of trust 
securing the same." 
I should point out an inaccuracy in Mr. Hanni's 
representation of this guaranty. This is not a suretyship. 
This is not an obligation to perform according to the terms 
of the note. It's an obligation to perform if there is a 
default. They are not indemnitors. They are not sureties. 
They are guarantees and six separate individuals, different 
and distinct from the Park City Racquet Club Corporation 
signed the guaranty. 
On May 19th, 1982, the Park City Racquet Club 
transferred undivided one-third itnerests in the Racquet 
Club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers and the transfer was made 
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1 subject to a loan in favor of Walker Bank and Trust Company. 
2 Mr. Hanni, once again, called your Honor's attention to 
3 Exhibit 7 of our brief stating that it shows that the bank 
4
 approved of this transfer. This is not the case. Exhibit 7 
5 is a consent to exchange dealing with yet another assumption 
6 of this obligation. In fact, as Mr. Hanni knows, we have 
7 been unable to locate any written agreement by the bank to 
8 the transfer of the Racquet Club from the corporation to the 
9 individual shareholders, but the transfer was made and the 
10 shareholders assumed the obligation. 
11 Then later in August of 1982 Becker and Dougan 
12 exchanged their interests in the Racquet Club for certain 
13 lots in Park Meadows Development and to a partnership 
14 called Park Meadows Development and it is alleged by these 
15 parties and not disputed for purposes of this motion that 
16 Park Meadows Development assumed the obligations of the 
17 Racquet Club note. 
18
 By letter dated January 24th, 1986, and a copy of that 
19 letter is attached to Mr. Hannifs brief as well as ours and 
20 I have a copy of it, First Interstate Bank of Utah notified 
21 Enoch Richard Smith, a partner of Park Meadows Development, 
22 that the note was in default and that unless the defaults 
23 were cured within 15 days, that First Interstate Bank of 
24 Utah would take all legal action available to them, which 
25 included acceleration of the note. 
i q 
1 The parties do not dispute, and I quote from Mr, 
2 Hanni's brief in this regard, that it is certainly the 
3 position of Dougans and Beckers that Park Meadows Development 
4
 was in place of the maker and had the rights and duties of 
5 J a maker and that the reference to Park Meadows Development 
as a holder was an inadvertent clerical error, 
7 I It is undisputed, your Honor, that the maker of the 
8 I note at the time of the default was Park Meadows Development 
9 land that First Interstate Bank of Utah gave notice to that 
individual who was standing in the shoes of the maker. 
On February 10th, 1986, 17 days after notifying Park 
Meadows Development of its default, First Interstate Bank of 
Utah executed a statutory notice of default which formally 
accelerated the obligations on the Park Meadows -- on the 
Park City Racquet Club note and that particular notice of 
default went out to all interested parties, including all 
of the guarantors here. 
It is undisputed, your Honor, that under state law 
and the citation to the statutory reference in that regard 
is contained in our brief and I won't belabor your Honor 
with it, but that for a period of 90 days thereafter of the 
statutory notice of default, any of these parties would 
have had the opportunity to come in, pay the amount that was 
then due, and to reinstate the note according to the terms. 
Nobody came forward and offered to reinstate the Park City 
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Racquet Club note. 
Under these facts, the sole issue before this Court 
is whether First Interstate Bank of Utah properly gave 
notice to the parties entitled to notice prior to the 
acceleration of the note. The inescapable conclusion is 
that they did so. 
Let me call your attention back to the Park City 
Racquet Club note, your Honor, and in paragraph 2 on page 2 it| 
specifically provides that notice is to be given to the 
undersigned when a default has occurred and without belaboring 
this argumnent by reading the entire terms, it also says that 
without further notice, the holder can then exercise the 
rights available to him under the note, including the right 
to accelerate, so the only obligation which First Interstate 
Bank of Utah had at the time it accelerated this note was 
to give notice to the maker. It is undisputed that the 
maker at the time of the default was Park Meadows Development, 
not Park City Racquet Club, not Defendants Dougan and 
Becker, although they from time to time had assumed the 
obligations and stood in that position and could still be 
liable for the obligations under the Park City Racquet Club 
note. 
THE COURT: Well, you're not suggesting, are you, that 
Park Meadows Development was the original signatory on the 
note, are you? 
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MS. WOOD: No. I'm saying because by virtue of the 
assignment they stood in the shoes of the maker and, your 
Honor, this is -- that is simple hornbook contract law that 
when there is an assignment of an obligation, an assignment 
of all the unperformed obligations and an assignment of all 
the rights and by accepting the -- assuming the Park City 
Racquet Club note and accepting an assignment from Dougan 
and Becker, they stood in the shoes of the maker. 
There is no question, although Defendants Dougan and 
Becker have raised questions throughout this brief, as to 
who Undersigned1 is with respect to the note, and I invite 
your Honor to read the note. It uses the word "undersigned" 
in virtually every paragraph of the note. "The undersigned 
promises and agrees to pay." 
"The undersigned shall have the opportunity to prepay. 
In the last paragraph of the note, the -- immediately 
following the last paragraph of the note, the undersigned 
is clearly the Park City Racquet Club, a corporation. The 
individual guarantors do not sign under the note. Instead, 
they sign under the guaranty and it states in the guaranty, 
"For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned 
jointly and severally guarantee payment of the promissory 
note," and then the individuri signatures of the guarantors 
follow the guaranty, but there is no question that the 
22L 
1 undersigned throughout the note refers to the maker of the 
2 note. 
3 Despite that fact, Defendants Dougan and Becker argue 
4
 that there is an ambiguity and that somehow the undersigned 
5 refers not to the maker of the note when used in the note, 
6 but refers to the guarantors themselves. It is clear, how-
7 ever, your Honor, that a guaranty obligation is separate 
8 and apart from the obligation under a note. Different 
9 parties executed the notes, they had different rights and 
10 obligations. The guarantor, the guarantors on the other 
11 hand, took on themselves separate obligations. They were 
12 not entitled to the rights and duties of the maker at the 
13 time the note was executed. 
14 You have two separate groups of people: Park City 
15 Racquet Club, who was the maker of the note, the individual 
16 guarantors who guaranteed the obligation. That's clear on 
17 the face of the document. So the question is, who was the 
18 maker? Who stood in the shoes of the maker on the day that 
19 the default occurred? 
20 Defendants Dougan and Becker assert quite vociferously, 
21 and we do not dispute for purposes of this motion, that the 
22 Park City Racquet Club note was assumed on two different 
23 occasions. It was assumed first by Defendants Dougan and 
24 Becker themselves, and then it was assigned to and assumed 
25 by Park Meadows Development. Consequently, as Dougans and 
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Beckers concede and as I read in their brief, the maker of 
the note, the individual staying in the position of the 
maker of the note the date of default was not Park City 
Racquet Club, was not Defendants Dougan and Becker them-
selves, but was Park Meadows Development. 
According to the Restatement of Contracts, Section 
323, unless the language or the circumstances indicate, 
to the contrary, an assignment for security, an assignment 
of all the contract, or of all rights under the contract, 
or an assignment of the same in general terms is an 
assignment of the assignor's rights and a delegation of 
his unperformed duties under the contract. 
When Park City Racquet Club assigned the note to 
Dougans and Beckers, the Dougans and Beckers became the 
maker and if the world had stopped on that date, there is 
no question that if the bank had received adequate notice, 
which therefs a question of whether or not they did, they 
would bo obligated to provide notice to Dougans and 
Beckers. 
However, the world did not freeze at that moment. 
Dougans and Beckers in turn assigned the Park City Racquet 
Club note to Park Meadows Development and at that time, 
according to the restatement, they assigned all of their right) 
under the contract, which included the right to receive noticj 
As a result, once a party to a contract has notice 
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that his counterpart has assigned its rights, that party 
must perform its obligations only to the counterpart assignee 
First Interstate Bank of Utah would itself have been in 
difficulty if instead of giving notice to the party it had 
notice had become the maker, Park Meadows Development, it 
had instead had given that notice to Park City Racquet Club 
Corporation or to the Dougans and Beckers. 
The argument which Mr. Hanni has made today would 
multiply the obligations of an obligor under a contract 
simply by virtue of an assignment and the law is quite clear 
and we have cited cases to that effect in our brief, that 
you can not by virtue of assignment multiply the obligations 
of an obligor under the contract. 
Let me just take an example which will show the 
illogic of Mr. Hannifs position. If instead of there 
having been three assignments and assumptions there had 
been ten in this case, then their logic would be that the 
bank would have an obligation to give notice of default to 
eleven former obligors under the note rather than simply to 
the last one. That is clearly not the law. By virtue of 
the assignment which Defendants Dougan and Becker themselves 
were the impetus for, they can not require the bank to give 
notice more than once. The bank is only obligated to give 
notice to the person standing in the shoes of the maker at 
the date the default occurred and that is exactly what 
-25-
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happened. 
Now, unfortunately, one of the things that happens 
when you assume an obligation is that you nev^r really get 
rid of it. You can assign your rights under a contract and 
your unperformed duties, but if the party to whom you assign 
them, in the absence of a novation, does not perform, then 
you are still required to step up to the plate and perform an<p 
that is the position which Dougans and Beckers are in and 
that, once again, is simply hornbook contract law dealing 
with the nature of an assumption and with the nature of 
assignments. 
Dougans and Beckers, when they took the assumption* 
from the corporation, promised to pay the bank the obligation^ 
Now they assigned the unperformed obligations and their 
rights under the contract to Park Meadows Development, but 
when Park Meadows Development did not perform, then, unfor-
tunately, Dougans and Beckers are still separately liable 
on their assumption agreement in addition to their guaranty, 
but that's not dispositive of this motion today. 
The significant thing for purposes of this motion today 
is that the bank provided notice, the written notice required 
by the note to the maker, the person who stood in the shoes of\ 
the maher, on the date that the default occurred. 
Now, let's then turn to the issue of whether these 
parties, Dougan and Becker, were entitled not as makers of 
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the note but as guarantors of the note, to notice. It's 
hornbook law that a guaranty is a contract and that obliga-
tions of the guarantor are to be interpreted according to 
the terms of the contract, the guaranty itself. Notice of 
the maker's default is not required unless?; the terms of the 
guaranty require that notice. 
Letfs turn again to the terms of the guaranty which 
are contain J on page 3 of the note and the guaranty. "For 
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency 
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and 
severally guarantee payment of the promissory note secured 
by the deed of trust and further guarantee payment of the 
entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the deed of trust 
securing the same." 
Nowhere in that unconditional guaranty do Dougans and 
Beckers reserve for themselves the right to receive notice 
of the maker's default. In the absence of a contract term 
entitling them to notice, they, the bank, was not required 
to give them notice as guarantors. 
To the extent that the note Itself addresses the 
(question of notice to the guarantors, it likewise does not 
prequire notice because the first paragraph on the last page 
pf the note says, "The makers, sureties, guarantors and 
Endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
protest, demand, notice of protest, notice of dishonor and 
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notice of nonpayment." 
Now, all of those terms prior to notice of nonpayment 
have very special meanings within the law that do not 
include this notice of right to cure or notice of default, 
but if notice of nonpayment means anything, it means notice 
that your obligor has not paid under the obligation and that'f 
precisely what happened in this case. 
The individuals to whom the Racquet Club and Dougans 
and Beckers assigned their rights and obligations did not pay, 
The ban1, -|Mve them notice and an opportunity to cure as 
required by the contract. The guarantors themselves, within 
the four corners of their guaranty, were not entitled to 
the notice which they seek. 
Now, the argument of Mr. Hanni is that these two 
documents have to be read together, and since the note 
required notice to the maker, then the guaranty must be read 
to require notice to the guarantor. 
THE COURT: By two documents, you're referring, are 
jyon not, to the guaranty and the note? 
MS. WOOD: That's right, that these two obligations 
[evidenced by separate parties have to be read together, and 
rche only way to read them together is to say well, the 
[Language of the guaranty must be precisely the same as the 
(language of the note. That would be ridiculous. 
It might be an argument that would make some sense if 
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'che language of the note specifically required notice to the 
guarantor and then the guaranty itself was silent on the 
issue, but instead, you have a notice required to the maker 
under the note and no notice required to the guarantor of 
the maker's default. 
There is absolutely no reason to read these documents 
together to require the terms of the guaranty to be 
identical to the terms of the note. In fact, the law is 
quite clear that an obligation of guaranty is entirely 
separate than the obligation of the note, and although Mr. 
Hanni has cited hundreds of cases in his brief to say that 
you have to read two instruments together if it makes sense, 
none of those cases fit this. Therefs not a single case that 
he cites that says you have to read the terms of the guaranty 
identical to the terms of the note. 
It would make no sense. Then you might as well have 
the guarantors become makers of the note, and it's clear 
that they undertake very separnfce•and very different 
obligations and these guarantors were not undertaking the 
principal obligation to pay this note; they were simply 
undertaking the obligation to perform in the event of a 
default. 
Moreover, the cases which he cites with regard to 
reading two instruments together always say when they're 
executed as part of the same transaction and involve the same 
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parties. Here it's quite clear on the face of the document 
you have separate parties. You have a note executed by a 
corporation. You have a guaranty executed by six separate 
individuals, some of whom were not principals in the 
corporation, so all of that case law is simply inappropriate 
for this argument. 
Now, the note is clear on its face. It requires 
notice only to the undersigned, the maker. The guaranty is 
clear on its face. It only requires -- it does not require 
notice at all of the maker's default. So all of the 
presumptions which Mr. Hanni attempts to imply in this case 
are completely irrelevant and that's why we don't think it 
makes any difference, for purposes of this motion, who 
drafted this particular document. Presumptions are only 
relevant if there's an ambiguity and these documents are 
clear on their face. They are not susceptible of an 
ambiguous interpretation that would give the guarantors 
right to notice on the one hand and take it away from them 
[on the other hand, and that is why, in part, why the 
^American Bonding case is such an inappropriate analogy here. 
Moreover, I should point out that our analysis of 
|Ame.-;.can Bonding -- I- won't take the time with the Court 
tocVy, but on page 2 6 at footnote 14 there's an exhaustive 
[treatment of that case and why it does not fit. 
Moreover, I should point out that the American Bonding 
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case was an indemnity case and not a guaranty case and that 
the ambiguity was within the same document, not within 
separate documents, and it simply does not control the 
resolution of this case as Mr. Hanni would have you believe. 
Now, let me just for a minute turn to an issue which 
was not argued, but the Dougans and Beckers have from time 
to time asserted in their briefs that the notice was also 
inadequate, not only because it went to the wrong party but 
because it didn't provide for 15 days notice. 
Your Honor, the language of the note that we already 
pointed out specifically says, and I quote it, that as used 
herein, written notice shall be effective as of the time the 
same is deposited in the United States Mail. A copy of the 
notice which is attached to Mr. Hanni.'s brief is dated 
January 24th and asks for cure before -- let's see, 
February 7th. If you count mailing, the date of mailing as 
one of the days, because it's deemed to be given on the date 
it's mailed, from January 24th to February 7th is exactly 
15 days. Mr. Hanni argues that you can't count the date of 
hailing and so it's at the most, 14 days. We think that that 
is a hypertechnical, illogical and totally unimportant 
(argument. 
In point of fact, 15 days of notice, according to the 
terms of the note, was given. The important factor is that 
no attempt was made to accelerate the note until 17 days in 
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any event, so it's clear that an appropriate period for cure 
was given to the maker of the note. 
Moreover, it is also clear that the acceleration 
occurred by virtue of a notice of default that went to all 
of the obligors, including the guarantors here, and that 
nobody ever stepped up to the plate and offered to pay the 
obligation. 
Now, this would be a different case if the bank had 
waved somebody off who came up with the $26,000 that was in 
default and said, "Herefs the money," and the bank said, 
"Wait a minute, you're too late. We've accelerated." That's 
not what happened here. 
The bank waited for months and the statutory — under 
our law, the statutory notice of default v/ould require them 
to wait an additional 90 days after giving notice of the 
acceleration before they could in fact sell the property 
and at that time for a period of 90 days any of these 
guarantors that come here and complain about one day could 
have come in and attempted to cure the default, but they 
did not and so as a result, whether you're counting 14 days, 
whether you're counting 15 days, whether you're counting 17 
days, they had an adequate opportunity to cure and they 
did not do so. 
Finally, Defendants Dougan and Becker assort that 
because of this hypertechnical failure, this one day that 
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they allege failure to give notice, that they are excused 
from their entire obligation which they undertook under 
an $800,000 note. That simply is not the law, your Honor, 
and we have cited law in our brief that shows that if there 
is a problem with the notice, that the only relief that the 
guarantors would be entitled to is relief based on any harm 
which they have incurred* 
As a result of their failure at any time to come 
forward and offer to make up the payment that was in 
default at the time the note was accelerated, it would be 
exceedingly difficult for them to establish that they had 
been harmed in any respect by any alleged defect in the 
notice which was given by First Interstate Bank of Utah. 
Consequently, your Honor, First Interstate Bank of 
Utah gave the party who was entitled to the notice of 
default, the person standing in the shoes of the maker at 
the time of the default, Park Meadows Development, a 15-day 
notice. In fact, they did not accelerate for 17 days after 
giving that notice. 
The guarantors clearly, unambiguously, on the face of 
their guaranty obligation were not entitled to notice of the 
maker's default prior to the acceleration, but even if your 
Honor were completely unpersuaded by any of my arguments and 
(were completely unwilling to award First Interstate Bank of 
,Utah summary judgment at this tine, summary judgment can not 
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be awarded to Defendants Dougan and Beckers because of one 
very important factual dispute between the parties and that 
involves the deposition testimony that was attached to our 
brief of Lynn Dougan in which Mr. Dougan states that he 
walked away from the Racquet Club obligation and that he 
said to send the notices to First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
Mr. Hanni says it is absolutely clear from that 
testimony that what they meant was coupons, that we were 
not giving up our right to receive notice of default. 
First of all, they didnft have a right to receive 
notice of default either under the terms of the guaranty or 
under the terms of the note, but if they did, that testimony 
of Mr. Dougan raises a factual question about what notices 
he told the bank to send elsewhere and waiver by definition 
is a question of fact and that will have to await determina-
tion by trial. That particular factual inquiry, however, 
your Honor, does not prevent First Interstate Bank of Utah 
from being entitled to summary judgment at this time. 
It is undisputed we gave notice. The dates of the 
notice that we gave are undisputed. The terms of the note 
are undisputed. The individual who received the notice stood 
in the shoes of the maker at the date of default, and we 
are entitled to summary judgment stating that we properly 
accelerated the Park City Racquet Club Note. 
Thank you. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Wood. 
2 Mr. Hanni? 
3 MR. HANNI: If it please the Court, the position here 
4 the bank is taking is this: They are taking the position 
5 that if they give notice to the person who is then primarily 
6 obligated to pay the note that they're going to accelerate, 
7 that that's all they've got to do. 
3 Now, your Honor, that's perfectly fine if they only 
9 want to look at that person, if they only want to look to 
10 Park Meadows, and that's exactly the v/ay this bank conducted 
H itself over a period of years. The exchange was in 1982 
12 where Dougan and Becker exchanged the Racquet Club to Park 
13 Meadows for some lots, and if your Honor will remember, on 
14 our last motions in here we talked about the fact that the 
15 bank did a workout agreement with everybody. The bank put a 
16 big blanket mortgage for several millions of dollars on the 
17 Racquet Club. They did a lot of things and that created a 
18 fact issue as to whether or not anybody could step up to the 
19 plate and pay anything off. 
20 Dougan and Becker, if your Honor will recall, ordered 
21 a title report and they see all these blanket mortgages on 
22 the Racquet Club. They see that the bank has put them into 
23 involuntary bankruptcy. They see lots of things that told 
24 them they couldn't step up to bat and pay off the obliga-
25 tion. Those are fact issues and your Honor's already ruled 
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about that. 
Now we're talking about a different thing today. We 
are not talking about whether Dougan and Becker had the 
financial condition to step up to bat or whether the title 
of the Racquet Club was such that it would have deterred 
anybody from trying to step up to bat. 
It isn't a question of curing the default. It's a 
question of whether the bank performed a condition precedent 
to its right to accelerate that note. 
Now, if you follow the bank's argument here, the bank 
is saying to your Honor, "We've got the Racquet Club, we've 
got Dougan and Becker who have assumed this indebtedness, 
and we got Park Meadows. Now, all we got to do is give notic^ 
to Park Meadows who is then the primary person that's liable, 
and if we do that, then we have effectively and legally 
accelerated that note." 
But, your Honor -- and they're absolutely right if 
they want to just look to Park Meadows, but if they want to 
keep Dougan and Becker on the string as being the immediate 
predecessor in interest and if they wanted to keep the 
Racquet Club Corporation on the string and liable as the 
initial maker, then they've got to accord those people who 
are parties to that note the rights that that note gives them 
They can't say, "You're saddled with all of the obligations 
but you're deprived of all of the rights," and they haven't 
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cited one case that says that. Not one. 
And we say to your Honor that Dougan and Becker, when 
they assumed that note and stepped into the shoes of the 
maker, they had a right to say to themselves, "Nobody, 
nobody can accelerate that note and hold us on it v/ithout 
giving us 15 days notice," and that didnft happen. 
Now, the Racquet Club itself can say the same thing. 
Dougan and Becker as guarantors, in their capacity as 
guarantors, could say, "The note that we guaranteed 
requires that 15 days notice be given to everybody up the 
line that you intend to hold liable on that note." 
Now, your Honor, there are numerous transactions that 
occurred. People buy homes, they buy all kinds of property, 
and they sign an initial note and a mortgage. That initial 
note says if you1re going to accelerate, you've got to give 
so much notice as a condition precedent to doing it. Then 
they sell to somebody else. Yes, they expect that somebody 
else to take care of the obligation. That somebody else 
is the primary obligor, and the one upstream is the 
secondary. Stands kind of like a guarantor or a surety or 
whatever you want to call them, and then if that person sells 
to another one, then you got another primary obligor and 
you got another one on downstream if that person in turn 
sells. And the holder of that note can look at all of them 
and he can say, "If the one thatfs primarily liable doesn't 
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pay, everybody in between, you're still liable to me as the 
holder." 
But each of those holders have certain rights. They 
don't just have obligations, and that's exactly the position 
the bank is taking here, that all they got is obligations, 
no rights at all, and I'd just say to your Honor, when 
somebody steps into the shoes of a maker, which Becker and 
Dougan did in this case by assuming that Racquet Club note, 
they got all the rights of that maker if the bank as the 
holder wants to accelerate and wants to hold them liable 
on that note and that's the point that we make. 
Yes, as to Park Meadows they gave notice. But, your 
Honor, I want to call your attention to the fact that their 
notice wasn't even adequate to Park Meadows. What they're 
trying to argue here is they send the note -- or they date 
their notice January 24, 1986, and that notice says you're 
delinquent three installments, you owe us $27,000. You get 
it into our office no later than February 7th. 
Now, the bank admits in their brief, your Honor, 
that in computing, time you got to, if you're going to count 
[day one, the day of the act, then you can not count the last 
day. You can't count both day one and the last day. You 
just don't compute time that way, whether it be construing 
la statute or contract or whatever, and I'd like to just read 
k/hat they said on page 10 of their initial brief. They say, 
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"We devoted a long time developing two propositions: One, 
a creditor must comply with the express terms of an accele-
ration clause to accelerate a debt; and two, in computing 
a time period, a Court includes either the first or the last 
day of the applicable time period, but not both. First 
Interstate does not disagree with either proposition." 
Nov, if you exclude January 24, which is the way you 
normally do, if that was the day the notice was mailed, 
there's nothing that says it was mailed on that day in this 
record. It's dated that day and we're assuming for purposes 
of the argument that it got into the mail that day. But 
there's nothing here from the bank that tells us that. 
But assuming it did, you would exclude that day and if 
you include February 7, that's 14 days. That is not the 15-
day notice to cure, and that -- so we say if all else fails, 
they haven't even legally accelerated the note as to Park 
Meadows, and on that ground, your Honor, the guarantors 
should be discharged. 
Now, they make one other argument here, your Honor. 
They say that the note itself -- and I'd like to just read 
the -- I'd just like to read the language. They are saying 
that there was a waiver of nonpayment. Now, let's keep 
in mind, your Honor, what we're talking about here: non-
payment. Quite often somebody that owes a note will get 
behind on a payment and the holder will send out a notice and 
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say, "Hey, you haven't made your payment." Yes, they're 
waiving that sort of a notice, your Honor, because you 
wouldn't want a guarantor to be able to say if a maker of a 
note got behind and missed an installment or two and the 
bank says they don't want to accelerate; all they're doing 
is saying hey, you're behind on your payments, can you please 
bring them up? 
Now, that's the kind of waiver they're talking about 
in that particular portion of the note. They are not talking 
about the waiver of the 15-day notice as a condition 
precedent to the right of acceleration. 
One other thing that counsel argues here is that you 
shouldn't be construing the guaranty and the note together. 
I'd just like to point out, your Honor, under Stacey 
Properties, which is our latest Court of Appeals case, that 
one involved a promissory note and — with an acceleration 
clause in it and it involved a separate letter agreement. 
The note provided for a certain notice if you're going to 
accelerate. The letter agreement said you have -- the obligoij-
on the note, you have the right to offset if certain 
conditions occur. The Court of Appeals said, "We're going 
to construe these together," and that's the Stacey 
Properties case, and they found in that case that the 
obligor on that obligation had a right to offset and that he 
had exercised his right to offset, so the holder of the note 
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on the other hand was unable to accelerate because theirs 
was no default. He'd exercised the right given in the 
letter agreement to work an offset. 
We submit, your Honor, we've labored this long and 
hard and I think that we have adequately on the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that if they want to hold these people 
liable upstream from Park Meadows, they've got to comply 
with those, the terms of the note. 
They didn't comply with the condition precedent. We're 
not dealing here with the question today about whether or not 
anybody stepped up to bat to cure the default. That's a 
fact issue if we have to try this case to a jury as to why 
that didn't happen, but the real narrow focus is, did they 
give notice as they were legally obligated to do before 
they got accelerated, and the answer is no, without question 
they did not, and even as to Park Meadows they only gave 
14 days notice. They did not give 15. 
We submit the motion should be granted. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hanni. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I'm prepared for a brief 
rebuttal, but if you choose to cut me off --
THE COURT: You may rebut briefly, Ms. Wood, I suppose, 
given the fact that you both have motions pending here, but 
at some point we v/ill have to make a determination as to 
who's going to have the last word. 
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MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I'm willing to take two 
minutes, if I can, of the last word. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MS. WOOD: Okay. Your Honor, I really only want to 
make a couple of points. One of them, the suretyship 
argument which Mr. Hanni has made is simply not the law. 
It's true, a ho.te, this note could be assigned and assumed 
many times. There is not an obligation to give any 
individual notice under the terms of the Racquet Club note 
or under the law except the person standing in the shoes of 
the maker at the date of default, absent a contract provision 
to inquire notice. 
The Dougans and Beckers, when they transferred their 
obligation to Park Meadows Development, could have extracted 
a promise from Park Meadows Development to give them notice 
of the default. They could have gone to the bank and said 
;wefre doing this, we still want notice of default. They 
could have asked for notice of default to be included in 
their guaranty. They did not do so. The law does not imply 
that requirement under these circumstances, and they have 
Icited absolutely no case law to the contrary. 
Second of all, with regard to the 15 days or 14 days, 
bnce again, we think that's a nonissue because acceleration 
did not occur until 17 days and the only thing that this 
provision of the note says you have to give notice 15 days 
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before you do anything, and then you otherwise don't have 
to give notice, but it is an unremarkable proposition that 
the law generally does not count the first day or the last 
day. That does not change the fact that these parties by 
contract changed that particular provision and they provided 
that notice was deemed to be given on the date it was mailed, 
so 15 days in fact was given. 
Your Honor, finally, the waiver arguments with regard 
to the Dougans only create factual issues which preclude Mr. 
Hanni getting the relief which he seeks, but does not 
preclude First Interstate Bank of Utah from being given 
summary judgment on the issue that they properly accelerated 
this note by giving notice to the person standing in the 
shoes of the maker at the date of default. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT 
MR. HANNI 
THE COURT 
All right. Thank you, Ms. Wood. 
We'll submit it, your Honor. 
Thank you. So it's clear on the record, 
Mr. Hanni, I received what I deemed to have been a courtesy 
copy of your reply memorandum in opposition to the Plaintifffs| 
motion for partial summary judgment. However, while it 
appears to be a photocopy of your signature, there is no 
courtesy copy stamp on the document. I presume that it is 
indeed a courtesy copy. 
MR. HANNI: I hope so, your Honor. It should have had 
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the stamp on it. The one we filed was not a bound one, so 
I'm sure this has to be a courtesy copy. Should have had 
the stamp, however. 
THE COURT: In the event that this is indeed intended 
as your original, we will see to it that it gets to the 
Clerk's office. 
As I stated at the outset, counsel, I have had 
considerable time to review the respective briefs in this 
matter and I will say that in my view, this is somewhat of 
a complex issue, or at least it has been made that way, 
and I will furthermore say that while I appreciate counsels1 
observations that the matter is in several particulars 
undisputed, if that is the case, why are we all here? 
Obviously, there is a serious contested dispute and I 
will commend counsel for what I think to have been both a 
very scholarly briefing of the issues, and presentation. 
Nevertheless, it is my view that the circumstances in this 
case dictate that I determine that the Dougans and Beckers 
were entitled to notice and that they did not receive notice 
in any of their respective capacities vis-a-vis the bank. 
I must, in making that ruling, rely upon and will 
therefore rely upon the authorities cited in the moving 
party's briefs. 
I am persuaded that the motion for summary judgment 
filed on behalf of the Defendants Dougans and Beckers is well 
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taken and is therefore granted. 
Furthermore, however, it is my observation that the 
notice that was sent is not in strict compliance with the 
bankfs documentation incident to the need to send and in 
the particulars in how the notice is sent. 
While it may be true, for purposes of argument, that 
that determination is hypertechnical, I am persuaded that 
in a matter of this magnitude, the bank must, being the 
drafter of the document upon which all of the parties here 
must rely, is expected at a minimum to comply with the 
terms of its own documents, particularly when it relates to 
something as serious as an acceleration of an obligation of 
this type. 
The motion of Dougans and Beckers, therefore, is 
granted. 
The Plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment is denied. 
Mr. Hanni, you prepare the appropriate order and 
submit it to this Court for execution. 
Court will be in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
• * * 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No. 
220, and one of the official court reporters of the state 
of Utah; that on the 19th day of April, 1989, I attended 
the within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings 
had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand 
proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, and the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 45, inclusive, 
constitute a full, true and correct account of the same, 
to the best of my ability. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day of 
April, 1989, 
^(UC&L M Jxst/c&f. c C£-\ 
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
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ADDENDUM XVIII 
ORDER DECEMBER 8, 1988 
Alll 
NO.. 
FILED 
GLENN C. HANNI #A1327 
MARK J. TAYLOR #4455
 c„ 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants- -. 
Beckers and Dougans 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
• :00,0 
r*T ^ounry 
0:-;- ZlA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CO., a Utah partnership, 
MARGARET M. BECKER, VICTOR R. 
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, 
J. LYNN DOUGAN, DIANA LADY 
DOUGAN, and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a banking 
corporation with its 
principal place of business 
in Utah, 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER II, 
MARGARET M. BECKER, J. LYNN 
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, 
Third Party Defendants 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 9159 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
1 "V", 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ENOCH 
RICHARD SMITH, 
Third Party Defendants 
vs. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff. 
On November 28, 1988, plaintiff's motion for partial 
summary judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, Mary Anne Q. 
Wood and Richie D. Haddock of the firm of Holme Roberts & Owen. 
Defendants Dougans and Beckers were represented by Glenn C. Hanni 
and Mark J. Taylor of the firm of Strong & Hanni. Defendants Park 
Meadows Investment and Third-Party Defendants were represented by 
Jeffrey Robinson of the firm of Moyle & Draper. Defendant Vic Ayers 
was not present in person nor by counsel. The court having heard 
arguments of counsel and having considered the records and files 
of this case, and it appearing to the court that material issues 
of fact exist in this case, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is 
hereby denied. 
Dated this _#^Tday of hbo , 1988. 
BY THE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid this Qc\ day of 
November, 1988, to: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
Suite 900 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Jeff Robinson 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Attorneys for Defendant Park Meadows 
Investment Co., a/k/a Park Meadows 
Development Co., 
J. Michael Kelly 
Kent H. Murdock 
Enid Greene 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0358 
Attorneys for Defendant 
First Security Bank of Utah 
David R. Olson 
Charles P. Sampson 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
174 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
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ADDENDUM XIX 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
A115 
No. 
F I L E D 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539 
Richie D. Haddock #4585 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 521-580CT' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. ) 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., a/k/a ) 
PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO., ) 
a Utah partnership, et al., ) Civil No. 9159 
Defendants. ) 
) Judge J. Dennis 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, et al., ) Frederick 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and ) 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, ) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 
Third-Party Defendant 
!»<V 1.6 1989 
Clerk of Summit County ' > 
<*- — 
M. 
Deputy C M 
NOTICE IS hereby given pursuant to Rule 3 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, that Plaintiff First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., hereby appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah from the Order Denying Plaintiffs7 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered on December 22, 
1988, and the Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint rendered by the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of 
Utah, and entered on May 5, 1989. A copy of the December 22, 
1988, Order and a copy of the May 5, 1989, Judgment are hereto 
attached. 
DATED this /£, day of May, 1988. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal this ll/^h day of May, 1989, to 
the following: 
Hardin A. Whitney, Esq. 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
Attorneys for Park Meadows Investment and 
Third-Party Defendants 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Kent H. Murdock, Esq. 
Enid Greene, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Attorneys for First Security Bank 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Victor Ayers 
50 Thayne Canyon Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson 
Attorneys for Victor R. Ayers 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1680 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Mark J. Taylor, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Becker and Dougan 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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